巴菲特致股东的信（1983年）附录：商誉及其摊销：规则与现实（上）

Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities

This appendix deals only with economic and accounting Goodwill – not the goodwill of everyday usage. For example, a business may be well liked, even loved, by most of its customers but possess no economic goodwill. (AT&T, before the breakup, was generally well thought of, but possessed not a dime of economic Goodwill.) And, regrettably, a business may be disliked by its customers but possess substantial, and growing, economic Goodwill. So, just for the moment, forget emotions and focus only on economics and accounting.

商誉及其摊销：规则与现实

这篇附录探讨的只是经济和会计商誉，而不是日常所说的声誉。比如，一个公司可能被大多数客户喜欢，甚至热爱，但是却不具有任何经济商誉。(AT&T 在分拆前总的来说声誉很好，但没有一分钱的经济商誉。)遗憾的是，一个公司可能并不被其客户所喜欢，但却具有大量，而且不断增长的经济商誉。所以，就目前而言，让我们先忘掉情绪，只关注于经济和会计。

When a business is purchased, accounting principles require that the purchase price first be assigned to the fair value of the identifiable assets that are acquired. Frequently the sum of the fair values put on the assets (after the deduction of liabilities) is less than the total purchase price of the business. In that case, the difference is assigned to an asset account entitled "excess of cost over equity in net assets acquired". To avoid constant repetition of this mouthful, we will substitute "Goodwill".

当一个公司被并购时，会计准则要求并购金额首先分配给所并购的可确认资产的公允价值。资产的公允价值总和(经扣除负债后)经常是少于公司的并购总价格。在这种情况，这两者的差异就被分配到一个资产帐户，称为“超出并购的净资产权益的额外成本”。为了避免不断的重复这一很长的说法，我们将用“商誉”来替代之。

Accounting Goodwill arising from businesses purchased before November 1970 has a special standing. Except under rare circumstances, it can remain an asset on the balance sheet as long as the business bought is retained. That means no amortization charges to gradually extinguish that asset need be made against earnings.

在 1970 年 11 月以前购买公司所产生的商誉有不同的处理。除非在极少的情况下，只要仍然持有所购买的公司，商誉就可以存在于资产负债表上。这意味着不需针对盈利核算摊销费用而逐渐削减这项资产。

The case is different, however, with purchases made from November 1970 on. When these create Goodwill, it must be amortized over not more than 40 years through charges – of equal amount in every year – to the earnings account. Since 40 years is the maximum period allowed, 40 years is what managements (including us) usually elect. This annual charge to earnings is not allowed as a tax deduction and, thus, has an effect on after-tax income that is roughly double that of most other expenses.

在 1970 年 11 月以后的并购就不同了。当并购产生商誉，这些商誉必须在不超过 40 年的时间里进行摊销。每年以相等的摊销费用减少利润帐户。由于 40 年是所允许的最长时间，这也是管理层(包括我们自己)通常选用的。这项减少利润的年度费用不允许被用来抵扣税，所以具有一般费用大约两倍的税后收益影响。

That’s how accounting Goodwill works. To see how it differs from economic reality, let’s look at an example close at hand. We’ll round some figures, and greatly oversimplify, to make the example easier to follow. We’ll also mention some implications for investors and managers.

这就是会计商誉的运作方式。为了揭示会计商誉与经济商誉的区别，让我们看一个手边的例子。我们将一些数字四舍五入，并极大的简化，以让这个例子容易理解。我们还将提及一些对投资者和经理人的影响。

Blue Chip Stamps bought See’s early in 1972 for $25 million, at which time See’s had about $8 million of net tangible assets. (Throughout this discussion, accounts receivable will be classified as tangible assets, a definition proper for business analysis.) This level of tangible assets was adequate to conduct the business without use of debt, except for short periods seasonally. See’s was earning about $2 million after tax at the time, and such earnings seemed conservatively representative of future earning power in constant 1972 dollars.

Blue Chip 于 1972 年初以 2500 万美元购买了 See's 糖果。当时，See's 有大约 800 万的净有形资产。在整个讨论中，应收帐款将被归于有形资产，这个定义对商业分析是适合的。当时这个水平的有形资产足够不用债务而运营业务，季节性短期的因素除外(圣诞节促销)。See's 当时的税后盈利是 200 万美元，这似乎保守的代表了以1972 年不变美元计的未来盈利能力。

Thus our first lesson: businesses logically are worth far more than net tangible assets when they can be expected to produce earnings on such assets considerably in excess of market rates of return. The capitalized value of this excess return is economic Goodwill.

因此，我们学到的第一课：当企业预期从这些有形资产上产生的收益远高于一般市场回报率时，从逻辑上讲，公司的价值远远超过了有形资产净值。这种市场回报的超额收益被资本化就是经济商誉。

In 1972 (and now) relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s – doing it, furthermore, with conservative accounting and no financial leverage. It was not the fair market value of the inventories, receivables or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based upon countless pleasant experiences they have had with both product and personnel.

在 1972 年以及现在，相对来说，很少有公司能像 See's 那样稳定的获得 25%的税后净有形资产回报率，而且采用了保守的会计核算，以及没有财务杠杆。并不是公允市场价值的库存，应收款，或者固定资产，产生了这种非凡的溢价回报率。正好相反，是无形资产的组合，尤其是在消费者中良好的声誉产生了这一切。这种良好的声誉是建立在消费者对其产品以及公司员工无数愉快的体验之上。

Such a reputation creates a consumer franchise that allows the value of the product to the purchaser, rather than its production cost, to be the major determinant of selling price. Consumer franchises are a prime source of economic Goodwill. Other sources include governmental franchises not subject to profit regulation, such as television stations, and an enduring position as the low cost producer in an industry.

这种声誉创造出了一个消费者特许经营权。决定商品销售溢价的重要决定性因素是商品满足了购买者的需求价值，而不是商品的生产成本(是需求定价，而不是成本定价)。消费者特许经营权是经济商誉的主要来源。其他的来源包括：无盈利管制的政府特许经营权如电视台，以及在一个行业的低成本生产者的持久地位。

Let’s return to the accounting in the See’s example. Blue Chip’s purchase of See’s at $17 million over net tangible assets required that a Goodwill account of this amount be established as an asset on Blue Chip’s books and that $425,000 be charged to income annually for 40 years to amortize that asset. By 1983, after 11 years of such charges, the $17 million had been reduced to about $12.5 million. Berkshire, meanwhile, owned 60% of Blue Chip and, therefore, also 60% of See’s. This ownership meant that Berkshire’s balance sheet reflected 60% of See’s Goodwill, or about $7.5 million.

让我们回到 See's 这个例子的会计处理。Blue Chip 对 See's 的并购超出了净有形资产 1700 万美元。这就要求在 Blue Chip 的资产负债表上设立同等额度的商誉帐户，并在 40 年的时间里，每年把这项资产摊销 42.5 万美元的费用，随之减少利润。到了 1983 年，经过了 11 年这样的摊销，这 1700 万已经被减少到了 1250 万。伯克希尔，与此同时，拥有 60%的 BlueChip，所以也就是 60%的 See's。这一所有权意味着伯克希尔的资产负债表反映了 60%的 See's 的商誉，即 750 万美元。

In 1983 Berkshire acquired the rest of Blue Chip in a merger that required purchase accounting as contrasted to the "pooling" treatment allowed for some mergers. Under purchase accounting, the "fair value" of the shares we gave to (or "paid") Blue Chip holders had to be spread over the net assets acquired from Blue Chip. This "fair value" was measured, as it almost always is when public companies use their shares to make acquisitions, by the market value of the shares given up.

1983 年伯克希尔并购了 Blue Chip 余下的股份。这一合并要求使用购买法会计处理(purchase)，而不是一些合并所允许的合并法会计处理(pooling)。在购买法会计处理下，我们支付给 Blue Chip 的股份的公允价值 FairValue 必须在我们从 Blue Chip 获得的净资产上分摊。这一公允价值的多少，当上市公司用股票进行并购时总是用所放弃的市场价值来衡量。

The assets "purchased" consisted of 40% of everything owned by Blue Chip (as noted, Berkshire already owned the other 60%). What Berkshire "paid" was more than the net identifiable assets we received by $51.7 million, and was assigned to two pieces of Goodwill: $28.4 million to See’s and $23.3 million to Buffalo Evening News.

并购的资产包括了 Blue Chip 所拥有的所有东西的 40%(如上所示，伯克希尔已拥有余下的 60%)。当伯克希尔支付的超过了我们收到的 5170 万美元可确认净资产，这一超出的部分被分配到两部分商誉：2840 万美元在See's，以及 2330 万美元在 Buffalo Evening News。

After the merger, therefore, Berkshire was left with a Goodwill asset for See’s that had two components: the $7.5 million remaining from the 1971 purchase, and $28.4 million newly created by the 40% "purchased" in 1983. Our amortization charge now will be about $1.0 million for the next 28 years, and $.7 million for the following 12 years, 2002 through 2013.

所以在并购后，伯克希尔有了 See's 的商誉，具有两部分：从 1971 年并购所剩下的 750 万美元，以及 1983年的 40%并购所新创造的 2840 万美元。我们在未来 28 年的摊销费用将是每年 100 万美元，之后的 12 年也就是2002-2013 年是每年 70 万美元。

In other words, different purchase dates and prices have given us vastly different asset values and amortization charges for two pieces of the same asset. (We repeat our usual disclaimer: we have no better accounting system to suggest. The problems to be dealt with are mind boggling and require arbitrary rules.)

换句话说，不同的并购日期和价格，让我们对同样一个资产有了两个非常不同的价值和摊销费用。(我们重复我们的免责声明：我们没有更好的会计系统建议。必须被解决的问题令人难以置信，因此必须有硬性的规则。)

But what are the economic realities? One reality is that the amortization charges that have been deducted as costs in the earnings statement each year since acquisition of See’s were not true economic costs. We know that because See’s last year earned $13 million after taxes on about $20 million of net tangible assets – a performance indicating the existence of economic Goodwill far larger than the total original cost of our accounting Goodwill. In other words, while accounting Goodwill regularly decreased from the moment of purchase, economic Goodwill increased in irregular but very substantial fashion.

但是，经济现实是什么？一个实际情况是，从 See's 并购后每年从利润表中作为成本扣除的摊销费用并不是真正的经济成本。我们知道 See's 去年在 2000 万美元的净有形资产之上，挣了 1300 万美元的税后利润。这一业绩表明现存的经济商誉远高于最初总的商誉会计成本。换句话说，虽然会计商誉从并购那一刻就有规律的摊销而定期减少，但经济商誉却以不规律但却非常重大的方式增加。

Another reality is that annual amortization charges in the future will not correspond to economic costs. It is possible, of course, that See’s economic Goodwill will disappear. But it won’t shrink in even decrements or anything remotely resembling them. What is more likely is that the Goodwill will increase – in current, if not in constant, dollars – because of inflation.

另一个现实是，未来的年度摊销费用将无法符合经济成本。当然，See's 的经济商誉也可能消失。但商誉不会稳定的消耗，或者以类似稳定的方式消耗。最有可能的是，商誉将会增加。由于美元的通胀作用，商誉价值将会以当前美元计增加，而不是以不变美元计。