巴菲特致股东的信（1988年）
⑤保险业务

Insurance Operations

     Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the insurance industry:

保险业务

下表是有关保险业务的几项主要数据更新：

     The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合比率代表的是保险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100 以下代表会有承保盈利，100 以上代表会有承保损失，若把持有保费收入所产生的浮存金(扣除股东权益部分所产生的收益)所产生的投资收益列入考量，盈亏平衡点的范围大概是在 107-111 之间。

     For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry’s incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry’s tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time. As the table shows, the industry’s underwriting loss grew in 1988. This trend is almost certain to continue - and probably will accelerate - for at least two more years.

基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增长的比率约在 10%左右，若是保费收入增长没有到达 10%以上，亏损一定会扩大。虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏起来，如表所示，1988 年行业整体的承保亏损有所增加，而这个趋势应该会继续持续下去，甚至在未来两年还会加速恶化。  

     The property-casualty insurance industry is not only subnormally profitable, it is subnormally popular. (As Sam Goldwyn philosophized: “In life, one must learn to take the bitter with the sour.”) One of the ironies of business is that many relatively-unprofitable industries that are plagued by inadequate prices habitually find themselves beat upon by irate customers even while other, hugely profitable industries are spared complaints, no matter how high their prices.  

产险业的获利情况不但是相当的低，而且也是不太受尊重的行业，(山姆戈德温(Samuel Goldwyn)曾颇具哲理地说过：生活中必须学会体验人生的苦痛酸涩)。商业中的一大讽刺是：许多行业做的要死要活的同时，还要被客户糟蹋；而有些赚翻了的行业，东西明明贵的要死，却是一个愿打一个愿挨。

     Take the breakfast cereal industry, whose return on invested capital is more than double that of the auto insurance industry (which is why companies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at five times book value and most large insurers sell close to book). The cereal companies regularly impose price increases, few of them related to a significant jump in their costs. Yet not a peep is heard from consumers. But when auto insurers raise prices by amounts that do not even match cost increases, customers are outraged. If you want to be loved, it’s clearly better to sell high-priced corn flakes than low-priced auto insurance.

以早餐麦片为例，它的投入资本回报率是汽车保险业的两倍多(这也是为什么家乐氏与通用磨坊的市净率是五倍，而大多数保险业者的市净率仅为一倍)，麦片公司常常在调整产品售价，即便其生产成本没什么变化，但消费者却没什么抱怨。但要是换做是保险业者，就算只是为了反映成本而稍微调整一下价格，保户马上就会生气地跳起来，所以若你识相，显然去卖高价的玉米片比卖低价的汽车保险，要好得多。

     The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can have serious consequences: Proposition 103, a California initiative passed last fall, threatens to push auto insurance prices down sharply, even though costs have been soaring. The price cut has been suspended while the courts review the initiative, but the resentment that brought on the vote has not been suspended: Even if the initiative is overturned, insurers are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California. (Thank heavens the citizenry isn’t mad at bonbons: If Proposition 103 applied to candy as well as insurance, See’s would be forced to sell its product for $5.76 per pound. rather than the $7.60 we charge - and would be losing money by the bucketful.) 

一般大众对于保险业的敌视可能会造成严重的后果，去年秋天加州通过的一项 103 提案可能会大幅压低保险价格，尽管成本一再飙升，所幸法院正在重新检视这项提案，但这次投票所引发的不满情绪却未曾消减，即使提案被推翻，保险业者在加州已很难再有营运获利的空间，(谢天谢地，加州人还没有对巧克力糖果感到反感，若是103 提案也如保险般适用于糖果的话，喜诗可能被迫卖每磅 5.76 元而不是现在的每磅 7.6 元，果真如此，喜诗可能就要亏大钱了)。

     The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the initiative are minor, since we saw few opportunities for profit in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the vote. However, the forcing down of prices would seriously affect GEICO, our 44%-owned investee, which gets about 10% of its premium volume from California. Even more threatening to GEICO is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in other states, through either initiatives or legislation.

对伯克希尔来说，这项法案的短期影响不大，因为即使在这法案之前，加州现行的费率结构也很难让我找到有获利的商机，然而这项压低保费的做法却会直接影响到我们持有 44%股权的 GEICO 保险，其有 10%的保费收入系来自加州。对 GEICO 更具威胁的是，其它州可能会通过提案或是立法的方式也采取类似的行动。

     If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost, it eventually must be sold by government. Stockholders can subsidize policyholders for a short period, but only taxpayers can subsidize them over the long term. At most property-casualty companies, socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for shareholders. Because of the commodity characteristics of the industry, most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by government to leave the auto insurance business. But GEICO, because it is a low-cost producer able to earn high returns on equity, has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk. In turn, so do we.

若民众坚持汽车保险费的价格一定要低于成本，则最后可能要由政府来直接负责，股东或可暂时补贴保户，但只有纳税人可以长期补贴他们。对大部分的财产意外险公司来说，社会化的汽车保险对于其股东不会有太大影响，因为由于这个产业是属于大众商品，保险业者所赚的投资回报平平，所以，若因此被政府强迫退出市场，也不会有太大的商誉损失。但 GEICO 保险就不一样了，由于它的成本低，相对地可以获得高报酬，所以可能会有很大的潜在商誉损失，而这当然会连带影响到我们。

     At Berkshire, in 1988, our premium volume continued to fall, and in 1989 we will experience a large decrease for a special reason: The contract through which we receive 7% of the business of Fireman’s Fund expires on August 31. At that time, we will return to Fireman’s Fund the unearned premiums we hold that relate to the contract. This transfer of funds will show up in our “premiums written” account as a negative $85 million or so and will make our third-quarter figures look rather peculiar. However, the termination of this contract will not have a significant effect on profits.

在 1988 年伯克希尔的保费收入持续减少，到了 1989 年我们预期保费收入还会大幅下滑，一方面是因为消防员退休基金 7%的份额业务即将于八月底到期，届时依合约我们必须将未到期的保费退还，估计总共退回的金额8,500 万美元，这将使得我们第三季度的数字看起来有点奇怪，当然合同结束不会对利润造成太大的影响。

     Berkshire’s underwriting results continued to be excellent in 1988. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 104. Reserve development was favorable for the second year in a row, after a string of years in which it was very unsatisfactory. Details on both underwriting and reserve development appear on pages 36-38.

伯克希尔 1988 年的承保表现依旧相当不错，我们的综合比率约 104%(依照法定基础扣除结构化结算与金融再保)，损失准备提列在前几年不佳后，连续两年情况还算良好。

     Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to run very low, since business with a reasonable potential for profit will almost certainly be scarce. So be it. At Berkshire, we simply will not write policies at rates that carry the expectation of economic loss. We encounter enough troubles when we expect a gain.

我们的保费收入规模预计在未来几年内都会维持在相当低的水平，因为有利可图的生意实在是少之又少，随它去，在伯克希尔我们不可能在知道明明会亏钱的情况下，还去硬接生意，光是接看起来有赚头的生意，就让我们的麻烦够多了。

     Despite - or perhaps because of - low volume, our profit picture during the next few years is apt to be considerably brighter than the industry’s. We are sure to have an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume, and that augurs well for profits. In 1989 and 1990 we expect our float/premiums ratio to be at least three times that of the typical property/casualty company. Mike Goldberg, with special help from Ajit Jain, Dinos Iordanou, and the National Indemnity managerial team, has positioned us well in that respect.

尽管(也或许正因为如此)我们的保单量少，可以预期我们的获利情况在未来几年内也会比同业来的出色，相较于保单量我们有高比例的浮存金，这对利润来说是个好兆头。在 1989-1990 年，我们的浮存金/保费收入比例至少会是同业水准的三倍以上，迈克·戈德伯格(Mike Goldberg)在阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)、迪诺斯·罗达瑙(DinosIordanou)和国民保险的经营团队的协助下使我们站在相当有利的位置。

     At some point - we don’t know when - we will be deluged with insurance business. The cause will probably be some major physical or financial catastrophe. But we could also experience an explosion in business, as we did in 1985, because large and increasing underwriting losses at other companies coincide with their recognition that they are far underreserved. in the meantime, we will retain our talented professionals, protect our capital, and try not to make major mistakes.

某些时候(我们不知道什么时候)我们可能会被保险业务拖垮，有可能会是一些重大的自然或金融灾难，但我们也有可能会经历像 1985 年一样爆炸式增长，因为当其它同业因长期杀价抢单，一夕之间损失突然爆发，才发现损失提列准备远远不足，在那种情况下，我们一定会留住优秀的人才，保护好资本并尽量避免犯下重大的错误。

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