巴菲特致股东的信（1988年）⑥有价证券

Marketable Securities

In selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income securities, (3) long-term fixed-income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

有价证券

在为我们的保险业务选择有价证券投资之时，我们主要有五种选择(1)长期股票投资；(2)长期固定收益债券；(3)中期固定收益债券；(4)短期现金等价物；(5)短期套利交易。

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by “mathematical expectation,” limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找，最高的税后回报率预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们认为了解和熟悉的投资，我们无意让与短期的报告收益好看，我们的目标是让长期的账面价值极大化。

o Below we list our common stock holdings having a value over $100 million, not including arbitrage commitments, which will be discussed later. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

o 下表是我们市值超过 1 亿美元以上的普通股投资(不包括套利交易，这部分我们后面再谈)，一部分投资属于伯克希尔关系企业所持有。

Our permanent holdings - Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company - remain unchanged. Also unchanged is our unqualified admiration of their managements: Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post. Charlie and I appreciate enormously the talent and integrity these managers bring to their businesses.

我们永久的持股，大都会/ABC、GEICO 保险与华盛顿邮报依旧不变，同样不变的是我们对于这些管理阶层无条件的敬仰，不管是大都会/ABC 的汤姆.墨菲与丹·伯克(Dan Burke)、GEICO 保险的比尔·斯奈德(Bill Snyder)和路易·辛普森(Lou Simpson)，还有华盛顿邮报的凯瑟琳·格雷厄姆与迪克·西蒙斯(Dick Simmons)，查理跟我对于他们所展现的才能与品格同感敬佩。

Their performance, which we have observed at close range, contrasts vividly with that of many CEOs, which we have fortunately observed from a safe distance. Sometimes these CEOs clearly do not belong in their jobs; their positions, nevertheless, are usually secure. The supreme irony of business management is that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate.

他们的表现，就我们最近距离的观察，与许多公司的 CEO 截然不同，所幸我们能与后者保持适当的距离，因为有时这些 CEO 实在是不胜任，但却总是能够坐稳其宝座，企业管理最讽刺的就是不称职的老板要比不称职的下属更容易保住其位置。

If a secretary, say, is hired for a job that requires typing ability of at least 80 words a minute and turns out to be capable of only 50 words a minute, she will lose her job in no time. There is a logical standard for this job; performance is easily measured; and if you can’t make the grade, you’re out. Similarly, if new sales people fail to generate sufficient business quickly enough, they will be let go. Excuses will not be accepted as a substitute for orders.

假设一位秘书在应征时被要求一分钟要能够打 80 个字，但录取之后被发现一分钟只能打 50 个字，很快地她就可能会被炒鱿鱼，因为有一个相当客观的标准在那里，其表现如何很容易可以衡量的出来；同样的，一个新进的业务员，若是不能马上创造足够业绩，可能立刻就被解雇，为了维持纪律，很难允许有例外情形发生。

However, a CEO who doesn’t perform is frequently carried indefinitely. One reason is that performance standards for his job seldom exist. When they do, they are often fuzzy or they may be waived or explained away, even when the performance shortfalls are major and repeated. At too many companies, the boss shoots the arrow of managerial performance and then hastily paints the bullseye around the spot where it lands.

但是一个 CEO 表现不好，却可以无限期的撑下去，一个原因就是根本没有一套可以衡量其表现的标准存在，就算真的有，也是写的很模糊，或是能含混解释过去，即便是错误与过失一再发生也是如此，有太多的公司是等老板先射出业绩之箭，再到墙上把准心描上去。

Another important, but seldom recognized, distinction between the boss and the foot soldier is that the CEO has no immediate superior whose performance is itself getting measured. The sales manager who retains a bunch of lemons in his sales force will soon be in hot water himself. It is in his immediate self-interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes. Otherwise, he himself may be weeded out. An office manager who has hired inept secretaries faces the same imperative.

另外一个很重要但却很少被提起的老板与员工之间的差别是，老板本身没有一个直接可以衡量判断其表现的上司，业务经理不可能让一颗老鼠屎一直留在他那一锅粥之内，他一定会很快地把它给挑出来，否则可能连他自己都会有问题，同样的一个老板要是请到一位无能的秘书，也会有相同的动作。

But the CEO’s boss is a Board of Directors that seldom measures itself and is infrequently held to account for substandard corporate performance. If the Board makes a mistake in hiring, and perpetuates that mistake, so what? Even if the company is taken over because of the mistake, the deal will probably bestow substantial benefits on the outgoing Board members. (The bigger they are, the softer they fall.)

但 CEO 的上司也就是董事会却很少检视其绩效，并为企业表现不佳负责，就算董事会选错了人，而且这个错误还持续存在又怎样？即使因为这样使得公司被接收，通常交易也会确保被逐出的董事会成员有丰厚的利益(且通常公司越大，甜头越多)。

Finally, relations between the Board and the CEO are expected to be congenial. At board meetings, criticism of the CEO’s performance is often viewed as the social equivalent of belching. No such inhibitions restrain the office manager from critically evaluating the substandard typist.

最后董事会与 CEO 之间的关系应该是要能够意气相投，在董事会议当中，对于 CEO 表现的批评就好象是在社交场合中打嗝一样不自然，但却没有一位经理人会被禁止不准严格地审核打字员的绩效。

These points should not be interpreted as a blanket condemnation of CEOs or Boards of Directors: Most are able and hard-working, and a number are truly outstanding. But the management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us thankful that we are linked with the managers of our three permanent holdings. They love their businesses, they think like owners, and they exude integrity and ability.

以上几点不是要一杆子打翻一条船，大部分的 CEO 或是董事会都相当努力、能干，有一小部分更是特别的杰出，但查理跟我在看过很多失败的例子之后，更加对于我们能够与前面三家公司优秀的经理人共事感到非常幸运，他们热爱他们的事业，想法跟老板一致，且散发出才气与品格。

o In 1988 we made major purchases of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Pfd. (“Freddie Mac”) and Coca Cola. We expect to hold these securities for a long time. In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever. We are just the opposite of those who hurry to sell and book profits when companies perform well but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that disappoint. Peter Lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and watering the weeds. Our holdings of Freddie Mac are the maximum allowed by law, and are extensively described by Charlie in his letter. In our consolidated balance sheet these shares are carried at cost rather than market, since they are owned by Mutual Savings and Loan, a non-insurance subsidiary.

o 1988 年我们做出两项重大的决定，大笔买进房地美与可口可乐，我们打算要持有这些股票很长的一段期间。事实上当我们发现我们持有兼具杰出企业与杰出经理人的股权时，我们最长的投资期间是永久，我们跟那些急着想要卖出表现不错的股票以实现获利，却顽固地不肯出脱那些绩效差的股份的那群人完全相反。彼得林奇曾生动地将这种行为解释成铲除花朵浇灌野草。我们持有房利美的股份比例是法令规定的上限，这部分查理在后面会详加为各位说明，因为他们是 Wesco 子公司旗下互助储贷所投资，所以在我们的合并资产负债表当中，这些持股将以成本而非市价列示。

We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few companies that we try to understand well. There are only a handful of businesses about which we have strong long-term convictions. Therefore, when we find such a business, we want to participate in a meaningful way. We agree with Mae West: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”

我们持续将投资集中在少数我们能够了解的公司之上，只有少部分企业是我们想要长期持有的，因为当我们好不容易找到这样的公司时，我们会想要达到一定的参与程度，我们同意 Mae West 的看法：好东西当然是多多益善。

o We reduced our holdings of medium-term tax-exempt bonds by about $100 million last year. All of the bonds sold were acquired after August 7, 1986. When such bonds are held by property-casualty insurance companies, 15% of the “tax-exempt” interest earned is subject to tax.

o 去年我们中期免税债券投资减少了约一亿美元，所有卖出的债券都是在 1986 年 8 月 7 日之后才取得的，当这些债券由产险公司所持有的时候，其中 15%的利息收入是要课税的。

The $800 million position we still hold consists almost entirely of bonds “grandfathered” under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which means they are entirely tax-exempt. Our sales produced a small profit and our remaining bonds, which have an average maturity of about six years, are worth modestly more than carrying value.

剩下我们仍持有约 8 亿美元的债券，都是属于适用 1986 年租税改革法案完全免税的祖父级债券，出售的债券将有些许的获利，而继续持有的债券平均到期日大概是六年，其市价大概略高于帐面价值。

Last year we described our holdings of short-term and intermediate-term bonds of Texaco, which was then in bankruptcy. During 1988, we sold practically all of these bonds at a pre-tax profit of about $22 million. This sale explains close to $100 million of the reduction in fixed-income securities on our balance sheet.

去年我们曾提及我们所持有的已破产的 Texaco 石油短期与中期公司债券，1988 年我们已经将所有头寸处分了，获利约 2200 万美元，此举将使得我们在固定收益债券的投资部位减少 1 亿美元。

We also told you last year about our holdings of another security whose predominant characteristics are those of an intermediate fixed-income issue: our $700 million position in Salomon Inc 9% convertible preferred. This preferred has a sinking fund that will retire it in equal annual installments from 1995 to 1999. Berkshire carries this holding at cost. For reasons discussed by Charlie on page 69, the estimated market value of our holding has improved from moderately under cost at the end of last year to moderately over cost at 1988 year end.

去年我们还提到了另外一个深具固定收益特色的投资：亦即所罗门公司 9%可转换优先股，这种特别股特别要求公司提拨偿债基金，自 1995 年到 1999 年间分批赎回，伯克希尔将这些投资以成本列示在帐上，基于查理所提的原因，现在的估计市价以从前一年度略低于成本，转变为 1988 年的略高于成本。

The close association we have had with John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon, during the past year has reinforced our admiration for him. But we continue to have no great insights about the near, intermediate or long-term economics of the investment banking business: This is not an industry in which it is easy to forecast future levels of profitability. We continue to believe that our conversion privilege could well have important value over the life of our preferred. However, the overwhelming portion of the preferred’s value resides in its fixed-income characteristics, not its equity characteristics.

我们与所罗门 CEO 约翰·古弗兰(John Gutfreund)之间良好的关系，随着几年来的合作日益增进，但我们还是无法判断投资银行业的前景，不管是短期、中期或是长期皆然，这是一个难以预估未来获利水平的产业，我们仍然相信我们所拥有的转换权益会在其有效期内，对我们产生相当大的贡献，然而这种特别股的价值主要还是来自于其固定收益，而不是股权特性之上。

o We have not lost our aversion to long-term bonds. We will become enthused about such securities only when we become enthused about prospects for long-term stability in the purchasing power of money. And that kind of stability isn’t in the cards: Both society and elected officials simply have too many higher-ranking priorities that conflict with purchasing-power stability. The only long-term bonds we hold are those of Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS). A few of our WPPSS bonds have short maturities and many others, because of their high coupons, are likely to be refunded and paid off in a few years. Overall, our WPPSS holdings are carried on our balance sheet at $247 million and have a market value of about $352 million.

o 我们对于长期债券的规避依旧不变，唯有当我们对于货币的长期购买力有信心时，我们才会对这类的债券有兴趣，但这种稳定性却根本没办法预期，因为不管是社会或是选出来的官员，实在是有太多的优先事项是与购买力的稳定性相冲突的。所以目前我们唯一持有的长期债券就是华盛顿公用电力供应系统 WPPSS，其中有些期限较短，有一些则是分几年赎回的高息票，目前资产负债表上帐列成本为 2.47 亿美元，目前市价约为 3.52 亿美元。

We explained the reasons for our WPPSS purchases in the 1983 annual report, and are pleased to tell you that this commitment has worked out about as expected. At the time of purchase, most of our bonds were yielding around 17% after taxes and carried no ratings, which had been suspended. Recently, the bonds were rated AA- by Standard & Poor’s. They now sell at levels only slightly below those enjoyed by top-grade credits.

我们在 1983 年年报中曾经解释过购买 WPPSS 的理由，现在很高兴跟大家报告，结果完全符合我们当初的预期，在买进的时候，债券的评级被暂时取消，估计税后的投资回报率约为 17%，最近它被标普评为 AA-等级，按目前的市价大概只有比最高等级债券的投资回报好一点。

In the 1983 report, we compared the economics of our WPPSS purchase to those involved in buying a business. As it turned out, this purchase actually worked out better than did the general run of business acquisitions made in 1983, assuming both are measured on the basis of unleveraged, after tax returns achieved through 1988.

在 1983 年的年报中，我们比较了投资 WPPSS 与一般企业的差异，结果显示这次的投资要比当时同期间所从事并购案还要好，假设两者皆以为无财务杠杆的基础下进行。

Our WPPSS experience, though pleasant, does nothing to alter our negative opinion about long-term bonds. It only makes us hope that we run into some other large stigmatized issue, whose troubles have caused it to be significantly misappraised by the market.

不过我们在 WPPSS 的愉快经历并未能改变我们对于长期债券的负面看法，除非再让我们碰到暂时僵住的大案子，因为短暂的问题使得其市价严重的被低估。