巴菲特致股东的信（1985年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

You may remember the wildly upbeat message of last year’s report: nothing much was in the works but our experience had been that something big popped up occasionally. This carefully-crafted corporate strategy paid off in 1985. Later sections of this report discuss (a) our purchase of a major position in Capital Cities/ABC, (b) our acquisition of Scott & Fetzer, (c) our entry into a large, extended term participation in the insurance business of Fireman’s Fund, and (d) our sale of our stock in General Foods.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：

各位可能还记得去年年报最后提到的那个非常乐观的消息：虽然平时表面上无所作为，但我们的经验显示偶尔也会有一些大动作。这一精心制定的企业策略终于在 1985 年有了结果，本报告的后半部将会讨论到：(a)入股Capital Cities/ABC，(b)并购 Scott & Fetzer，(c)进入 Fireman's Fund 保险业务，(d)卖出 General Foods。

Our gain in net worth during the year was $613.6 million, or 48.2%. It is fitting that the visit of Halley’s Comet coincided with this percentage gain: neither will be seen again in my lifetime. Our gain in per-share book value over the last twenty-one years (that is, since present management took over) has been from $19.46 to $1643.71, or 23.2% compounded annually, another percentage that will not be repeated.

去年伯克希尔的账面价值约增加了 6.136 亿美金，约增长了 48.2%(标普 31.6%)，这一比率就好比哈雷慧星造访一般，在我有生之年这两者都不会再见到了。自现任管理层接手的 21 年来，每股账面价值从 19.46 增加到1,643.71 美元，年复合增长率约 23.2%，这是另一项不可能再重现的比率。

Two factors make anything approaching this rate of gain unachievable in the future. One factor probably transitory - is a stock market that offers very little opportunity compared to the markets that prevailed throughout much of the 1964-1984 period. Today we cannot find significantly-undervalued equities to purchase for our insurance company portfolios. The current situation is 180 degrees removed from that existing about a decade ago, when the only question was which bargain to choose.

有两个因素使得这种比率在未来难以持续，一种因素属于暂时性：与过去 20 相比，如今的投资机会越来越少。我们很难找到价值低估的股票为保险业务构建投资组合，这种情况与十年前有 180 度的转变，当时惟一的问题是该挑选哪个便宜货，而现在是没有便宜货。

This change in the market also has negative implications for our present portfolio. In our 1974 annual report I could say: “We consider several of our major holdings to have great potential for significantly increased values in future years.” I can’t say that now. It’s true that our insurance companies currently hold major positions in companies with exceptional underlying economics and outstanding managements, just as they did in 1974. But current market prices generously appraise these attributes, whereas they were ignored in 1974. Today’s valuations mean that our insurance companies have no chance for future portfolio gains on the scale of those achieved in the past.

市场的热情也对我们现有的投资组合产生不利的影响，在 1974年的年报中，我可以说：我们认为我们的几个主要持股在未来几年具有显着增加价值的巨大潜力，但现在我们不能这么说了。虽然我们投资组合持有的公司拥有优秀经营团队和特许经营的经济业务像 1974 年一样的优秀，但目前市场上的股价已充分反应这项特点，而 1974 年股价却被大大低估了。现在的估值意味着，今后我们保险公司的投资绩效再也无法像过去那样优异。

The second negative factor, far more telling, is our size. Our equity capital is more than twenty times what it was only ten years ago. And an iron law of business is that growth eventually dampens exceptional economics. just look at the records of high-return companies once they have amassed even $1 billion of equity capital. None that I know of has managed subsequently, over a ten-year period, to keep on earning 20% or more on equity while reinvesting all or substantially all of its earnings. Instead, to sustain their high returns, such companies have needed to shed a lot of capital by way of either dividends or repurchases of stock. Their shareholders would have been far better off if all earnings could have been reinvested at the fat returns earned by these exceptional businesses. But the companies simply couldn’t turn up enough high-return opportunities to make that possible.

第二项负面因素更显而易见，也就是我们的规模。目前我们在股票投入的资金是十年前的 20 倍，而市场的铁律是，规模增长终将拖累经济效率。看看那些高回报率的公司，一旦当他们的股本规模超过十亿美金，没有一家公司在往后的十年能够将其全部或大部分收益进行再投资的同时，维持 20%以上的股权回报率。相反，为了维持高回报率，这些公司只能通过大量分红或回购来剥离资本。如果所有的收益都可以再投资于这些杰出企业来获得的丰厚回报，股东的情况则会好得多，但是根本无法找到足够的高回报机会来实现这一目标。

Their problem is our problem. Last year I told you that we needed profits of $3.9 billion over the ten years then coming up to earn 15% annually. The comparable figure for the ten years now ahead is $5.7 billion, a 48% increase that corresponds - as it must mathematically - to the growth in our capital base during 1985. (Here’s a little perspective: leaving aside oil companies, only about 15 U.S. businesses have managed to earn over $5.7 billion during the past ten years.)

而我们的问题就跟他们一样，去年我告诉各位在往后十年我们大约要赚到 39 亿美金，每年才能达到 15%的收益率。今年由于账面价值增长了 48%，同样的门槛提高到 57 亿美金。撇开石油公司，据统记只有 15 家公司在过去十年能够赚到 57 亿美金。

Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, and I are reasonably optimistic about Berkshire’s ability to earn returns superior to those earned by corporate America generally, and you will benefit from the company’s retention of all earnings as long as those returns are forthcoming. We have several things going for us: (1) we don’t have to worry about quarterly or annual figures but, instead, can focus on whatever actions will maximize long-term value; (2) we can expand the business into any areas that make sense - our scope is not circumscribed by history, structure, or concept; and (3) we love our work. All of these help. Even so, we will also need a full measure of good fortune to average our hoped-for 15% - far more good fortune than was required for our past 23.2%.

查理和我对于伯克希尔能够获得高于一般美国企业的获利能力持相当乐观的态度，而只要获利持续成长，股东就会从公司保留收益中受益。我们有几件事情要做：(1)我们不必去担心每季或每年的帐面获利数字，而是将注意力集中在最大化长期价值上，(2)我们可以将业务版图扩大到任何有利可图的产业之上，而完全不受经验、组织或观念所限，(3)我们喜爱我们的工作。这些都是关键因素，但即便如此我们仍需要充分的好运气(比过去达到23.2%还要更多)才有办法使我们的平均回报率维持 15%。

We need to mention one further item in the investment equation that could affect recent purchasers of our stock. Historically, Berkshire shares have sold modestly below intrinsic business value. With the price there, purchasers could be certain (as long as they did not experience a widening of this discount) that their personal investment experience would at least equal the financial experience of the business. But recently the discount has disappeared, and occasionally a modest premium has prevailed.

另外我要特别说一下投资恒等式「P=EPS*PE」的另一个项目：市场估值，这与最近购买本公司股票的投资人密切相关。从历史上看，伯克希尔股票的售价一直略低于内在商业价值。维持在这样的估值，投资人可以确定，只要折价的幅度不再继续扩大，其个人的投资收益与公司的业绩表现趋于一致，但最近折价消失了，甚至出现适度的溢价。

The elimination of the discount means that Berkshire’s market value increased even faster than business value (which, itself, grew at a pleasing pace). That was good news for any owner holding while that move took place, but it is bad news for the new or prospective owner. If the financial experience of new owners of Berkshire is merely to match the future financial experience of the company, any premium of market value over intrinsic business value that they pay must be maintained.

折价消失代表着伯克希尔的市值增加的幅度高于内在价值增长的速度，虽然后者的表现也不错，当然这对于此前便持有股份的人算是好消息，但对于新股东或潜在股东却是不利的，而后者若想投资收益与公司的表现一致，则这种估值溢价现象需一直维持。

Management cannot determine market prices, although it can, by its disclosures and policies, encourage rational behavior by market participants. My own preference, as perhaps you’d guess, is for a market price that consistently approximates business value. Given that relationship, all owners prosper precisely as the business prospers during their period of ownership. Wild swings in market prices far above and below business value do not change the final gains for owners in aggregate; in the end, investor gains must equal business gains. But long periods of substantial undervaluation and/or overvaluation will cause the gains of the business to be inequitably distributed among various owners, with the investment result of any given owner largely depending upon how lucky, shrewd, or foolish he happens to be.

然而管理层无法控制股价，尽管可以对外披露公司政策与情况，以促使市场参与者的行为理性一点。而我个人偏好是期望公司股价的表现始终与其企业内在价值接近，惟有这样，股东持有期间的回报跟公司业绩才能趋于一致。股价过高或过低地偏离其内在价值的剧幅波动并无法改变股东的最终回报，所有股东的回报必定与公司的业绩保持一致。股价长期偏离其内在价值(不管是高估或低估)只会导致企业的获利被不公平的分配到各个股东之间，而股东投资结果的好坏完全取决于其幸运、聪明或愚笨的程度。

Over the long term there has been a more consistent relationship between Berkshire’s market value and business value than has existed for any other publicly-traded equity with which I am familiar. This is a tribute to you. Because you have been rational, interested, and investment-oriented, the market price for Berkshire stock has almost always been sensible. This unusual result has been achieved by a shareholder group with unusual demographics: virtually all of our shareholders are individuals, not institutions. No other public company our size can claim the same.

长期来看，伯克希尔的市场价值与内在价值一直保持着一种稳定的关系，在所有我熟悉的上市公司中，这都是很少见的。这要归功于所有伯克希尔的股东，因为你们的理性、专注、以投资为导向，伯克希尔的股价一直很合理，这不寻常的结果是由一群不寻常的股东实现的，实际上，几乎我们所有的股东都是个人而不是机构，没有一家这样规模的上市公司能够做到这一点。

You might think that institutions, with their large staffs of highly-paid and experienced investment professionals, would be a force for stability and reason in financial markets. They are not: stocks heavily owned and constantly monitored by institutions have often been among the most inappropriately valued.

或许你会认为机构拥有大量高薪与经验丰富的专业人员，将会成为金融市场稳定与理性的力量。但事实并非如此，机构大量持股且持续受关注的的股票，其价格通常是最不合理的。

Ben Graham told a story 40 years ago that illustrates why investment professionals behave as they do: An oil prospector, moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad news. “You’re qualified for residence”, said St. Peter, “but, as you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed. There’s no way to squeeze you in.” After thinking a moment, the prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector cupped his hands and yelled, “Oil discovered in hell.” Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St. Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself comfortable. The prospector paused. “No,” he said, “I think I’ll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some truth to that rumor after all.”

格雷厄姆 40 年前曾讲过一个故事，它说明了专业人士为何会如此行事：一个石油商人在天堂的门口见到圣彼得 St. Peter，圣彼得带给他一个好消息跟一个坏消息，好消息是他确实有资格进入天堂，但坏消息专供石油人居住的屋子已经没有位置了。石油商人想了一下，问圣彼得他能不能跟现有住户讲几句话，圣彼得觉得没什么大碍就答应了，石油商人捧着手对屋里大喊：“地狱里发现石油了”，随即屋门打开，所有的石油商人争先恐后地往地狱奔去，圣彼得随即邀请石油商人搬进来，但石油商人顿了一下后说到：“不！我还是跟他们一起去比较妥当，传言有可能是真的。”