巴菲特致股东的信（1985年）⑤保险业务

Insurance Operations

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table, listing two key figures for the insurance industry:

保险业务

下表是年报中常见表格的更新版本，列示保险业务的两项关键数字：

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.

综合比率代表总保险成本(已发生的损失加上费用)与保费收入的比较:低于100的比率表示承保利润，高于100的比率表示亏损。

The industry’s 1985 results were highly unusual. The revenue gain was exceptional, and had insured losses grown at their normal rate of most recent years - that is, a few points above the inflation rate - a significant drop in the combined ratio would have occurred. But losses in 1985 didn’t cooperate, as they did not in 1984. Though inflation slowed considerably in these years, insured losses perversely accelerated, growing by 16% in 1984 and by an even more startling 17% in 1985. The year’s growth in losses therefore exceeds the inflation rate by over 13 percentage points, a modern record.

1985 年保险业整体的业绩有点不寻常，保费收入大幅成长，如果投保损失与前几年一样以固定比率成长，约比通货膨胀率高几个百分点，那么综合比率就会明显下降。但 1985 年的承保损失并没有配合，尽管这几年通货膨胀显着放缓，但承保损失却反常地加速，1984 年增长 16%，1985 年更是惊人地增长了 17%，超过通货膨胀率13 个百分点，创下新记录。

Catastrophes were not the culprit in this explosion of loss cost. True, there were an unusual number of hurricanes in 1985, but the aggregate damage caused by all catastrophes in 1984 and 1985 was about 2% of premium volume, a not unusual proportion. Nor was there any burst in the number of insured autos, houses, employers, or other kinds of “exposure units”.

灾难并不是损失成本激增的主因，虽然 1985 年确实有几次相当大的飓风发生，但 1984 年和 1985 年所有灾难造成的总损失约为保费量的 2%，这比例不算异常。投保汽车、房屋、员工或其它投保标的出险的也没有爆增。

A partial explanation for the surge in the loss figures is all the additions to reserves that the industry made in 1985. As results for the year were reported, the scene resembled a revival meeting: shouting “I’ve sinned, I’ve sinned”, insurance managers rushed forward to confess they had under reserved in earlier years. Their corrections significantly affected 1985 loss numbers.

承保损失激增的部分原因是去年业界大幅提升损失准备，就像报告所显示的，这场景就像检讨会议，都在大喊“我有罪，我有罪”，保险业务经理人一窝蜂地承认前几年损失准备拨备不足，业界的集体修正显著影响了今年的业绩。

A more disturbing ingredient in the loss surge is the acceleration in “social” or “judicial” inflation. The insurer’s ability to pay has assumed overwhelming importance with juries and judges in the assessment of both liability and damages. More and more, “the deep pocket” is being sought and found, no matter what the policy wording, the facts, or the precedents.

承保损失激增的另外一个更令人不安的因素是社会或司法通膨成本的增加，在陪审团和法官评估责任和损害时，保险人的支付能力具有压倒性的重要性。无论保单条款、事实真相或先前判例如何，越来越多的人在觊觎财大气粗的保险公司。

This judicial inflation represents a wild card in the industry’s future, and makes forecasting difficult. Nevertheless, the short-term outlook is good. Premium growth improved as 1985 went along (quarterly gains were an estimated 15%, 19%, 24%, and 22%) and, barring a supercatastrophe, the industry’s combined ratio should fall sharply in 1986.

这成为保险业预测未来的最不确定的因素。尽管如此，短期前景还不错，整个 1985 年保费增长不断改善(按季度 15%-19%-24%-22%)，除非发生巨灾，否则 1986 年综合比率有望大幅下降。

The profit improvement, however, is likely to be of short duration. Two economic principles will see to that. First, commodity businesses achieve good levels of profitability only when prices are fixed in some manner or when capacity is short. Second, managers quickly add to capacity when prospects start to improve and capital is available.

然而获利改善的情况无法持续太久，经济上有两个主要原因，一是大宗商品企业只有当价格稳定或供给短缺的情况下才能维持不错的获利水平，二是行业景气转暖且业者资金充裕时便会猛增产能。

In my 1982 report to you, I discussed the commodity nature of the insurance industry extensively. The typical policyholder does not differentiate between products but concentrates instead on price. For many decades a cartel-like procedure kept prices up, but this arrangement has disappeared for good. The insurance product now is priced as any other commodity for which a free market exists: when capacity is tight, prices will be set remuneratively; otherwise, they will not be.

在 1982 年年报中，我曾广泛地讨论大宗商品化企业的特点，一般的投保人不太在乎产品的差异而只关注价格，几十年来行业联盟式的制度使得价格居高不下，但这种情况如今已不复见到。保险产品现在的定价方式，与自由市场存在的任何其他商品一样：当供给吃紧，价格自然上升，反之就不会。

Capacity currently is tight in many lines of insurance - though in this industry, unlike most, capacity is an attitudinal concept, not a physical fact. Insurance managers can write whatever amount of business they feel comfortable writing, subject only to pressures applied by regulators and Best’s, the industry’s authoritative rating service. The comfort level of both managers and regulators is tied to capital. More capital means more comfort, which in turn means more capacity. In the typical commodity business, furthermore, such as aluminum or steel, a long gestation precedes the birth of additional capacity. In the insurance industry, capital can be secured instantly. Thus, any capacity shortage can be eliminated in short order.

目前，保险行业许多业务线的产能供应紧张，虽然保险业跟大部分的行业不同，所谓的供应紧张仅仅是心态上而非实质性的(承保意愿低迷)，只要保险业者愿意，他可以签下无限数量的保单，这期间只会受到监管机构和行业评级机构 Best's 的压力。而公司管理层和监管当局的承保意愿只跟资本实力有关，更多的资本代表更多的冲动，也意味着乐意签下更多的保单。在大宗商品企业，如钢铁或铝业，增加产能需要很长的准备时间。而在保险业资本可以立刻到位，因此供给不足的情况可能马上就会消失。

That’s exactly what’s going on right now. In 1985, about 15 insurers raised well over $3 billion, piling up capital so that they can write all the business possible at the better prices now available. The capital-raising trend has accelerated dramatically so far in 1986.

这就是目前实际发生的状况，1985 年大约 15 家保险公司筹集了超过 30 亿美元的资金，以便在价格高位吃进所有可能的生意，而且 1986 年以来资金募集的速度越来越快。

If capacity additions continue at this rate, it won’t be long before serious price-cutting appears and next a fall in profitability. When the fall comes, it will be the fault of the capital-raisers of 1985 and 1986, not the price-cutters of 198X. (Critics should be understanding, however: as was the case in our textile example, the dynamics of capitalism cause each insurer to make decisions that for itself appear sensible, but that collectively slash profitability.)

如果产能继续以这种速度增加，不用多久马上会出现杀价竞争的情况，之后获利也会承压。而这一切都要归咎那些大幅增资的业者，然而，批评人士应该明白：正如我们的纺织业一样，市场经济的变化导致每个保险公司做出的决策本身似乎是明智的，但就行业整体来说，竞争降低了集体的盈利能力。

In past reports, I have told you that Berkshire’s strong capital position - the best in the industry - should one day allow us to claim a distinct competitive advantage in the insurance market. With the tightening of the market, that day arrived. Our premium volume more than tripled last year, following a long period of stagnation. Berkshire’s financial strength (and our record of maintaining unusual strength through thick and thin) is now a major asset for us in securing good business.

以往年报我曾告诉过大家，伯克希尔强大的资本状况(堪称业界之最)有一天能让我们在保险业拥有明显的竞争优势，随着市场的紧缩，这一天已到来了。在经过长期的停滞之后，去年我们的保费收入增加了 2 倍多，伯克希尔的财务实力(以及过去优异的承保记录)是我们最好的竞争力。

We correctly foresaw a flight to quality by many large buyers of insurance and reinsurance who belatedly recognized that a policy is only an IOU - and who, in 1985, could not collect on many of their IOUs. These buyers today are attracted to Berkshire because of its strong capital position. But, in a development we did not foresee, we also are finding buyers drawn to us because our ability to insure substantial risks sets us apart from the crowd.

我们正确地预见到许多保险和再保险的大客户会转向高质量保险公司，在 1985 年他们许多保单无法兑现的时候才发现，保单只是一张欠条。如今这些客户都被伯克希尔雄厚的资产实力吸引上门，而另外一点是我们没有预见到的发展过程，那就是我们有能力为重大风险承保从而使我们脱颖而出。

To understand this point, you need a few background facts about large risks. Traditionally, many insurers have wanted to write this kind of business. However, their willingness to do so has been almost always based upon reinsurance arrangements that allow the insurer to keep just a small portion of the risk itself while passing on (“laying off”) most of the risk to its reinsurers. Imagine, for example, a directors and officers (“D & O”) liability policy providing $25 million of coverage. By various “excess-of-loss” reinsurance contracts, the company issuing that policy might keep the liability for only the first $1 million of any loss that occurs. The liability for any loss above that amount up to $24 million would be borne by the reinsurers of the issuing insurer. In trade parlance, a company that issues large policies but retains relatively little of the risk for its own account writes a large gross line but a small net line.

要理解这一点，你必须对巨额风险有一些认识，以往有许多保险公司都很愿意承保此类保单，他们这么做是基于再保险的安排，他们自己只要保留一小部分的风险，而将大部分的风险转嫁给再保业者。例如，一单 2500万保额的董事和经理人责任险，承保公司通过各种超额损失再保险合同，将超过 2400 万损失责任签发给再保险公司承担，而自己只留下一个 100 万的零头。按业界的说法是，保单总额很高，但净额很少。

In any reinsurance arrangement, a key question is how the premiums paid for the policy should be divided among the various “layers” of risk. In our D & O policy, for example. what part of the premium received should be kept by the issuing company to compensate it fairly for taking the first $1 million of risk and how much should be passed on to the reinsurers to compensate them fairly for taking the risk between $1 million and $25 million?

在任何的再保安排中，最重要的问题是保费收入应如何公平在各个风险层级中分配。例如前面的管理层责任险案例，签发保单的保险公司应保留多数保费以承担其前面第一个 100 万的损失风险，以及应该向再保人转嫁多少保费以公平的承担 100-2500 万之间的损失风险。

One way to solve this problem might be deemed the Patrick Henry approach: “I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience.” In other words, how much of the total premium would reinsurers have needed in the past to compensate them fairly for the losses they actually had to bear?

一种解决这种难题的方法叫做 Patrick Henry 法则：我只有一盏灯可以指引我的脚，那就是经验之灯。换句话说，再保业者需要多少保费才能公平的补偿其所承担的损失要依据过去的经验。

Unfortunately, the lamp of experience has always provided imperfect illumination for reinsurers because so much of their business is “long-tail”, meaning it takes many years before they know what their losses are. Lately, however, the light has not only been dim but also grossly misleading in the images it has revealed. That is, the courts’ tendency to grant awards that are both huge and lacking in precedent makes reinsurers’ usual extrapolations or inferences from past data a formula for disaster. Out with Patrick Henry and in with Pogo: “The future ain’t what it used to be.”

但不幸的是经验之灯根本不够亮，因为大部分业务都是“长尾”业务，往往需要在许多年之后才能真正知道发生了多少损失。而且最近经验之灯不仅黯淡下来还存在误导，也就是说，法院倾向于给予缺乏先例的巨额赔偿金，使得再保业者依据过去经验推估变成一场灾难。Patrick Henry 失效，换成 Pogo：未来已今非昔比了。

The burgeoning uncertainties of the business, coupled with the entry into reinsurance of many unsophisticated participants, worked in recent years in favor of issuing companies writing a small net line: they were able to keep a far greater percentage of the premiums than the risk. By doing so, the issuing companies sometimes made money on business that was distinctly unprofitable for the issuing and reinsuring companies combined. (This result was not necessarily by intent: issuing companies generally knew no more than reinsurers did about the ultimate costs that would be experienced at higher layers of risk.) Inequities of this sort have been particularly pronounced in lines of insurance in which much change was occurring and losses were soaring; e.g., professional malpractice, D & 0, products liability, etc. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that issuing companies remained enthusiastic about writing business long after premiums became woefully inadequate on a gross basis.

近年来，再保险业务不断增长的不确定性，叠加许多经验不足的新进者，使得直保公司倾向通过保留远高于风险的保费比例，将风险转嫁给再保公司，仅仅承担较少额度的风险。这样的作法有时在直保公司与再保公司整体亏钱的情况下，直保公司甚至还能获利。但这种结局并不是故意的，对于更高风险水平下所产生最终成本，直保公司通常并不比再保公司了解更多。这种不平等现象在保险业中尤为明显，保险业正在发生巨大变化，损失也在飙升，例如职业舞弊、管理层责任险以及产品责任险等。在这些情况下，在保费严重不足的情况下，直保公司还在积极签发保单就不足为奇了。

An example of just how disparate results have been for issuing companies versus their reinsurers is provided by the 1984 financials of one of the leaders in large and unusual risks. In that year the company wrote about $6 billion of business and kept around $2 1/2 billion of the premiums, or about 40%. It gave the remaining $3 1/2 billion to reinsurers. On the part of the business kept, the company’s underwriting loss was less than $200 million - an excellent result in that year. Meanwhile, the part laid off produced a loss of over $1.5 billion for the reinsurers. Thus, the issuing company wrote at a combined ratio of well under 110 while its reinsurers, participating in precisely the same policies, came in considerably over 140. This result was not attributable to natural catastrophes; it came from run-of-the-mill insurance losses (occurring, however, in surprising frequency and size). The issuing company’s 1985 report is not yet available, but I would predict it will show that dramatically unbalanced results continued.

1984 年，一家大型异常风险领域的领军企业的财务报告提供了一个例子，说明了直保公司与再保险公司的结果有多么不同。在那一年这家公司一共签下 60 亿元的保单，在保留其中的 40%约 25 亿后，将剩下的 35 亿转给再保公司，结果最后，保留部分理赔的损失只有不到 2 亿美元，非常不错的承保业绩。与此同时，分保出去的部分却使再保业者蒙受了 15 亿美元的损失，使得直保公司的综合比率不到 110，但再保公司却高达 140，这一结果不是自然灾害造成的，它来自普通保险损失，然而，发生的频率和损失都令人惊讶。虽然我尚未看到该公司今年的年报，但可想而知这种不平衡的情况一定还在继续。

A few years such as this, and even slow-witted reinsurers can lose interest, particularly in explosive lines where the proper split in premium between issuer and reinsurer remains impossible to even roughly estimate. The behavior of reinsurers finally becomes like that of Mark Twain’s cat: having once sat on a hot stove, it never did so again - but it never again sat on a cold stove, either. Reinsurers have had so many unpleasant surprises in long-tail casualty lines that many have decided (probably correctly) to give up the game entirely, regardless of price inducements. Consequently, there has been a dramatic pull-back of reinsurance capacity in certain important lines.

这种情况已经好几年了，在直保和再保公司之间的保费合理分配仍无法粗略估计的大量业务线上，即使是一些反应较慢的再保业者都失去了兴趣。再保业者的行为就像马克吐温的猫一样：“一旦被热炉子烫过一次，便不会再去碰任何炉子，即使是冷的炉子也一样”，再保业者在长期的意外险遭遇了太多不愉快的意外，以至于到最后决定放弃这项业务(可能也是正确的)，完全不理投保价格如何诱人，因此，某些业务的再保能力出现了严重短缺。

This development has left many issuing companies under pressure. They can no longer commit their reinsurers, time after time, for tens of millions per policy as they so easily could do only a year or two ago, and they do not have the capital and/or appetite to take on large risks for their own account. For many issuing companies, gross capacity has shrunk much closer to net capacity - and that is often small, indeed.

如此一来许多直保客户面临压力，他们再也不能够像以前一样，动不动就将上千万的保单转给再保业者。他们也没有能力与资本自行承接大额的保单，有的直保业者的承保总额也大幅缩水到净额附近。

At Berkshire we have never played the lay-it-off-at-a-profit game and, until recently, that put us at a severe disadvantage in certain lines. Now the tables are turned: we have the underwriting capability whereas others do not. If we believe the price to be right, we are willing to write a net line larger than that of any but the largest insurers. For instance, we are perfectly willing to risk losing $10 million of our own money on a single event, as long as we believe that the price is right and that the risk of loss is not significantly correlated with other risks we are insuring. Very few insurers are willing to risk half that much on single events - although, just a short while ago, many were willing to lose five or ten times that amount as long as virtually all of the loss was for the account of their reinsurers.

在伯克希尔我们从来不玩这类盈利为目的分割游戏，最近几年，这样的作法使我们在某些业务处于严重劣势，不过现在情况发生逆转：我们拥有同业无法比拟的承保实力。只要我们认为价格合理，我们愿意承保其它大型业者都吃不下的保单。例如，我们愿意承担一次事件中损失 1000 万美元的风险，只要价格合理且其风险与我们已承保的风险无显著相关性。其他同业连承保一半的风险都不多见。尽管在不久之前，许多业者甚至愿意吃下十倍以上的保单，只要有再保业者来承担所有的损失。

In mid-1985 our largest insurance company, National Indemnity Company, broadcast its willingness to underwrite large risks by running an ad in three issues of an insurance weekly. The ad solicited policies of only large size: those with a minimum premium of $1 million. This ad drew a remarkable 600 replies and ultimately produced premiums totaling about $50 million. (Hold the applause: it’s all long-tail business and it will be at least five years before we know whether this marketing success was also an underwriting success.) Today, our insurance subsidiaries continue to be sought out by brokers searching for large net capacity.

1985 年我们旗下最大的保险公司国民保险在三期保险期刊上大幅投放广告，对外宣传愿意承保巨大风险的意愿。该广告只征集超过 100 万美金的大额保单，结果总计收到 600 条回函，最后产生约 5000 万美金保费，先不要高兴太早，由于属于长期保单，至少要经过五年以上才能确定这次成功的营销是不是承保成功。现在，一般的保险经纪人要接高额的保单，一定会首先找到我们的保险子公司。

As I have said, this period of tightness will pass; insurers and reinsurers will return to underpricing. But for a year or two we should do well in several segments of our insurance business. Mike Goldberg has made many important improvements in the operation (prior mismanagement by your Chairman having provided him ample opportunity to do so). He has been particularly successful recently in hiring young managers with excellent potential. They will have a chance to show their stuff in 1986.

正如我说过的，这段供应紧张的时期将会过去，大家还是会回到价格战。不过一两年内，我们在几项业务方面还是有很好的发挥空间，Mike Goldberg 在营运上作了许多的重要改进(本人先前的管理不当，提供他不少发挥的空间)，尤其是最近几年他找了许多深具潜力的优秀人才进来(1985 年迈克把原麦肯锡部下阿吉特·贾因招进伯克希尔)，明年他们将更有机会一显长才。

Our combined ratio has improved - from 134 in 1984 to 111 in 1985 - but continues to reflect past misdeeds. Last year I told you of the major mistakes I had made in loss-reserving, and promised I would update you annually on loss-development figures. Naturally, I made this promise thinking my future record would be much improved. So far this has not been the case. Details on last year’s loss development are on pages 50-52. They reveal significant underreserving at the end of 1984, as they did in the several years preceding.

综合比率方面也有所改善，从 1984 年的 134%改善到 1985 年的 111%，但过去的不良影响仍在。去年我告诉你我在损失准备金方面犯的主要错误，并承诺每年向你更新损失调整的数字。当然，我做出这个承诺是因为我认为未来的记录会有很大的改善，但到目前为止，情况并非如此。细节详如后述。与前几年一样，它们在 1984年底揭示了严重的准备金不足。

The only bright spot in this picture is that virtually all of the underreserving revealed in 1984 occurred in the reinsurance area - and there, in very large part, in a few contracts that were discontinued several years ago. This explanation, however, recalls all too well a story told me many years ago by the then Chairman of General Reinsurance Company. He said that every year his managers told him that “except for the Florida hurricane” or “except for Midwestern tornadoes”, they would have had a terrific year. Finally he called the group together and suggested that they form a new operation - the Except-For Insurance Company - in which they would henceforth place all of the business that they later wouldn’t want to count.

几乎所有的准备金不足都发生在再保部分，而且很大程度上，都发生在几年前陆续到期的许多保单上。这种解释使我想起许多年前，通用再保的董事长告诉我的一个小故事，他说每年公司的经理人都告诉他“除了佛罗里达的飓风和中西部的龙卷风的话，今年的成绩一定很好”，到最后实在忍不住他召集这群人开会并建议他们干脆另外成立一个新的业务，叫作“除了保险公司”，专门把他们后来不想计入的业务放入其中。

In any business, insurance or otherwise, “except for” should be excised from the lexicon. If you are going to play the game, you must count the runs scored against you in all nine innings. Any manager who consistently says “except for” and then reports on the lessons he has learned from his mistakes may be missing the only important lesson - namely, that the real mistake is not the act, but the actor.

不管是保险还是其它行业，应该把“除了”这个字眼从辞典里删除。如果你要参加比赛，就应该把对手所有的得分全部计入，任何一直把“除了”挂在嘴上的经理人，不停报告他从错误中吸取的教训，那么他可能会错过唯一重要的教训：错的不是剧本，而是演员。

Inevitably, of course, business errors will occur and the wise manager will try to find the proper lessons in them. But the trick is to learn most lessons from the experiences of others. Managers who have learned much from personal experience in the past usually are destined to learn much from personal experience in the future.

当然做业务往往不可避免的会出些差错，而聪明的经理人一定能从中汲取教训，但诀窍是这个教训最好是从别人身上学来的，过去习惯犯错的经理人通常未来还是会继续犯错。

GEICO, 38%-owned by Berkshire, reported an excellent year in 1985 in premium growth and investment results, but a poor year - by its lofty standards - in underwriting. Private passenger auto and homeowners insurance were the only important lines in the industry whose results deteriorated significantly during the year. GEICO did not escape the trend, although its record was far better than that of virtually all its major competitors.

伯克希尔持有 38%股权的 GEICO 保险公司，在保费收入成长与投资收益方面皆表现突出，但在承保结果与其过去高标准相较却表现不佳，私家车与住宅房屋险是财产险业务中唯一显著恶化的重要险种。GEICO 保险也难逃一劫，虽然它的成绩比起其它主要的竞争对手要好得多。

Jack Byrne left GEICO at mid-year to head Fireman’s Fund, leaving behind Bill Snyder as Chairman and Lou Simpson as Vice Chairman. Jack’s performance in reviving GEICO from near-bankruptcy was truly extraordinary, and his work resulted in enormous gains for Berkshire. We owe him a great deal for that.

Jack Byrne 在年中离开 GEICO 保险加入消防员基金保险公司，留下比尔·斯奈德(Bill Snyder)与路易辛普森(Lou Simpson)担任正副董事长，Jack 之前挽救 GEICO 保险免于破产的表现卓著，他的努力使得伯克希尔获益巨大，我们欠他太多。

We are equally indebted to Jack for an achievement that eludes most outstanding leaders: he found managers to succeed him who have talents as valuable as his own. By his skill in identifying, attracting and developing Bill and Lou, Jack extended the benefits of his managerial stewardship well beyond his tenure.

我们同样要感谢 Jack 另一项成就，这是大多数杰出领导者无法做到的：他找到具有跟他一样特质的经理人来接替他，通过识别、吸引和发展 Bill 和 Lou的技能，Jack 使得他对公司的贡献与影响力超过他实际的任期。

Insurance Operations Shown below is an updated version of our usual table, listing two key figures for the insurance industry:

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.

That’s exactly what’s going on right now. In 1985, about 15 insurers raised well over $3 billion, piling up capital so that they can write all the business possible at the better prices now available. The capital-raising trend has accelerated dramatically so far in 1986.

Insurance Operations

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table, listing two key figures for the insurance industry: