巴菲特致股东的信（1987年）⑤有价证券-其它

Marketable Securities - Other

In addition to our three permanent common stock holdings, we hold large quantities of marketable securities in our insurance companies. In selecting these, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income securities, (3) long-term fixed income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

有价证券 - 其它

除了上述的三家重要投资业务，我们的保险公司也持有大量的有价证券，主要可以分为五个类型，分别为：(1)长期股票投资(2)长期固定收益债券(3)中期固定收益债券(4)短期现金等价物(5)短期套利交易。

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by "mathematical expectation," limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的税后回报预计的数学期望值，并且仅限于我们认为了解熟悉的领域，我们无意让与短期的报告收益好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值的最大化。

o Let's look first at common stocks. During 1987 the stock market was an area of much excitement but little net movement: The Dow advanced 2.3% for the year. You are aware, of course, of the roller coaster ride that produced this minor change. Mr. Market was on a manic rampage until October and then experienced a sudden, massive seizure.

o 首先，看看普通股投资，1987 年股市的表现精彩连连，但最后指数却没有太大的进展，道琼斯指数整个年度只涨了 2.3%，你知道这个过程就好象是在坐过山车，市场先生在 10 月前爆跳如雷，但随后却突然收敛了下来。

We have "professional" investors, those who manage many billions, to thank for most of this turmoil. Instead of focusing on what businesses will do in the years ahead, many prestigious money managers now focus on what they expect other money managers to do in the days ahead. For them, stocks are merely tokens in a game, like the thimble and flatiron in Monopoly.

市场上有些所谓专业的投资人，掌管着数以亿万计的资金，就是这些人造成市场的动荡，他们不去研究企业未来几年的发展方向，反而专研于其它基金经理人未来几天的动向，对他们来说，股票只不过是赌博交易的筹码，就像是大富翁里的棋子一样。

An extreme example of what their attitude leads to is "portfolio insurance," a money-management strategy that many leading investment advisors embraced in 1986-1987. This strategy - which is simply an exotically-labeled version of the small speculator's stop-loss order dictates that ever increasing portions of a stock portfolio, or their index-future equivalents, be sold as prices decline. The strategy says nothing else matters: A downtick of a given magnitude automatically produces a huge sell order. According to the Brady Report, $60 billion to $90 billion of equities were poised on this hair trigger in mid-October of 1987.

他们的做法发展到极致，便形成所谓的投资组合风险理论，一个在 1986-1987 年间广为基金经理人所接受的一种策略，这种策略只不过是像投机者止损指令一样，当投资组合或是类似指数期货价格下跌时就必须卖出持股，这种策略不管其他，只要下跌到一定程度便会自动涌出一大堆卖单，根据《布雷迪报告》(Brady Report)显示：在 1987 年 10 月中旬，有高达 600-900 亿的股票投资面临一触即发的险境。

If you've thought that investment advisors were hired to invest, you may be bewildered by this technique. After buying a farm, would a rational owner next order his real estate agent to start selling off pieces of it whenever a neighboring property was sold at a lower price? Or would you sell your house to whatever bidder was available at 9:31 on some morning merely because at 9:30 a similar house sold for less than it would have brought on the previous day?

若是你认为投资顾问是被请来投资的，那你就大错特错了。在买下一家农场后，一个理性的主人会不会叫其不动产经纪人，每当附近的农场以较低的价格出售时，就变卖农场的一部分？或者，你会不会一早起来就想要把你的房子卖掉，只因为几分钟前你听到隔壁的房子以比以前便宜的价格脱手。

Moves like that, however, are what portfolio insurance tells a pension fund or university to make when it owns a portion of enterprises such as Ford or General Electric. The less these companies are being valued at, says this approach, the more vigorously they should be sold. As a "logical" corollary, the approach commands the institutions to repurchase these companies - I'm not making this up - once their prices have rebounded significantly. Considering that huge sums are controlled by managers following such Alice-in-Wonderland practices, is it any surprise that markets sometimes behave in aberrational fashion?

然而，投资组合风险理论告诉退休基金或是大学，当他们持有福特或是通用电气部分股权时，应该要采取这样的动作。这种理论方法认为，这些公司的价值越被低估，你就越应该赶快把他们处分掉。根据“合乎”逻辑的推论，一旦价格大幅反弹，这种方法就会命令投资机构再把他们买回来。这可不是我瞎编的。一想到有这么多的资金，掌握在整天沉溺在爱莉丝梦游仙境般的经理人手中，也难怪股票市场会有如此不寻常的表现。

Many commentators, however, have drawn an incorrect conclusion upon observing recent events: They are fond of saying that the small investor has no chance in a market now dominated by the erratic behavior of the big boys. This conclusion is dead wrong: Such markets are ideal for any investor - small or large - so long as he sticks to his investment knitting. Volatility caused by money managers who speculate irrationally with huge sums will offer the true investor more chances to make intelligent investment moves. He can be hurt by such volatility only if he is forced, by either financial or psychological pressures, to sell at untoward times.

然而许多评论家在观察最近所发生的事时，归纳出一个不正确的结论：他们喜欢说，由于股票市场掌握在这些投资大户手上，所以小额投资人根本一点机会也没有。这种结论实在是大大地错误，不管资金多寡，这样的市场绝对有利于任何投资者，只要他能够坚持自己的投资理念。事实上由手握重金的基金经理人所造成的市场波动，反而使得真正的投资人有更好的机会可以去贯彻其明智的投资行动，只要他在面临股市波动时，不会因为财务或心理因素而被迫在不当的时机卖出手中持股，他就很难会受到伤害。

At Berkshire, we have found little to do in stocks during the past few years. During the break in October, a few stocks fell to prices that interested us, but we were unable to make meaningful purchases before they rebounded. At yearend 1987 we had no major common stock investments (that is, over $50 million) other than those we consider permanent or arbitrage holdings. However, Mr. Market will offer us opportunities - you can be sure of that - and, when he does, we will be willing and able to participate.

在伯克希尔过去几年，我们在股票市场实在没有什么可以发挥的地方，在十月的那段期间，有几支股票跌到相当吸引我们的价位，不过我们没有能够在他们反弹之前买到够多的股份，在 1987 年底，除了永久的持股与短期的套利之外，我们并没有新增任何主要的股票投资组合(指 5,000 万美元以上)，不过你大可以放心，一旦市场先生再次给我们机会的时候，我们一定会好好把握住的。

o In the meantime, our major parking place for money is medium-term tax-exempt bonds, whose limited virtues I explained in last year's annual report. Though we both bought and sold some of these bonds in 1987, our position changed little overall, holding around $900 million. A large portion of our bonds are "grandfathered" under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which means they are fully tax-exempt. Bonds currently purchased by insurance companies are not.

o 与此同时，我们主要的资金避风港是中期的免税债券，在去年我已经解释过其特点，虽然在 1987 年间我们也有进出，但整个头寸变化不大，总金额约在 9 亿美元左右。根据 1986 年税务改革法案，大部分的债券受到了祖父级的疼爱，这意味着他们是完全免税的。但现在保险公司新买进的债券不是这样。

As an alternative to short-term cash equivalents, our medium-term tax-exempts have - so far served us well. They have produced substantial extra income for us and are currently worth a bit above our cost. Regardless of their market price, we are ready to dispose of our bonds whenever something better comes along.

作为短期现金的替代品，中期免税债券的表现还算不错，他们贡献了不少额外的投资报酬，而且目前的价值也略高于我们当初投资的成本，但不管之后他们的市价高或低，只要我们找到更好的投资机会，我们随时都有可能把他们给处分掉。

o We continue to have an aversion to long-term bonds (and may be making a serious mistake by not disliking medium-term bonds as well). Bonds are no better than the currency in which they are denominated, and nothing we have seen in the past year - or past decade - makes us enthusiastic about the long-term future of U.S. currency.

o 我们仍然避免去碰长期债券(也有可能因为没有对中期免税债券保持距离而犯下大错)，债券没有比他们能兑换的货币来得好，在过去十年以及可预见的未来，我们看不出我们会对美国债券有太大的兴趣。

Our enormous trade deficit is causing various forms of "claim checks" - U.S. government and corporate bonds, bank deposits, etc. - to pile up in the hands of foreigners at a distressing rate. By default, our government has adopted an approach to its finances patterned on that of Blanche DuBois, of A Streetcar Named Desire, who said, "I have always depended on the kindness of strangers." In this case, of course, the "strangers" are relying on the integrity of our claim checks although the plunging dollar has already made that proposition expensive for them.

我们巨额的贸易逆差，使得我们必须面临许多不同形式的支票帐单，这包含外国人持有的美国政府与企业公债、银行存款等，以惊人的速度累积成长，一开始我们的政府所采取的方式，就像是《欲望街车》主角布兰奇所说的：我总是依赖陌生人的同情心而活。当然本案的陌生人依靠的主要是债务人的可靠性，虽然贬值的美元也让他们必须付出高昂的代价。

The faith that foreigners are placing in us may be misfounded. When the claim checks outstanding grow sufficiently numerous and when the issuing party can unilaterally determine their purchasing power, the pressure on the issuer to dilute their value by inflating the currency becomes almost irresistible. For the debtor government, the weapon of inflation is the economic equivalent of the "H" bomb, and that is why very few countries have been allowed to swamp the world with debt denominated in their own currency. Our past, relatively good record for fiscal integrity has let us break this rule, but the generosity accorded us is likely to intensify, rather than relieve, the eventual pressure on us to inflate. If we do succumb to that pressure, it won't be just the foreign holders of our claim checks who will suffer. It will be all of us as well.

外国人对我们的信心可能有点所托非人，因为当未偿付债券持续的增加，而债务人又能够单方面地确定其购买力时，美钞发行人增加流通货币来稀释其货币价值的情况铁定会发生。对于债务国政府来说，通货膨胀这项武器就好象是经济战争中威力强大的氢弹一样，很少有国家可以让全世界充斥着以自己货币计价的债券，不过由于我们国家过去不错的财政记录，使得我们能够打破这项限制，只是这样的宽容使得我们通膨的压力只会增加不会减少，而一旦我们屈服于这样的压力，不只是持有美国债权的外国人遭殃，连带的我们也会受到影响。

Of course, the U.S. may take steps to stem our trade deficit well before our position as a net debtor gets out of hand. (In that respect, the falling dollar will help, though unfortunately it will hurt in other ways.) Nevertheless, our government's behavior in this test of its mettle is apt to be consistent with its Scarlett O'Hara approach generally: "I'll think about it tomorrow." And, almost inevitably, procrastination in facing up to fiscal problems will have inflationary consequences.

当然在债务问题失控之前，美国政府也会试着采取一些方法来抑制贸易逆差，(有关于这点，下滑的美元汇率或许会有帮助，只是同样地它又会造成另一种伤害)，目前我们政府的做法跟《乱世佳人》里斯嘉丽·奥哈拉(Scarlett O'Hara)的态度差不多一样，“明天再想办法吧！”，而且几乎无可避免地，对于财政问题的处理拖延将会造成通货膨胀的后果。

Both the timing and the sweep of those consequences are unpredictable. But our inability to quantify or time the risk does not mean we should ignore it. While recognizing the possibility that we may be wrong and that present interest rates may adequately compensate for the inflationary risk, we retain a general fear of long-term bonds.

只是这些后果发生的时点与影响我们实在无法去预测，不过无法去量化或是锁定这种风险不代表我们就可以忽视它的存在，当然我们的推论也许会不准确，目前的利率水平或可弥补通货膨胀所带来的损失，只是我们对于长期的债券仍报以持续的戒心。

We are, however, willing to invest a moderate portion of our funds in this category if we think we have a significant edge in a specific security. That willingness explains our holdings of the Washington Public Power Supply Systems #1, #2 and #3 issues, discussed in our 1984 report. We added to our WPPSS position during 1987. At yearend, we had holdings with an amortized cost of $240 million and a market value of $316 million, paying us tax-exempt income of $34 million annually.

然而，如果在某些特定的有价证券上有显著的优势，我们仍愿意把一部分资金摆在这上头，就像是我在 1984年年报中曾经提到我们在华盛顿公用电力系统债券 WPPSS 上的投资，在 1987 年我们又持续加码投资，年末，我们持有的这类债券帐面未摊销成本为 2.4 亿美元，市价约为 3.16 亿美元，每年 3400 万美元的免税利息收益。

o We continued to do well in arbitrage last year, though - or perhaps because - we operated on a very limited scale. We enter into only a few arbitrage commitments each year and restrict ourselves to large transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not participate in situations in which green-mailers are attempting to put a target company "in play."

o 我们持续在短期套利交易上有所斩获，虽然我们从事的规模有限，每年我们限制自己只专注在几个少数已公开信息的大型交易案，我们不介入那些已被投机套利客(绿邮诈骗)锁定的个案。

We have practiced arbitrage on an opportunistic basis for decades and, to date, our results have been quite good. Though we've never made an exact calculation, I believe that overall we have averaged annual pre-tax returns of at least 25% from arbitrage. I'm quite sure we did better than that in 1987. But it should be emphasized that a really bad experience or two - such as many arbitrage operations suffered in late 1987 - could change the figures dramatically.

我们从事基于机会成本的套利已有好几十年的经验，到目前为止，我们的成果还算不错，虽然我们从来没有仔细去算过，我相信我们在套利投资方面的税前年回报率应该有 25%左右，我确信 1987 年的成绩甚至比以前好的多，但必须强调的是只要发生一、两次像今年其它几个套利惨痛的经验，就可能使得整个结果猪羊变色。

Our only $50 million-plus arbitrage position at yearend 1987 was 1,096,200 shares of Allegis, with a cost of $76 million and a market value of $78 million.

今年我们唯一超过 5,000 万美元的套利案是，斥资 7,600 万美元投资 100 万股安杰利斯(Allegis)，目前的市价约为 7,800 万美元。

o We had two other large holdings at yearend that do not fit precisely into any of our five categories. One was various Texaco, Inc. bonds with short maturities, all purchased after Texaco went into bankruptcy. Were it not for the extraordinarily strong capital position of our insurance companies, it would be inappropriate for us to buy defaulted bonds. At prices prevailing after Texaco's bankruptcy filing, however, we regarded these issues as by far the most attractive bond investment available to us.

o 我们在年底还有另外二个较大持股不在前述五个范围之内，一项是 Texaco 短期债券，全都是在它破产之后才买进，要不是因为我们旗下保险公司的财务实力雄厚，我们实在不太适合去买这种已发生问题的债券，不过以这些债券在 Texaco 破产后的低廉价格，这是目前我们可以找得到最吸引我们的投资标的。

On a worst-case basis with respect to the Pennzoil litigation, we felt the bonds were likely to be worth about what we paid for them. Given a sensible settlement, which seemed likely, we expected the bonds to be worth considerably more. At yearend our Texaco bonds were carried on our books at $104 million and had a market value of $119 million.

考量其所牵涉的诉讼案件，在最坏的情况之下，我们认为应该还是可以将投资成本回收，而若是官司可以和解收场，我们预期债券的价值将会更高，截至年底 Texaco 石油债券在我们帐面上的成本约为 1.04 亿美元，目前的市值则约为 1.19 亿美元。
(Texaco 石油在 1984 年与 Pennzoil 石油争夺 Getty 石油的并购战中以高价胜出，破坏了一桩已经完成的交易。Pennzoil 起诉了 Texaco，获得了 100 亿美元的赔偿金。后来这一判决又减至 10 亿美元。然而，1987 年，最高法院宣布维持原判。Texaco 由于无力支付这项赔偿 4 月 12 日申请破产保护。股东诉讼接踵而至，他们一致认为公司兼并 Getty 石油的过程是违规操作。后来，Texaco 赔偿了 30 亿美元，股东的诉讼请求没有得到批准。1988年，Texaco 公司开始重新经营，最终于 2001 年被雪佛龙(Chevron)以 390 亿美元收购。)

By far our largest - and most publicized - investment in 1987 was a $700 million purchase of Salomon Inc 9% preferred stock. This preferred is convertible after three years into Salomon common stock at $38 per share and, if not converted, will be redeemed ratably over five years beginning October 31, 1995. From most standpoints, this commitment fits into the medium-term fixed-income securities category. In addition, we have an interesting conversion possibility.

到目前为止，我们在 1987 年最大和最广为人知的投资是以 7 亿美元购下所罗门公司 9%的优先股。该优先股在三年后以每股 38 美元的价格转换为所罗门普通股，如果不转换，将从 1995 年 10 月 31 日开始的五年内按比例赎回。从大多数角度来看，这一承诺属于中期固定收益证券类别。此外，我们还有一个有趣的转换可能性。

We, of course, have no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking. By their nature, the economics of this industry are far less predictable than those of most other industries in which we have major Commitments. This unpredictability is one of the reasons why our participation is in the form of a convertible preferred.

在投资银行业，我们当然没有特殊的远见能够预知其未来发展的方向与获利能力，就产业特性而言，投资银行业比起我们其它主要投资的行业更难预测，这种不可预测性是我们选择以可转换优先股的方式投资的原因。

What we do have a strong feeling about is the ability and integrity of John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon Inc. Charlie and I like, admire and trust John. We first got to know him in 1976 when he played a key role in GEICO's escape from near-bankruptcy. Several times since, we have seen John steer clients away from transactions that would have been unwise, but that the client clearly wanted to make - even though his advice provided no fee to Salomon and acquiescence would have delivered a large fee. Such service-above-self behavior is far from automatic in Wall Street.

当然我们对于所罗门公司的 CEO 约翰·古夫兰(John Gutfreund)的能力与品格有不错的印象，查理与我都很尊崇且信赖他，我们是在 1976 年开始认识他，当时他在协助 GEICO 保险汽车保险免于破产的命运时出了不少力，之后我们看到他好几次引导客户免于那些愚蠢的交易，虽然这使得所罗门因此损失许多顾问费收入，这种以客户服务至上的表现在华尔街并不多见。

For the reasons Charlie outlines on page 50, at yearend we valued our Salomon investment at 98% of par, $14 million less than our cost. However, we believe there is a reasonable likelihood that a leading, high-quality capital-raising and market-making operation can average good returns on equity. If so, our conversion right will eventually prove to be valuable. Two further comments about our investments in marketable securities are appropriate. First, we give you our usual warning: Our holdings have changed since yearend and will continue to do so without notice.

如同查理在之前所陈述的理由，截至年底我们将在所罗门公司的投资价值定在面额的 98%，大约比我们的投资成本少 1,400 万，不过我们仍然相信，这家公司在领先的高品质融资和与市场做市营运，将可为我们的投资创造不错的回报，若果真如此，我们的可转换权将会非常有价值。

The second comment is related: During 1987, as in some earlier years, there was speculation in the press from time to time about our purchase or sale of various securities. These stories were sometimes true, sometimes partially true, and other times completely untrue. Interestingly, there has been no correlation between the size and prestige of the publication and the accuracy of the report. One dead-wrong rumor was given considerable prominence by a major national magazine, and another leading publication misled its readers by writing about an arbitrage position as if it were a long-term investment commitment. (In not naming names, I am observing the old warning that it's not wise to pick fights with people who buy ink by the barrel.)

最后关于我们有价证券的投资再补充两点，第一，照例我还是给诸位一个提醒，相较于去年底的持股内容，我们现在的投资组合又有变动，并且还会继续变动，恕不另行通知。第二也与此相关，跟前几年一样，在 1987 年，媒体不断在猜测我们进出的投资标的，这些报导有时是真的，有时是半真半假，有时根本就不是事实。有趣的是，我发现媒体的规模与声誉和报导的真实性一点相关都没有，曾经有一家全美举足轻重的媒体杂志刊登一项完全错误的谣言，另外一家出版业者则将一桩短期的套利投资误当做是一项长期的投资。(之所以没有公布名字，是因为古有名训，遇到整桶整桶买墨水的人(代指媒体)，最好不要跟他发生争吵(因为根本吵不赢))。

You should understand that we simply don't comment in any way on rumors, whether they are true or false. If we were to deny the incorrect reports and refuse comment on the correct ones, we would in effect be commenting on all.

大家应该知道，我们从来不会对任何的谣言加以评论，不管是真或是假，因为若是我们否认不实的报导，或是拒绝对真实的事件发表评论，都等于间接表达了我们的立场。

In a world in which big investment ideas are both limited and valuable, we have no interest in telling potential competitors what we are doing except to the extent required by law. We certainly don't expect others to tell us of their investment ideas. Nor would we expect a media company to disclose news of acquisitions it was privately pursuing or a journalist to tell his competitors about stories on which he is working or sources he is using.

在现在这个社会，大型的投资机会相当的稀少且弥足珍贵，除非法令特别要求，我们不可能向潜在的竞争对手透露我们的动向，就像我们也不可能期待对手告诉我们他的想法，同样地我们也不期待媒体能够揭露他们独家采访得到的并购消息，就像是一个记者不可能向他的同业透露他正在努力追踪的独家新闻。

I find it uncomfortable when friends or acquaintances mention that they are buying X because it has been reported - incorrectly - that Berkshire is a buyer. However, I do not set them straight. If they want to participate in whatever Berkshire actually is buying, they can always purchase Berkshire stock. But perhaps that is too simple. Usually, I suspect, they find it more exciting to buy what is being talked about. Whether that strategy is more profitable is another question.

我特别觉得很不高兴，当我的朋友或是旧识告诉我说，他们正买进 X 公司的股票，因为报纸错误地报导说伯克希尔已经买进这家公司的股票。如果他们想参与伯克希尔实际购买的任何东西，他们可以随时购买伯克希尔股票，但也许这太简单了。不过后来我发现事情没有那么单纯，他们会买的原因主要是因为这些股票实在太热门，至于是否能够真正获利则是另外一回事。