巴菲特致股东的信(1989年)
①概述


To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

     Our gain in net worth during 1989 was $1.515 billion, or 44.4%. Over the last 25 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,296.01, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东:

本公司 1989 年的账面价值增加了 15.15 亿美元,或增长了 44.4%(标普 31.7%),自从现任管理层接手的 25年以来,每股帐面价值从 19.46 美元增长到现在的 4,296.01 美元,年复合增长率约为 23.8%。

     What counts, however, is intrinsic value - the figure indicating what all of our constituent businesses are rationally worth. With perfect foresight, this number can be calculated by taking all future cash flows of a business - in and out - and discounting them at prevailing interest rates. So valued, all businesses, from manufacturers of buggy whips to operators of cellular phones, become economic equals. 

然而真正重要的还是内在价值,这个数字代表组成我们企业所有业务的合理价值,根据精准的远见,这个数字可由企业未来预计的现金流量(包含流进与流出),并以现行的利率予以折现,不管是马鞭的制造公司或是移动电话的业者都可以在同等的地位上,据以评估其经济价值。

     Back when Berkshire's book value was $19.46, intrinsic value was somewhat less because the book value was entirely tied up in a textile business not worth the figure at which it was carried. Now most of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying values. This agreeable evolution from a discount to a premium means that Berkshire's intrinsic business value has compounded at a rate that somewhat exceeds our 23.8% annual growth in book value.

当伯克希尔的帐面价值是 19.46 美元之时,由于主要的资产属于纺织业务,所以内在价值要低于帐面价值,时至今日,我们多数业务的内在价值却早已较帐面价值多的多,这种令人愉快的从折价到溢价的演变,代表着伯克希尔内在价值增长的速度要比帐面价值每年平均 23.8%的复合增长率还要再高一些。

     The rear-view mirror is one thing; the windshield is another. A large portion of our book value is represented by equity securities that, with minor exceptions, are carried on our balance sheet at current market values. At yearend these securities were valued at higher prices, relative to their own intrinsic business values, than has been the case in the past. One reason is the buoyant 1989 stock market. More important, the virtues of these businesses have been widely recognized. Whereas once their stock prices were inappropriately low, they are not now.

后视镜是一回事,面向未来又是另外一回事,我们帐面价值大部分是我们所持有的有价证券,除了少数的例外,大多数是以市价列示在资产负债表上,与过去相比,年底这些有价证券市价已大幅超过其内在价值,一方面是因为 1989 年股市的飙涨,另一方面则是这些有价证券的价值得到大家的认同,也就是说过去他们的股价曾经相当的低估,但这种情况如今已不复存在。

     We will keep most of our major holdings, regardless of how they are priced relative to intrinsic business value. This 'til-death-do-us-part attitude, combined with the full prices these holdings command, means that they cannot be expected to push up Berkshire's value in the future as sharply as in the past. In other words, our performance to date has benefited from a double-dip: (1) the exceptional gains in intrinsic value that our portfolio companies have achieved; (2) the additional bonus we realized as the market appropriately "corrected" the prices of these companies, raising their valuations in relation to those of the average business. We will continue to benefit from good gains in business value that we feel confident our portfolio companies will make. But our "catch-up" rewards have been realized, which means we'll have to settle for a single-dip in the future.

我们仍然会保持主要持仓不动,不管相较于内在价值其市价是多少,我们对于他们至死不分离的态度加上这些股票现在的价位,意味者他们在未来可能无法再像先前那样将伯克希尔的净值大幅向上推升。换句话说,我们能有现在的表现主要受惠于量价双击:(1)我们旗下的公司所创造出的内在价值增长,(2)由于市场修正这些公司的股价,他们相对于一般企业的估值大幅提高了,我们又收到了额外的红利。我们将继续受益于公司业务价值的良好增长,但是对于估值修复的回报已经实现,这意味着我们将来只能依靠业绩的增长。

     We face another obstacle: In a finite world, high growth rates must self-destruct. If the base from which the growth is taking place is tiny, this law may not operate for a time. But when the base balloons, the party ends: A high growth rate eventually forges its own anchor.

此外我们还面临到另一项挑战,在有限的世界里,任何高成长的事物终将自我毁灭,若是增长的基数相对较小,那么这条定律可能暂时不起作用,但是当基数膨胀到一定程度时,好戏就会结束,高成长终有一天会被自己所束缚。

     Carl Sagan has entertainingly described this phenomenon, musing about the destiny of bacteria that reproduce by dividing into two every 15 minutes. Says Sagan: "That means four doublings an hour, and 96 doublings a day. Although a bacterium weighs only about a trillionth of a gram, its descendants, after a day of wild asexual abandon, will collectively weigh as much as a mountain...in two days, more than the sun - and before very long, everything in the universe will be made of bacteria." Not to worry, says Sagan: Some obstacle always impedes this kind of exponential growth. "The bugs run out of food, or they poison each other, or they are shy about reproducing in public." 

Carl Sagan 曾经开玩笑地解释这种现象,有一种细菌每 15 分钟可以分裂一次,亦即代表每一小时复制四次,一天可复制 96 次,虽然单一个细菌其重量只有万亿分之一克,但是只要经过一天无止尽的无性生殖,其重量可能会比一座山还重,经过两天后,甚至会比太阳还重,要不了多久宇宙所有空间都将由这种细菌所组成。不过Sagan 又说,大家不必担心,大自然总有一些障碍会阻止其指数成长,有可能是耗尽食物,或是互相毒害,或是羞于在大庭广众之下复制。

     Even on bad days, Charlie Munger (Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner) and I do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium. Nor, to our unending sorrow, have we found a way to double its net worth every 15 minutes. Furthermore, we are not the least bit shy about reproducing - financially - in public. Nevertheless, Sagan's observations apply. From Berkshire's present base of $4.9 billion in net worth, we will find it much more difficult to average 15% annual growth in book value than we did to average 23.8% from the $22 million we began with.  

即使是在最坏的情况下,查理·芒格与我都不认为伯克希尔会像细菌一样无止境地成长,当然更不可能像细菌那样找到每 15 分钟就能将净资产翻一番的方法,虽然,我们不会像细菌那般羞于在公开场合进行复制,不过,Sagan 的观察仍然适用,相较于刚开始的 2,200 万,以伯克希尔目前的 49 亿美元的账面价值基础,我们实在很难像过去那样每年以 15%以上的增长率增加。

〔译文源于芒格书院整理的巴菲特致股东的信〕

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