巴菲特致股东的信（1987年）⑥融资

Financing

Shortly after yearend, Berkshire sold two issues of debentures, totaling $250 million. Both issues mature in 2018 and will be retired at an even pace through sinking fund operations that begin in 1999. Our overall interest cost, after allowing for expenses of issuance, is slightly over 10%. Salomon was our investment banker, and its service was excellent.

融资

在年后不久，伯克希尔发行了两期 30 年期债券，总共的金额是 2.5 亿美元，到期日皆为 2018 年并且会从1999 年开始慢慢分期由偿债基金赎回，包含发行成本在内，平均的资金成本约在 10%上下，负责这次发行债券的投资银行就是所罗门，他们提供了绝佳的服务。

Despite our pessimistic views about inflation, our taste for debt is quite limited. To be sure, it is likely that Berkshire could improve its return on equity by moving to a much higher, though still conventional, debt-to-business-value ratio. It's even more likely that we could handle such a ratio, without problems, under economic conditions far worse than any that have prevailed since the early 1930s.

尽管我们对于通货膨胀抱持悲观的看法，我们对于举债的兴趣还是相当有限，虽然可以肯定的是伯克希尔可以靠提高举债来增加投资报酬，即使这样做我们的负债比例还是相当的保守，且就算如此，我们很有信心应该可以应付比 1930 经济大萧条更坏的经济环境。

But we do not wish it to be only likely that we can meet our obligations; we wish that to be certain. Thus we adhere to policies - both in regard to debt and all other matters - that will allow us to achieve acceptable long-term results under extraordinarily adverse conditions, rather than optimal results under a normal range of conditions.

但我们还是不希望做这种大概没有问题的事情，我们要的是百分之百的确定。因此我们坚持一项政策，那就是不管是举债或是其它任何方面，我们希望的是，能够在最坏的情况下得到可以接受的合理结果，而不是预期在乐观的情况下，得到最佳的利益。

Good business or investment decisions will eventually produce quite satisfactory economic results, with no aid from leverage. Therefore, it seems to us to be both foolish and improper to risk what is important (including, necessarily, the welfare of innocent bystanders such as policyholders and employees) for some extra returns that are relatively unimportant. This view is not the product of either our advancing age or prosperity: Our opinions about debt have remained constant.

只要是好的商业模式或是好的投资决策，不依靠杠杆，最后也能取得令人满意的结果。因此我们认为，为了一点相对不重要的额外回报，将重要的东西(也包含保单持有人与员工福祉)暴露在不必要的风险之下是相当愚蠢且不适当的。这种观点既不是我们年龄增长还是繁荣的产物：我们对债务的看法保持不变。

However, we are not phobic about borrowing. (We're far from believing that there is no fate worse than debt.) We are willing to borrow an amount that we believe - on a worst-case basis - will pose no threat to Berkshire's well-being. Analyzing what that amount might be, we can look to some important strengths that would serve us well if major problems should engulf our economy: Berkshire's earnings come from many diverse and well-entrenched businesses; these businesses seldom require much capital investment; what debt we have is structured well; and we maintain major holdings of liquid assets. Clearly, we could be comfortable with a higher debt-to-business-value ratio than we now have.

当然，我们不会畏惧借贷(我们还不至于认为借钱是万恶不赦的)，我们还是愿意在估计不会损及伯克希尔利益的最坏情况下，进行举债。至于这个限度在哪里，我们就必须评估自己自身的实力，伯克希尔的获利来自于许多不同且扎实的产业，这些产业通常不需要额外大量的投资，负债的部分也相当健全，同时我们还保有大量的流动资产，很明显的，我们大可以承担比现在更高的债务比例。

One further aspect of our debt policy deserves comment: Unlike many in the business world, we prefer to finance in anticipation of need rather than in reaction to it. A business obtains the best financial results possible by managing both sides of its balance sheet well. This means obtaining the highest-possible return on assets and the lowest-possible cost on liabilities. It would be convenient if opportunities for intelligent action on both fronts coincided. However, reason tells us that just the opposite is likely to be the case: Tight money conditions, which translate into high costs for liabilities, will create the best opportunities for acquisitions, and cheap money will cause assets to be bid to the sky. Our conclusion: Action on the liability side should sometimes be taken independent of any action on the asset side.

我们举债政策还有一项特点值得说明，不像其它公司，我们比较希望能够未雨绸缪事先预备，而不是亡羊补牢事后补救。一家公司若能够同时管好资产负债表的两侧，就会有不错的财务结果，这代表一方面要能够将资产的回报率提高，一方面要能够将负债的成本降低，若是两边都能碰巧的兼顾那就太好了。不过事实告诉我们，通常情况正好相反，当资金吃紧时，代表负债的成本上升，这正是对外并购的最好时机，因为便宜的资金有时会将竞标的资产飙到天价。我们的结论是，在举债方面的动作，有时应该要跟购置资产方面的动作分开做。

Alas, what is "tight" and "cheap" money is far from clear at any particular time. We have no ability to forecast interest rates and - maintaining our usual open-minded spirit - believe that no one else can. Therefore, we simply borrow when conditions seem non-oppressive and hope that we will later find intelligent expansion or acquisition opportunities, which - as we have said - are most likely to pop up when conditions in the debt market are clearly oppressive. Our basic principle is that if you want to shoot rare, fast-moving elephants, you should always carry a loaded gun.

当然何谓吃紧？何谓便宜的资金？很难有一个清楚的分野，我们无法去预测利率的走向，所以我们随时保持开放的心态。因此，随机地在市场宽松时借钱，并期望之后可以找到合适的并购机会或投资标的，而通常如同我们先前所提到的，大概是会在市场悲观时出现。我们一个基本的原则就是，如果你想要猎捕那种罕见且移动迅速的大象，那么你的枪支就要随时上膛准备。

Our fund-first, buy-or-expand-later policy almost always penalizes near-term earnings. For example, we are now earning about 6 1/2% on the $250 million we recently raised at 10%, a disparity that is currently costing us about $160,000 per week. This negative spread is unimportant to us and will not cause us to stretch for either acquisitions or higher-yielding short-term instruments. If we find the right sort of business elephant within the next five years or so, the wait will have been worthwhile.

我们这种先准备资金，之后再买进扩张的政策，虽然会对我们短期内的收益造成影响，例如我们之前取得10%成本的 2.5 亿美元，现在大概只能赚得 6.5%的收益，中间的利差损失每个礼拜大概是 16 万美元，这对我们来说，只是个小数目，也不会迫使我们去从事一些短期高风险的投资，只要我们能在未来五年内找到理想的目标猎物，这一切等待都是值得的。