巴菲特致股东的信（1985年）③关闭纺织业务

Shutdown of Textile Business

In July we decided to close our textile operation, and by yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history of this business is instructive.

关闭纺织业务

7 月我们决定关闭我们的纺织业务，年底这项令人不快的工作也将基本完成，投资纺织业的历史深具启发性。

When Buffett Partnership, Ltd., an investment partnership of which I was general partner, bought control of Berkshire Hathaway 21 years ago, it had an accounting net worth of $22 million, all devoted to the textile business. The company’s intrinsic business value, however, was considerably less because the textile assets were unable to earn returns commensurate with their accounting value. Indeed, during the previous nine years (the period in which Berkshire and Hathaway operated as a merged company) aggregate sales of $530 million had produced an aggregate loss of $10 million. Profits had been reported from time to time but the net effect was always one step forward, two steps back.

21 年前，我作为普通合伙人的巴菲特合伙公司收购了伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的控制权，当时公司的帐面资产为2200 万美元，全部集中在纺织业务。然而当时由于公司无法赚得与帐面价值相称的回报，其内在价值远低于净资产，事实上过去 9 年，即伯克希尔与哈撒韦两家合并经营期间，总计 5.3 亿美元的营收产生了 1000 万美元的累计亏损，虽然时有获利，但净效应总是进一步退两步。

At the time we made our purchase, southern textile plants - largely non-union - were believed to have an important competitive advantage. Most northern textile operations had closed and many people thought we would liquidate our business as well.

在我们买下该公司的当时，南方的纺织工厂大部分没有工会组织而被公认为较具竞争优势。当大多数北方的工厂皆已结束营运时，许多人认为我们也应清算纺织业务。

We felt, however, that the business would be run much better by a long-time employee whom. we immediately selected to be president, Ken Chace. In this respect we were 100% correct: Ken and his recent successor, Garry Morrison, have been excellent managers, every bit the equal of managers at our more profitable businesses.

然而我们觉得公司若能有一位长期稳定的管理者，营运将可改善，所以当时我们马上选中肯·蔡斯(Ken Chase)接手，有关这点我们到是做对了，Ken 跟后来接替他的加里·莫里森(Garry Morrison)干得非常好，一点也不输给我们其它盈利更高的业务经营者。

In early 1967 cash generated by the textile operation was used to fund our entry into insurance via the purchase of National Indemnity Company. Some of the money came from earnings and some from reduced investment in textile inventories, receivables, and fixed assets. This pullback proved wise: although much improved by Ken’s management, the textile business never became a good earner, not even in cyclical upturns.

1967 年初，我们利用纺织业务产生的大量现金买下国民保险公司进入保险业务，部分资金来自于利润，部分资金来自于减少纺织品存货、应收账款与固定资产的投资。这次撤退的决策事后证明完全正确，尽管 Ken 的管理营运已大为改善，但即使是在景气高峰的时候，纺织业务也没赚到钱。

Further diversification for Berkshire followed, and gradually the textile operation’s depressing effect on our overall return diminished as the business became a progressively smaller portion of the corporation. We remained in the business for reasons that I stated in the 1978 annual report (and summarized at other times also): “(1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment.” I further said, “As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect that they will - we intend to continue to support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.”

随后伯克希尔进一步多元化，纺织业份额越来越小，对于公司整体的拖累也越来越轻微，而我们之所以继续留在纺织业的原因，我早在 1978 年便曾提过(后来也曾陆续提到)：(1)该公司为当地非常重要的雇主，(2)管理层坦诚面对困境并努力解决问题，(3)公司员工体认困境并极力配合，(4)相对于投资，尚能产生稳定现金回报。我后来还说：只要这些情况持续不变(我们也预期不会变)，即使有更好的投资机会，我们仍会继续支持纺织业务。

It turned out that I was very wrong about (4). Though 1979 was moderately profitable, the business thereafter consumed major amounts of cash. By mid-1985 it became clear, even to me, that this condition was almost sure to continue. Could we have found a buyer who would continue operations, I would have certainly preferred to sell the business rather than liquidate it, even if that meant somewhat lower proceeds for us. But the economics that were finally obvious to me were also obvious to others, and interest was nil.

但事实证明我对(4)的判断大错特错，尽管第二年 1979 年的获利状况还不错，但此后就消耗了大量的现金。到 1985 年中期，情况变得再明显不过了。若我们能够找到合适的买主，即使贱价出售我们也不愿意清算，但我们清楚这点表示别人更清楚，没有人会有兴趣。

I won’t close down businesses of sub-normal profitability merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once it appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith would disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx would disagree with my second; the middle ground is the only position that leaves me comfortable.

我们不会仅仅为了提高我们公司的回报率而关闭盈利能力尚可但低于正常水平的企业。但同时我们还认为，即使是一家利润非常丰厚的公司，一旦出现无休止的亏损，也不应该继续向他提供资金。亚当·斯密(Adam Smith)一定不赞同我第一项的看法，而卡尔·马克思(Karl Marx)却又会反对我第二项见解，而中间立场是惟一能让我感到安心的作法。

I should reemphasize that Ken and Garry have been resourceful, energetic and imaginative in attempting to make our textile operation a success. Trying to achieve sustainable profitability, they reworked product lines, machinery configurations and distribution arrangements. We also made a major acquisition, Waumbec Mills, with the expectation of important synergy (a term widely used in business to explain an acquisition that otherwise makes no sense). But in the end nothing worked and I should be faulted for not quitting sooner. A recent Business Week article stated that 250 textile mills have closed since 1980. Their owners were not privy to any information that was unknown to me; they simply processed it more objectively. I ignored Comte’s advice - “the intellect should be the servant of the heart, but not its slave” - and believed what I preferred to believe.

我必须再次强调，Ken 与 Garry 两个人都极具干劲与想象力，努力地想要使我们的纺织业务经营成功，为了使公司持续稳定获利，他们重新规划产品线、生产流程与分销商配置，同时我们还大手笔的并购了 WaumbecMills 工厂，期望发挥协同效应(商业并购中广泛使用的术语，用于解释没有意义的收购)，但最后没有一点效果，没有早点退出纺织业的错误在我。最近《商业周刊》有一篇文章提到，自 1980 年以来已有 250 家纺织业关闭营运。这些工厂股东所知道的我亦全都明了，只是他们能够更客观地看待事情，我忽略了孔德(Auguste Comte 法国哲学家)的建议：智者应该是心灵的仆人，而非它的奴隶(The intellect should be the servant of the heart,but not its slave)，而去选择相信我更愿意相信的东西。

The domestic textile industry operates in a commodity business, competing in a world market in which substantial excess capacity exists. Much of the trouble we experienced was attributable, both directly and indirectly, to competition from foreign countries whose workers are paid a small fraction of the U.S. minimum wage. But that in no way means that our labor force deserves any blame for our closing. In fact, in comparison with employees of American industry generally, our workers were poorly paid, as has been the case throughout the textile business. In contract negotiations, union leaders and members were sensitive to our disadvantageous cost position and did not push for unrealistic wage increases or unproductive work practices. To the contrary, they tried just as hard as we did to keep us competitive. Even during our liquidation period they performed superbly. (Ironically, we would have been better off financially if our union had behaved unreasonably some years ago; we then would have recognized the impossible future that we faced, promptly closed down, and avoided significant future losses.)

国内的纺织业所面临的是全球产能过剩的大宗商品的激烈竞争，我们所面临的问题主要归因于直接或是间接来自于国外低劳力成本的竞争，这些国家的工人工资仅仅是美国最低工资的一小部分。但这绝不意味着我们的劳动力应该为我们的倒闭承担任何责任，事实上比起美国其它产业的劳工来说，整个纺织业的员工薪资水准低得可怜。在劳资协议谈判时，工会的干部与成员充分体认到整个产业所面临的困境，从未作出不合理的调薪要求或不符生产效益的诉求，相反地，大家都努力的想要维持竞争力，即使在公司清算期间，他们仍极力配合。而讽刺的是，如果工会表现的过分一些，使我们早一点体认行业的不利前景而立刻关厂，我们的损失可能会少一点。

Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses.

多年来，我们一再面临投入大量的资本支出以降低变动成本的抉择，每次提出的投资企划案看起来都稳赚不赔，以标准的投资回报率来看，甚至比起我们高获利的糖果与新闻事业还好的许多。

But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company’s capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic.

但这些预期的回报最后都证明只是一种幻象，因为我们许多国内外竞争者同样也都在加大资本投入力度，使得降低的成本被迫全数反应在售价之上。单独来看，每家公司的资本支出计划看起来都具有成本效益和合理性，但再整体上看，其效益完全被抵销掉而变得很不合理，就好像每个观看游行的人都认为踮起脚尖可以看得更清楚一样，每一轮投资过后，所有的竞争者押注的金额越来越高，但投资回报却一点也不见起色。

Thus, we faced a miserable choice: huge capital investment would have helped to keep our textile business alive, but would have left us with terrible returns on ever-growing amounts of capital. After the investment, moreover, the foreign competition would still have retained a major, continuing advantage in labor costs. A refusal to invest, however, would make us increasingly non-competitive, even measured against domestic textile manufacturers. I always thought myself in the position described by Woody Allen in one of his movies: “More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.”

因此，我们面临着一个悲惨的选择：大笔的资本支出虽然可以令我们的纺织业务得以存活，但糟糕的投资回报却是少得可怜，而且不断的资本投入依然要面对国外持续的低成本的强力竞争。若不再继续投资，将使我们更不具竞争力，即使是与国内同行相比亦是如此。我觉得自己就好象处于伍迪·艾伦(Woody Allen)在他某一部电影中所描述的位置：比起历史上的任何一刻，此时人类处在面临抉择的路口，一条通往绝望的深渊，而另一条则通往毁灭，让我们祈祷有足够的智慧去作正确的决定。

For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales of $1.2 billion against our $50 million. It had strengths in both distribution and production that we could never hope to match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13.

想要了解在大宗商品业务中是否应该继续投入资本，不妨看看伯灵顿工业(Burlington Industries)，二十年来都是美国最大的纺织公司，1964 年该公司的营业额约为 12 亿美元，而我们是 5000 万美元，他们在分销与生产方面都拥有我们永远无法比拟的优势，利润数字也比我们要好看得多，当时它的股价为 60 美元，我们是 13 美元。

Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business, and in 1985 had sales of about $2.8 billion. During the 1964-85 period, the company made capital expenditures of about $3 billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more than $200-per-share on that $60 stock. A very large part of the expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and expansion. Given Burlington’s basic commitment to stay in textiles, I would also surmise that the company’s capital decisions were quite rational.

之后 Burlington 坚守纺织本业，1985 年营业额达到 28 亿美金。1964-1985 年间，该公司累计资本支出约30 亿美元，远远超过美国任何一家纺织公司，这相当于向 1964 年底 60 美元的每股股价累计投入资本超过 200美元。我相信其大部分资本用于降低成本与扩张之上，鉴于公司固守本业的承诺，这种投资决策属于是合理的。

Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20 years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34 -- on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964. Meanwhile, the CPI has more than tripled. Therefore, each share commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have shrunk significantly in purchasing power.

尽管如此，与 20 年前相比，以实际美元购买力计算，伯灵顿现在的实际销售数字有所下降，而且毛利率与股本回报率也大不如前。而该公司现在的股价仅仅是 34 美元，考虑到 1965 年一分二扩股，大约略高于当年的 60美元，而在此同时，消费者物价指数 CPI 却早已是当年的三倍，因此每股购买力约为 1964 年底的三分之一，虽然每年有固定的股息发放，但购买力同样大幅缩水。

This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson’s horse: “A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse - not a remarkable mathematician.” Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company - but not a remarkable business.

对股东而言，这个最悲惨的结局表明，花费大量人力物力在错误的产业将会导致什么后果。这种情况有如塞缪尔·约翰逊(Samuel Johnson)的那匹马：一只能数到十的马是只了不起的马，却不是了不起的数学家。同样的，一家能够合理配置资本的纺织公司是一家了不起的纺织公司，但却不是一家了不起的企业。

My conclusion from my own experiences and from much observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record (measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row (though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: “When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.” Nothing has since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find yourself in a chronically-leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.

根据我个人的经验和对其他企业的大量观察，我得出一个结论：从经济回报来衡量，一项优异的企业经营记录的背后，你划的是一条怎样的船远比你怎样去划更重要。当然不管企业是好是坏，努力与才能也都很重要。几年前我曾说：当一个以管理著称的管理层遇到一家不具前景的糟糕公司时，通常是后者会占上风。如今我的看法依然不变，当你处于一艘长期漏水的破船上，与其费力修补破洞，还不如把精力放在如何换条好船之上。

* * *

There is an investment postscript in our textile saga. Some investors weight book value heavily in their stock-buying decisions (as I, in my early years, did myself). And some economists and academicians believe replacement values are of considerable importance in calculating an appropriate price level for the stock market as a whole. Those of both persuasions would have received an education at the auction we held in early 1986 to dispose of our textile machinery.

* * *

在说完我们纺织业的投资传奇后，我想说几句投资忠告。一些投资者在他们的股票购买决策中非常重视账面价值(正如我早年所做的那样)，并且一些经济学家和学者认为，重置价值对于计算整个股票市场的适当价格水平具有相当重要的意义。关于这两种说法在经过 1986 年初拍卖纺织机器设备后，让我好好地上了一课。

The equipment sold (including some disposed of in the few months prior to the auction) took up about 750,000 square feet of factory space in New Bedford and was eminently usable. It originally cost us about $13 million, including $2 million spent in 1980-84, and had a current book value of $866,000 (after accelerated depreciation). Though no sane management would have made the investment, the equipment could have been replaced new for perhaps $30-$50 million.

卖掉的设备(包括几个月前已经卖掉的一部分)堆满了新贝德福德 75 万英尺的厂房空间，这些设备皆为可用。原始成本为 1300 万美金，包括近几年投入的 200 万，经加速折旧后，帐面价值为 86.6 万美元。虽然没有人会笨到投资纺织业，但要买一套这样的全新的设备也要花 3-5 千万美金。

Gross proceeds from our sale of this equipment came to $163,122. Allowing for necessary pre- and post-sale costs, our net was less than zero. Relatively modern looms that we bought for $5,000 apiece in 1981 found no takers at $50. We finally sold them for scrap at $26 each, a sum less than removal costs.

我们出售此套设备的总收益为163,122 美元，考虑到必要的售前和售后成本，净收益为负。我们在 1981 年以每台 5000 美元的价格购买的相对现代的织布机，现在以 50 美元处理却无人问津。最后只能以 26 美元作为废品卖掉，这连拆除的成本都不够。

Ponder this: the economic goodwill attributable to two paper routes in Buffalo - or a single See’s candy store - considerably exceeds the proceeds we received from this massive collection of tangible assets that not too many years ago, under different competitive conditions, was able to employ over 1,000 people.

作为对比：两条布法罗报纸的分销线路或一家喜诗糖果店铺所能发挥的无形经济商誉价值远远超过我们从大量有形资产中获得的回报，而这些有形资产在几年之前不同的经济环境之下，却能一口气雇用上千人。

Shutdown of Textile Business In July we decided to close our textile operation, and by yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history of this business is instructive.

At the time we made our purchase, southern textile plants - largely non-union - were believed to have an important competitive advantage. Most northern textile operations had closed and many people thought we would liquidate our business as well.

Shutdown of Textile Business

In July we decided to close our textile operation, and by yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history of this business is instructive.