巴菲特致股东的信（1985年）⑧大都会/美国广播公司

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.

Right after yearend, Berkshire purchased 3 million shares of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (“Cap Cities”) at $172.50 per share, the market price of such shares at the time the commitment was made early in March, 1985. I’ve been on record for many years about the management of Cap Cities: I think it is the best of any publicly-owned company in the country. And Tom Murphy and Dan Burke are not only great managers, they are precisely the sort of fellows that you would want your daughter to marry. It is a privilege to be associated with them - and also a lot of fun, as any of you who know them will understand.

大都会/美国广播公司

大约在年后，伯克希尔以每股 172.5 美元买进 300 万股的大都会/ABC 股票，这是 1985 年 3 月初做出承诺时这些股票的市场价格。我追踪该公司的管理绩效已有许多年，我认为他们是上市公司当中最优秀的，汤姆·墨菲(Tom Murphy)与丹·柏克(Dan Burke)不但是伟大的经理人，也是那种你会想把自己的女儿嫁给他的那一种人，跟他们交往实在是我的荣幸，也相当愉快，任何认识他们的人都会明白。

Our purchase of stock helped Cap Cities finance the $3.5 billion acquisition of American Broadcasting Companies. For Cap Cities, ABC is a major undertaking whose economics are likely to be unexciting over the next few years. This bothers us not an iota; we can be very patient. (No matter how great the talent or effort, some things just take time: you can’t produce a baby in one month by getting nine women pregnant.)

我们投资提供的资金帮助大都会以 35 亿美元并购美国广播公司(ABC)，对大都会来说，ABC 是一项重要的业务，其经济状况在未来几年可能并不会令人满意。但我们很有耐心一点也不心急，毕竟就算是天赋与努力俱备，很多事情还是需要时间来发酵：就算你让九个女人都怀孕，也不可能让小孩一个月就生出来。

As evidence of our confidence, we have executed an unusual agreement: for an extended period Tom, as CEO (or Dan, should he be CEO) votes our stock. This arrangement was initiated by Charlie and me, not by Tom. We also have restricted ourselves in various ways regarding sale of our shares. The object of these restrictions is to make sure that our block does not get sold to anyone who is a large holder (or intends to become a large holder) without the approval of management, an arrangement similar to ones we initiated some years ago at GEICO and Washington Post.

为了展现我们的信心，我们与管理阶层签订了一项特别的协议：在较长的期间内，我们的投票权将交给担任CEO 的 Tom 来处理(或是 Dan，如果他是 CEO 的话)。事实上这项提案是由查理和我主动提出的，同时还以各种方式限制我们出售自己的股份。这个动作主要是为了确保我们的股份不会未经现有管理层同意的情况下出售给任何潜在大股东，有点类似几年前我们在 GEICO 与华盛顿邮报签订的协议。

Since large blocks frequently command premium prices, some might think we have injured Berkshire financially by creating such restrictions. Our view is just the opposite. We feel the long-term economic prospects for these businesses - and, thus, for ourselves as owners - are enhanced by the arrangements. With them in place, the first-class managers with whom we have aligned ourselves can focus their efforts entirely upon running the businesses and maximizing long-term values for owners. Certainly this is much better than having those managers distracted by “revolving-door capitalists” hoping to put the company “in play”. (Of course, some managers place their own interests above those of the company and its owners and deserve to be shaken up - but, in making investments, we try to steer clear of this type.)

由于巨额股份交易经常会溢价，有些人认为这样的限制可能会损及伯克希尔股东的权益，不过我们的看法正好完全相反，身为公司的所有权人，我们认定这些企业的长期经济利益将因为这些限制而更加巩固，因为如此一来，与之结盟的专业经理人便能将全部精力集中到公司经营上去，进而为全体股东创造最大的利益，很显然这比公司整天换老板分散经理们的注意力要好得多。当然有些经理人会把自己的利益摆在公司的利益之前，所以我们在投资时会尽量避开这类的管理层。

Today, corporate instability is an inevitable consequence of widely-diffused ownership of voting stock. At any time a major holder can surface, usually mouthing reassuring rhetoric but frequently harboring uncivil intentions. By circumscribing our blocks of stock as we often do, we intend to promote stability where it otherwise might be lacking. That kind of certainty, combined with a good manager and a good business, provides excellent soil for a rich financial harvest. That’s the economic case for our arrangements.

今天企业的不稳定性是股权分散的必然结果，一家公司随时都会有大股东浮上台面，满口仁义道德但实际上却包藏祸心，我们常藉由锁住自身持有的股权来宣示对公司稳定的支持，这种股权结构的安定感加上优秀的管理层和良好的业务，是让企业获利丰收的沃土，这就是我们会这样安排的用意所在。

The human side is just as important. We don’t want managers we like and admire - and who have welcomed a major financial commitment by us - to ever lose any sleep wondering whether surprises might occur because of our large ownership. I have told them there will be no surprises, and these agreements put Berkshire’s signature where my mouth is. That signature also means the managers have a corporate commitment and therefore need not worry if my personal participation in Berkshire’s affairs ends prematurely (a term I define as any age short of three digits).

当然人性面也很重要，我们不希望我们欣赏与钦佩的经理人，在欢迎我们的加入后，会担心一觉醒来，因为我们持有重要股权，所有事情一夕生变。我告诉他们绝对放心，我们一定说话算话，而且也包括伯克希尔公司的承诺，即使我个人发生了什么不幸(意思是指我本人活不到一百岁就挂了)。

Our Cap Cities purchase was made at a full price, reflecting the very considerable enthusiasm for both media stocks and media properties that has developed in recent years (and that, in the case of some property purchases, has approached a mania). it’s no field for bargains. However, our Cap Cities investment allies us with an exceptional combination of properties and people - and we like the opportunity to participate in size.

我们以全价购买大都会反映出近年来对媒体股票和媒体资产的极大热情(当然还比不上某些资产并购案的疯狂)，事实上也没有多少讨价还价的余地，但重点是这项投资让我们能与这样杰出的人才与业务结合在一起，而且也是相当庞大的投资规模。

Of course, some of you probably wonder why we are now buying Cap Cities at $172.50 per share given that your Chairman, in a characteristic burst of brilliance, sold Berkshire’s holdings in the same company at $43 per share in 1978-80. Anticipating your question, I spent much of 1985 working on a snappy answer that would reconcile these acts.

至于有人可能会觉得很奇怪，为何同样一家公司，你们的董事长在 1980 年以前曾以 43 美元的价钱卖掉，而现在却以 172.5 美元的高价买回。

A little more time, please.

有关这个问题，容我在多花一点时间，想一个漂亮一点的答案给各位。