巴菲特致股东的信（1987年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1987 was $464 million, or 19.5%. Over the last 23 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,477.47, or at a rate of 23.1% compounded annually.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：

本公司 1987 年的账面价值增加了 4.64 亿美元，或增长了 19.5%(标普 5.1%)，自从现任管理层接手的 23 年以来，每股账面价值从 19.46 美元增长到现在的 2,477.47 美元，年复合增长率约为 23.1%。

What counts, of course, is the rate of gain in per-share business value, not book value. In many cases, a corporation's book value and business value are almost totally unrelated. For example, just before they went bankrupt, LTV and Baldwin-United published yearend audits showing their book values to be $652 million and $397 million, respectively. Conversely, Belridge Oil was sold to Shell in 1979 for $3.6 billion although its book value was only $177 million.

真正重要的当然是企业每股内在价值的增长率，而非帐面价值，在许多情况下一家公司的帐面价值与其内在价值一点关连都没有，例如，LTV 与鲍德温联合公司(Baldwin-United)就在宣布破产之前的年度审计报告显示，帐面价值分别为 6.52 亿与 3.97 亿美金，但是另一个公司贝尔里奇石油公司(Belridge Oil)在 1979 年以 36 亿美元高价卖给壳牌石油之时，其账面价值只有 1.77 亿美元。
（Long Temco Vought (LTV)这个例子出现在《聪明的投资者》中。公司从 1958 年起步，从 700 万美元资本在仅仅 2 年内就规模扩大了 19 倍，债务从 4400 万美元扩大到了 16 亿美元，1969-1970 年出现巨额亏损，股价从1958 年起步的 20 美元涨到 1960 年的最高的 169 美元，此后一路下跌，1971 年跌到 7 美元的最低价位。Baldwin-United 最初是一家钢琴行，后来发展为金融超市。查诺斯在研究报告当中指出，该公司的账目存在彼此矛盾、难以自圆其说之处，他建议投资者卖出这只股票。在转年的 1983 年，这家公司正式宣告破产，创下了当时的最大企业破产案纪录。）

At Berkshire, however, the two valuations have tracked rather closely, with the growth rate in business value over the last decade moderately outpacing the growth rate in book value. This good news continued in 1987.

不过在伯克希尔，两种价值的成长趋势倒是蛮相近的，过去十年公司的内在价值增长率略高于帐面价值增长率，很高兴这种好现象在 1987 年得以维持。

Our premium of business value to book value has widened for two simple reasons: We own some remarkable businesses and they are run by even more remarkable managers.

我们的内在价值对帐面价值的溢价有所扩大，原因是：我们拥有优秀的企业，而且这些企业皆由最优秀的经理人在管理。

You have a right to question that second assertion. After all, CEOs seldom tell their shareholders that they have assembled a bunch of turkeys to run things. Their reluctance to do so makes for some strange annual reports. Oftentimes, in his shareholders' letter, a CEO will go on for pages detailing corporate performance that is woefully inadequate. He will nonetheless end with a warm paragraph describing his managerial comrades as "our most precious asset." Such comments sometimes make you wonder what the other assets can possibly be.

各位有理由质疑后者，因为 CEO 很少会告诉公司股东说，你们所投资的公司是由一群笨蛋组成的管理层在管理，为了要避免露出马脚，一些公司常常会出现相当诡异的财务报表。通常在致股东的报告中，CEO 会花大量篇幅详细描述企业过去的表现是如何的不当，最后不可免俗地会以感性的语气来形容其所带领的公司管理层实在是公司最珍贵的资产，这种形容有时会让人搞不清楚那其它的资产到底又算是什么。

At Berkshire, however, my appraisal of our operating managers is, if anything, understated. To understand why, first take a look at page 7, where we show the earnings (on an historical-cost accounting basis) of our seven largest non-financial units: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See's Candies, and World Book. In 1987, these seven business units had combined operating earnings before interest and taxes of $180 million.

不过在伯克希尔，我个人对于管理层任何的称赞都是很容易让人理解的，首先请看看下面的报告收益表格，显示本公司七家主要的非金融企业：布法罗新闻报、费区海默西服、柯比吸尘器、内布拉斯加家具城、斯科特费泽制造集团、喜诗糖果与世界图书公司的获利状况(以历史成本会计基础)，1987 年这七家公司的年度在扣除利息与所得税前的获利(EBIT 息税前利润)高达 1.8 亿美元。

By itself, this figure says nothing about economic performance. To evaluate that, we must know how much total capital - debt and equity - was needed to produce these earnings. Debt plays an insignificant role at our seven units: Their net interest expense in 1987 was only $2 million. Thus, pre-tax earnings on the equity capital employed by these businesses amounted to $178 million. And this equity - again on an historical-cost basis - was only $175 million.

数字本身并不足以说明其经济表现，为了评估这一点，我们必须知道产生这些收益需要多少资本(包括债务和股本在内)。债务在我们的七家公司中扮演着微不足道的角色：1987 年的净利息支出仅为 200 万美元。因此，这些企业所占用股本的税前收益为 1.78 亿美元。而股本(以历史成本计)仅为 1.75 亿美元。

If these seven business units had operated as a single company, their 1987 after-tax earnings would have been approximately $100 million - a return of about 57% on equity capital. You'll seldom see such a percentage anywhere, let alone at large, diversified companies with nominal leverage. Here's a benchmark: In its 1988 Investor's Guide issue, Fortune reported that among the 500 largest industrial companies and 500 largest service companies, only six had averaged a return on equity of over 30% during the previous decade. The best performer among the 1000 was Commerce Clearing House at 40.2%.

若把这七家公司看作是一家公司，其 1987 年的税后净利约为 1 亿美元，股本回报率更高达 57%，即使财务杠杆再高，你也很难在一般公司看到这种比率。根据《财富》杂志在 1988 年出版的投资人指南，在全美制造业500 强与服务业 500 强中，只有 6 家公司过去十年的平均股本回报率超过 30%，最高的商业清算所公司也不过只有 40.2%。
(Commerce Clearing House,始建于 1913 年，是美国目前最大的专业法律、税务、财务、审计、风险管理和系统软件的平台提供商，占据美国 65%的专业领域市场。在美国，几乎所有的会计师事务所、律师事务所、跨国公司集团、大学、研究机构、政府等等，都广泛使用 CCH 和 Wolters Kluwer 的数据和解读。CCH 税务、财务和法律的法规解读被视为专业行业内最为权威的专业解读。)

Of course, the returns that Berkshire earns from these seven units are not as high as their underlying returns because, in aggregate, we bought the businesses at a substantial premium to underlying equity capital. Overall, these operations are carried on our books at about $222 million above the historical accounting values of the underlying assets. However, the managers of the units should be judged by the returns they achieve on the underlying assets; what we pay for a business does not affect the amount of capital its manager has to work with. (If, to become a shareholder and part owner of Commerce Clearing House, you pay, say, six times book value, that does not change CCH's return on equity.)

当然伯克希尔真正从这些公司赚得的报酬并没有那么地高，因为当初买下这些公司时，支付了相当的溢价才取得这些股份，经过统计，我们在这些公司原始投资超过其账面价值的溢价金额约为 2.22 亿美元，当然要判断这些公司经理人的绩效应该是要看他们创造的收益是使用多少资产所产生的，至于我们用多少钱买下这些公司并不影响经理人必须使用的资本数量，就算你用六倍账面价值的价钱买下商业结算所公司 CCH，同样也不会影响该公司的股本回报率。

Three important inferences can be drawn from the figures I have cited. First, the current business value of these seven units is far above their historical book value and also far above the value at which they are carried on Berkshire's balance sheet. Second, because so little capital is required to run these businesses, they can grow while concurrently making almost all of their earnings available for deployment in new opportunities. Third, these businesses are run by truly extraordinary managers. The Blumkins, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey all meld unusual talent, energy and character to achieve exceptional financial results.

以上所提数字代表着三项重要的推论，首先，现在这七家企业的内在价值远高于其历史账面价值，同样也远高于伯克希尔负债表上帐列的投资成本。第二，因为经营这些业务并不需要太多的资金，所以这些公司利用所赚取的收益既能实现自身业务增长，又能投入新机会中。第三，这些业务都由非常能干的经理人在经营，像布卢姆金家族 Blumkins、海德曼家族 Heldmans、查克·哈金斯 ChuckHuggins、斯坦·利普西 StanLipsey 与拉尔夫·谢伊 RalphSchey，皆兼具才干、精力与品格，将旗下业务经营的有声有色。

For good reasons, we had very high expectations when we joined with these managers. In every case, however, our experience has greatly exceeded those expectations. We have received far more than we deserve, but we are willing to accept such inequities. (We subscribe to the view Jack Benny expressed upon receiving an acting award: "I don't deserve this, but then, I have arthritis and I don't deserve that either.")

也因此当初这些明星经理人加入时，我们抱持着极高的期待，事后证明得到的结果远高于预期，我们获得远高于我们所应得的，当然我们很乐意接受这种不平等，我们借用杰克班尼在获得最佳男主角时的感言：“我不应该得到这个奖项，但同样地我也不应该得到关节炎。”

Beyond the Sainted Seven, we have our other major unit, insurance, which I believe also has a business value well above the net assets employed in it. However, appraising the business value of a property-casualty insurance company is a decidedly imprecise process. The industry is volatile, reported earnings oftentimes are seriously inaccurate, and recent changes in the Tax Code will severely hurt future profitability. Despite these problems, we like the business and it will almost certainly remain our largest operation. Under Mike Goldberg's management, the insurance business should treat us well over time.

除了这七个圣徒之外，我们还有一项主要的事业：保险业务，同样地我也认为它的价值远高于其帐列的资产，只是要评估一家财产意外险公司的价值就没有办法那么精确了，这个行业波动很大，报表所列的获利数字有时会有很大的偏差，而且最近税法修正对我们未来年度的获利有很大的影响，尽管如此，保险业务仍会是我们经营事业的最大重心，在迈克·戈德伯格(Mike Goldberg)的管理之下，保险业务的回报仍可期待。

With managers like ours, my partner, Charlie Munger, and I have little to do with operations. in fact, it is probably fair to say that if we did more, less would be accomplished. We have no corporate meetings, no corporate budgets, and no performance reviews (though our managers, of course, oftentimes find such procedures useful at their operating units). After all, what can we tell the Blumkins about home furnishings, or the Heldmans about uniforms?

有这些优秀的专业经理人，在业务的日常营运上，查理·芒格跟我实在是没有什么好费心思的地方，事实上，平心而论我们管的越多，可能只会把事情搞砸，在伯克希尔我们没有企业会议，也没有年度预算，更没有绩效考核(当然各个企业单位因自身所需，有自己的一套管理办法)，但总的来说，我们实在没有什么可以告诉指导布鲁姆金家族如何去卖家具，或是指导海德曼家族如何经营制服业务。

Our major contribution to the operations of our subsidiaries is applause. But it is not the indiscriminate applause of a Pollyanna. Rather it is informed applause based upon the two long careers we have spent intensively observing business performance and managerial behavior. Charlie and I have seen so much of the ordinary in business that we can truly appreciate a virtuoso performance. Only one response to the 1987 performance of our operating managers is appropriate: sustained, deafening applause.

我们对于这些所属事业单位最重要的支持就是适时地给予掌声，但这绝对不是在做烂好人，相反地这是长久下来我们深入观察这些企业的经营结果与管理层的作为所给予的正面肯定，我们两个人这些年来看过太多平庸企业的表现，所以我们是真正地珍惜他们艺术级的演出，对于 1987 年旗下子公司整体的表现，我们只能报以热烈的掌声，而且是震耳欲聋的掌声。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 1987 was $464 million, or 19.5%. Over the last 23 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,477.47, or at a rate of 23.1% compounded annually.

At Berkshire, however, the two valuations have tracked rather closely, with the growth rate in business value over the last decade moderately outpacing the growth rate in book value. This good news continued in 1987.

Our premium of business value to book value has widened for two simple reasons: We own some remarkable businesses and they are run by even more remarkable managers.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1987 was $464 million, or 19.5%. Over the last 23 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,477.47, or at a rate of 23.1% compounded annually.