巴菲特致股东的信（1988年）②会计原则变动

Accounting Changes

We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990. When we move figures around from year to year, without any change in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary.

会计原则变动

1988 年执行了一项重要的会计原则变动，展望 1990 年还会有另一项变动。当经济现况没有改变，却将会计帐面数字改来改去，花一番工夫讨论一下影响层面是必要的。

First, I’ll offer my customary disclaimer: Despite the shortcomings of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules. The limitations of the existing set, however, need not be inhibiting: CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and creditors - and indeed they should. After all, any manager of a subsidiary company would find himself in hot water if he reported barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his boss, the parent corporation’s CEO. Why, then, should the CEO himself withhold information vitally useful to his bosses - the shareholder-owners of the corporation?

首先我习惯性的提出免责声明：尽管 GAAP(一般公认会计原则)确有缺点，但我没有能力重新制定一套新的会计规则，虽然这套原则确有其局限性，却不必就此废除，CEO 大可以也应该将 GAAP 报告当作是对股东与债权人尽告知义务的开始而非结束。若部门经理人只是提供 GAAP 报告，却不附上经营分析所必要的关键讯息，他们将会被 CEO 修理的很惨。同样的，公司的 CEO 是不是也应该向他的老板，也就是公司股东，报告必要的信息呢？

What needs to be reported is data - whether GAAP, non-GAAP, or extra-GAAP - that helps financially-literate readers answer three key questions: (1) Approximately how much is this company worth? (2) What is the likelihood that it can meet its future obligations? and (3) How good a job are its managers doing, given the hand they have been dealt?

真正需要报告的是数据，不管是 GAAP、非 GAAP 或是 GAAP 之外的，都可以帮助财务报表使用者了解三个问题：(1)这家公司大概价值多少？(2)它到达未来目标的可能性有多大？(3)在现有条件下，管理层的表现如何？

In most cases, answers to one or more of these questions are somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the minimum GAAP presentation. The business world is simply too complex for a single set of rules to effectively describe economic reality for all enterprises, particularly those operating in a wide variety of businesses, such as Berkshire.

大部分的情况下，简单的财务数字并不能回答以上的问题，商业世界太复杂了，很难用一套简单的规则有效地来描述所有企业的实质经济状况，尤其是像伯克希尔这种经营多种不同业务的企业集团。

Further complicating the problem is the fact that many managements view GAAP not as a standard to be met, but as an obstacle to overcome. Too often their accountants willingly assist them. (“How much,” says the client, “is two plus two?” Replies the cooperative accountant, “What number did you have in mind?”) Even honest and well-intentioned managements sometimes stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will more appropriately describe their performance. Both the smoothing of earnings and the “big bath” quarter are “white lie” techniques employed by otherwise upright managements.

更复杂的是，许多管理层不把 GAAP 当作是应该达到的标准，而是需要克服的障碍。而且，大多数的会计师也心甘情愿给予协助，当客户问到二加二等于几？配合的会计师可能会回答：那要看你想要多少？”即使是诚实且正直的管理阶层有时也会超越 GAAP，以使得报表数字更能展示他们的绩效。不管是让损益平滑一点或是某季巨额冲销，都是还算正直的管理层经常运用的做帐技巧。

Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and defraud. They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP results as gospel. So these charlatans interpret the rules “imaginatively” and record business transactions in ways that technically comply with GAAP but actually display an economic illusion to the world.

另外还有一些不肖经理人专门利用 GAAP 来进行欺骗与贪污，他们很清楚许多投资人与债权人把 GAAP 结果奉为圣经，因此，这些骗子运用丰富的想象力技巧性让交易符合 GAAP 规则，但却与实际的经济实质背道而驰。

As long as investors - including supposedly sophisticated institutions - place fancy valuations on reported “earnings” that march steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers and promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers, no matter what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen than small sums with a gun.

只要投资人，包括老练的专业投资机构，迷信于那些稳定向上攀升的收益数字，我们可以百分之百确定还会有经理人与拥护者不顾现实，继续滥用 GAAP 来满足投资人的需求。多年以来，查理跟我看到许多规模惊人的会计诈骗案，鲜少有人因此被惩罚，有的甚至都没有被发现，用笔偷钱要比用枪抢劫要来的容易的多。

Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988, we have been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our balance sheet and earnings statement. In the past, Mutual Savings and Loan, and Scott Fetzer Financial (a credit company that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby products) were consolidated on a “one-line” basis. That meant we (1) showed our equity in their combined net worths as a single-entry asset on Berkshire’s consolidated balance sheet and (2) included our equity in their combined annual earnings as a single-line income entry in our consolidated statement of earnings. Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset and liability of these companies in our balance sheet and each item of their income and expense in our earnings statement.

1988 年 GAAP 有一项重大变更，依新规定，伯克希尔的资产表和损益表必须全面合并所有子公司。在过去，互助储贷与斯科特费泽金融(Scott Fetzer Financial 主要为世界百科全书与柯比吸尘器产品提供分期付款服务的信贷公司)，只须单独认列损益即可，意思是说，(1)仅将被投资公司净值按投资比例以投资权益显示在伯克希尔的合并资产负债表之上。(2)仅将被投资公司年度损益按投资比例的投资收益显示在伯克希尔的合并损益表之上。但现在，我们必须将被投资公司的资产与负债、营收与费用，放进合并的财务报表之上。

This change underscores the need for companies also to report segmented data: The greater the number of economically diverse business operations lumped together in conventional financial statements, the less useful those presentations are and the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed earlier. Indeed, the only reason we ever prepare consolidated figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements. On the other hand, Charlie and I constantly study our segment data.

这项变更低估了公司也要报告部门信息。企业形态越复杂的公司，其按传统财务报表所加总出来的数字越没有意义，越没有办法让投资人回答前面所提的三个问题。事实上在伯克希尔，我们会准备合并数字的唯一原因就是要符合外部监管规定，查理和我看的则是细分部门的信息。

Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP statements, we have decided to publish additional supplementary information that we think will help you measure both business value and managerial performance. (Berkshire’s ability to discharge its obligations to creditors - the third question we listed - should be obvious, whatever statements you examine.) In these supplementary presentations, we will not necessarily follow GAAP procedures, or even corporate structure. Rather, we will attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid analysis but do not swamp you with detail. Our goal is to give you important information in a form that we would wish to get it if our roles were reversed.

现在我们被要求在财务报表上将更多的数字混在一起，我们现在决定公布更多的补充信息，有助于帮助各位来衡量企业价值与管理层的表现。伯克希尔履行对债权人义务的能力，我们提到的第三个问题，应该是显而易见的，不管你看什么样的报表。在这些补充信息中，我们不一定依照 GAAP，甚至不以公司来区分，相反地，我们会试着将同性质的企业汇总，有助于大家分析而不是被一大堆信息所掩没，我们的目标是设身处地的为各位设想，给各位我们认为重要的讯息。

On pages 41-47 we show separate combined balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; (2) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (3) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in (3) as well as various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.

我们按以下四个部门分类：(1)金融业务，包含互助储贷与斯科特财务公司。(2)保险业务，依投资部位分门别类。(3)制造、出版、零售业务，扣除某些非营业资产以及购买法会计调整数。(4)其它业务，包含前述非营业资产(主要是有价证券投资)及 Wesco 与伯克希尔母公司所持有的资产与负债。

If you combine the earnings and the net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, we want to emphasize that our new presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it. (In fact, they may be horrified; I don’t want to ask.)

如果将以上四类的收益与净值加总，你将得到与 GAAP 一致的总数，但是我们必须强调的是这种新的表示方法并未经过会计师审计，最好是不要审，因为他们要是看到这种报表，一定会被吓个半死。

I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is expected in 1990. This change relates to the calculation of deferred taxes, and is both complicated and controversial - so much so that its imposition, originally scheduled for 1989, was postponed for a year.

先前我曾提到在 1990 年会有另一项会计原则的重大变更，主要与递延所得税有关，这项原则相当的复杂且极具争议性，以致于原定计划于 1989 年实施又被延后一年。

When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various ways. Most important, we will be required to change the way we calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.

当这项原则开始实施后，对我们影响有几个方面，最重要的一点就是我们必须重新修正旗下保险公司所持有的未实现股票资本利得，以及计算递延所得税负债的方式。

Right now, our liability is layered. For the unrealized appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years, $1.2 billion, we have booked a 28% tax liability. For the unrealized appreciation built up since, $600 million, the tax liability has been booked at 34%. The difference reflects the increase in tax rates that went into effect in 1987.

原先我们在这方面的负债分作好几层，对于 1986 年以前帐列未实现收益，大约在 12 亿美元左右，系以 28%的税率估算，对于 1986 年之后的帐列未实现收益，大约在 6 亿美元左右，系以 34%的税率估算，1987 年起调整税率的差异反应税负的差异。

It now appears, however, that the new accounting rule will require us to establish the entire liability at 34% in 1990, taking the charge against our earnings. Assuming no change in tax rates by 1990, this step will reduce our earnings in that year (and thereby our reported net worth) by $71 million. The proposed rule will also affect other items on our balance sheet, but these changes will have only a minor impact on earnings and net worth.

现在看起来，新的会计原则要求我们从 1990 年开始，必须将所有未实现收益的预估税率订在 34%，经估算光是这一项改变，就会使得我们的年度收益与净值减少 7100 万美元，还不包含其它大大小小的影响，但这些变化对净利润和净资产的影响很小。

We have no strong views about the desirability of this change in calculation of deferred taxes. We should point out, however, that neither a 28% nor a 34% tax liability precisely depicts economic reality at Berkshire since we have no plans to sell the stocks in which we have the great bulk of our gains.

其实我们不认为这样变更有其必要性，因为对于伯克希尔来说，不管税率是 28%或是 34%，都不能反应我们公司的实质现况，因为我们从来不考虑出售这些，我们具有庞大未实现收益的股票。

To those of you who are uninterested in accounting, I apologize for this dissertation. I realize that many of you do not pore over our figures, but instead hold Berkshire primarily because you know that: (1) Charlie and I have the bulk of our money in Berkshire; (2) we intend to run things so that your gains or losses are in direct proportion to ours; and (3) the record has so far been satisfactory. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this kind of “faith” approach to investing. Other shareholders, however, prefer an “analysis” approach and we want to supply the information they need. In our own investing, we search for situations in which both approaches give us the same answer.

对于那些对会计不感兴趣的人，很抱歉耽误各位的时间，我很清楚你们当中有很多根本不会仔细去看数字，但却仍持续支持我们，因为你们知道：(1)查理跟我本身的身家也都在里面；(2)我们绝对会与各位同甘共苦；(3)到目前为止先前的记录还算令人满意。事实上这种信仰式的投资方法并没有什么不好，但也有一些股东比较喜欢深入分析的方式，因此我们也有必要提供足够的信息给他们，至于伯克希尔本身在做投资时，则是两种方法并用，重点在于能不能得到满意的答案。

Accounting Changes We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990. When we move figures around from year to year, without any change in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary.

I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is expected in 1990. This change relates to the calculation of deferred taxes, and is both complicated and controversial - so much so that its imposition, originally scheduled for 1989, was postponed for a year.

When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various ways. Most important, we will be required to change the way we calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.

Accounting Changes

We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990. When we move figures around from year to year, without any change in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary.