巴菲特致股东的信（1988年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569 million, or 20.0%. Over the last 24 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：

本公司 1988 年的账面价值增加了 5.69 亿美元，或增长了 20.0%(标普 16.6%)，自从现任管理层接手的 24年以来，每股帐面价值从 19.46 美元增长到现在的 2,974.52 美元，年复合增长率约为 23.0%。

We’ve emphasized in past reports that what counts, however, is intrinsic business value - the figure, necessarily an estimate, indicating what all of our constituent businesses are worth. By our calculations, Berkshire’s intrinsic business value significantly exceeds its book value. Over the 24 years, business value has grown somewhat faster than book value; in 1988, however, book value grew the faster, by a bit.

在过去的年报中我们一再强调，真正重要的是企业的内在价值，它代表着我们旗下企业组成份子到底值多少钱？这个数字只是个估计数，根据我们内部的估算，目前伯克希尔内在价值已大幅超越其帐面价值，过去 24 年以来，企业内在价值增长的速度一直比帐面价值增长速度略快一点，但 1988 年，帐面价值的增长幅度略高于内在价值。

Berkshire’s past rates of gain in both book value and business value were achieved under circumstances far different from those that now exist. Anyone ignoring these differences makes the same mistake that a baseball manager would were he to judge the future prospects of a 42-year-old center fielder on the basis of his lifetime batting average.

过去伯克希尔内在价值与帐面价值成长的背景，与现在有很大的不同，若搞不清楚其间的差异，就好象是一位棒球教练在判断 42 岁高龄的中场选手未来潜力时，以他一生的平均打击率作为判断依据。

Important negatives affecting our prospects today are: (1) a less attractive stock market than generally existed over the past 24 years; (2) higher corporate tax rates on most forms of investment income; (3) a far more richly-priced market for the acquisition of businesses; and (4) industry conditions for Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company - Berkshire’s three permanent investments, constituting about one-half of our net worth - that range from slightly to materially less favorable than those existing five to ten years ago. All of these companies have superb management and strong properties. But, at current prices, their upside potential looks considerably less exciting to us today than it did some years ago.

目前我们所面临不利的因素主要有：(1) 与过去 24 年相比，股票市场的吸引力普遍下降。(2) 对大多数形式的投资收入，征收更高的公司税率。(3)企业被并购的价格偏高。(4) 约占伯克希尔账面价值一半的主要三大投资企业：大都会/ABC、GEICO 保险和华盛顿邮报，其产业状况多多少少不若以往，虽然这些公司有杰出的管理与强势的资产，但以目前的股价来看，他们向上成长的潜力相对有限。

The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital base. You’ve heard that from us before, but this problem, like age, grows in significance each year. (And also, just as with age, it’s better to have this problem continue to grow rather than to have it “solved.”)

然而我们面对的主要问题还是不断增加的资金规模，先前各位也听过类似的说明，不过这个问题就好象是一个人的身体健康与年纪的关系一样，随着时间的流逝，问题也越严重，(当然在这种情况下，我们希望这个问题越严重越好。)

Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of $3.9 billion to achieve a 15% annual return over the decade then ahead. Today, for the next decade, a 15% return demands profits of $10.3 billion. That seems like a very big number to me and to Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner. (Should that number indeed prove too big, Charlie will find himself, in future reports, retrospectively identified as the senior partner.)

四年前我曾告诉各位，未来十年，伯克希尔要想每年维持 15%的回报率，我们需要赚 39 亿美元的利润。时至今日，这个数字暴增到 103 亿美元。对查理与我来说，这实在是无法承担之重，(当然若这个数字事后发现真的过大，大家或许会在以后的报告中，查理可能会另外个别署名资深合伙人)。

As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital base exerts upon returns, we have a very important advantage now that we lacked 24 years ago. Then, all our capital was tied up in a textile business with inescapably poor economic characteristics. Today part of our capital is invested in some really exceptional businesses.

虽然不断增长的资金规模会拖累的投资回报率，但同时我们也拥有另外一项以前没有的优势，过去我们大部分的资本都被束缚在没有多少经济效益的纺织业务上，如今资本已转移到一些相当不错的业务。

Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See’s, and World Book. In 1988 the Saints came marching in. You can see just how extraordinary their returns on capital were by examining the historical-cost financial statements on page 45, which combine the figures of the Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units. With no benefit from financial leverage, this group earned about 67% on average equity capital.

去年我将他们取名叫做七个圣徒，布法罗新闻报、费区海默制服、柯比吸尘器、内布拉斯加家具超市、斯科特费泽制造集团、喜诗糖果及世界图书公司，今年七圣徒持续向前迈进，大家可以发现以历史投资成本的角度来看，他们的投资报酬实在是惊人，没有依靠财务杠杆，平均股本回报率高达 67%。

In most cases the remarkable performance of these units arises partially from an exceptional business franchise; in all cases an exceptional management is a vital factor. The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone.

虽然这些企业的卓越表现源于卓越的特许经营权，但优良的管理绝对是关键因素，查理跟我唯一可以做的就是让他们放手去干。

In my judgment, these businesses, in aggregate, will continue to produce superb returns. We’ll need these: Without this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15% goal. You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver; the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can effectively employ the funds that they generate.

在我看来，这些企业总体上将会持续产生丰厚回报，我们想要在往后年度继续维持 15%回报率的目标，绝对需要他们的支持，唯一的关键在于，查理跟我是否能够有效地运用他们所贡献出来源源不绝的现金。

In that respect, we took a step in the right direction early in 1989 when we purchased an 80% interest in Borsheim’s, a jewelry business in Omaha. This purchase, described later in this letter, delivers exactly what we look for: an outstanding business run by people we like, admire, and trust. It’s a great way to start the year.

在这点我们做出了一个正确的决定，那就是买下位于奥马哈波仙珠宝(Borsheim's)80%的股权，这项并购案会在后面说明，与我们当初的预期相符，一家优秀的企业由我们所欣赏且信任的人来经营。今年有一个好的开始。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569 million, or 20.0%. Over the last 24 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.

The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital base. You’ve heard that from us before, but this problem, like age, grows in significance each year. (And also, just as with age, it’s better to have this problem continue to grow rather than to have it “solved.”)

In most cases the remarkable performance of these units arises partially from an exceptional business franchise; in all cases an exceptional management is a vital factor. The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569 million, or 20.0%. Over the last 24 years (that is, since present management took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.