巴菲特致股东的信（1990年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Last year we made a prediction: "A reduction [in Berkshire's net worth] is almost certain in at least one of the next three years." During much of 1990's second half, we were on the road to quickly proving that forecast accurate. But some strengthening in stock prices late in the year enabled us to close 1990 with net worth up by $362 million, or 7.3%. Over the last 26 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,612.06, or at a rate of 23.2% compounded annually.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：

去年我们曾经预测过，伯克希尔的帐面价值在未来的三年内有可能会减少，结果在 1990 年的下半年我们差点就证明了这项预测的真实性，还好年底前股票价格的上涨使得我们公司的净值增长 3.62 亿美元，或增长了7.3%(标普跌 3.1%)。自从现任管理层接手的 26 年以来，每股帐面价值从 19.46 美元增长到现在的 4,612.06 美元，年复合增长率约为 23.2%。

Our growth rate was lackluster in 1990 because our four major common stock holdings, in aggregate, showed little change in market value. Last year I told you that though these companies - Capital Cities/ABC, Coca-Cola, GEICO, and Washington Post - had fine businesses and superb managements, widespread recognition of these attributes had pushed the stock prices of the four to lofty levels. The market prices of the two media companies have since fallen significantly - for good reasons relating to evolutionary industry developments that I will discuss later - and the price of Coca-Cola stock has increased significantly for what I also believe are good reasons. Overall, yearend 1990 prices of our "permanent four," though far from enticing, were a bit more appealing than they were a year earlier.

1990 年我们增长之所以减缓，主要是因为我们四个主要的股票投资的市值并没有多大的变动所致，去年我曾向各位表示，虽然这些公司(大都会/ABC、可口可乐、GEICO 保险与华盛顿邮报)拥有优秀的业务与精湛的管理，但是因为这些特点现在已广为投资大众所认同，所以也促使公司股价推升到一个颇高的价位；另外其中两家媒体事业之后的股价又大幅滑落，原因在于后面我会再详细叙述该产业革命性的演进，另外可口可乐的股价也因为我个人也相当认同的原因为大众所接受而大涨，不过总的来说，目前这四大天王的股价，虽然不够吸引人，但比起一年以前来说，要算是合理的多。

Berkshire's 26-year record is meaningless in forecasting future results; so also, we hope, is the one-year record. We continue to aim for a 15% average annual gain in intrinsic value. But, as we never tire of telling you, this goal becomes ever more difficult to reach as our equity base, now $5.3 billion, increases.

伯克希尔过去 26 年来辉煌的记录并不足以确保未来也会如此发展，当然我们也希望过去一年惨痛的记录也不能代表未来的结果就是如此，我们还是依旧将目标订在每年 15%的内在价值增长率，只是正如我们不厌其烦告诉各位的，随着我们的股本规模(现为 53 亿美元)不断增加，这个目标会变得越来越难以实现。

If we do attain that 15% average, our shareholders should fare well. However, Berkshire's corporate gains will produce an identical gain for a specific shareholder only if he eventually sells his shares at the same relationship to intrinsic value that existed when he bought them. For example, if you buy at a 10% premium to intrinsic value; if intrinsic value subsequently grows at 15% a year; and if you then sell at a 10% premium, your own return will correspondingly be 15% compounded. (The calculation assumes that no dividends are paid.) If, however, you buy at a premium and sell at a smaller premium, your results will be somewhat inferior to those achieved by the company.

要是我们真的能够达到这样的目标，那么我们的股东一定赚翻了，因为伯克希尔的企业获利将会为那些买卖价格与公司内在价值一致的投资人创造相同的获利，举例来说，如果你以内在价值 10%的溢价买进伯克希尔股份，假设后来公司内在价值每年增长了 15%，而之后你同样以内在价值 10%的溢价卖出所持有的股份，则你的投资年回报率应该也会是 15%(这个例子假设期间公司并未发放任何股利)，当然要是后来你以低于 10%的溢价卖出股份的话，那么你最后所得到的投资回报率可能就会低于公司同期间 15%的回报率。

Ideally, the results of every Berkshire shareholder would closely mirror those of the company during his period of ownership. That is why Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I hope for Berkshire to sell consistently at about intrinsic value. We prefer such steadiness to the value-ignoring volatility of the past two years: In 1989 intrinsic value grew less than did book value, which was up 44%, while the market price rose 85%; in 1990 book value and intrinsic value increased by a small amount, while the market price fell 23%.

在理想的情况下，伯克希尔所有股东的投资回报，在其拥有公司部分所有权的期间，应该会与公司本身的经营成果相符，这也是为什么查理·芒格-伯克希尔的副主席，也是我的合伙人，和我本身都希望伯克希尔的股价能与其所代表的内在价值维持一定关系的原因，相较于过去两年股市默视价值的任意波动，我们宁愿伯克希尔股价稳定一点。1989 年，我们内在价值的增长幅度远低于帐面价值 44%的增长幅度，但股价却大涨了 85%；到了 1990年，帐面价值与内在价值都略微增加，但同期股价却下跌了 23%。

Berkshire's intrinsic value continues to exceed book value by a substantial margin. We can't tell you the exact differential because intrinsic value is necessarily an estimate; Charlie and I might, in fact, differ by 10% in our appraisals. We do know, however, that we own some exceptional businesses that are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books.

截至目前为止，伯克希尔的内在价值仍超过帐面价值不少，不过我们无法告诉你实际的数字是多少，因为内在价值本身就是一个估计数，事实上光是查理与我自己本身所估出来的数字就可能有超过 10%的差距，不过可以确信的是，我们所拥有一些优秀的企业其实际的价值远高于列示在公司帐上的投资成本。

Much of the extra value that exists in our businesses has been created by the managers now running them. Charlie and I feel free to brag about this group because we had nothing to do with developing the skills they possess: These superstars just came that way. Our job is merely to identify talented managers and provide an environment in which they can do their stuff. Having done it, they send their cash to headquarters and we face our only other task: the intelligent deployment of these funds.

我们的被投资公司之所以能够拥有这么多额外的价值，完全要归功于经营它们的这批优秀经理人，查理跟我可以很自在地夸耀这支团队，因为他们之所以能够拥有这些才能与我们一点关系都没有，这些超级经理人一直都是如此，而我们的工作只不过是发掘这些有才能的经理人，并提供一个让他们可以好好发挥的工作环境。这样他们就会将现金源源不绝地送回总部，接下来我们就会面临另一项重要的任务：如何有效地配置这些资金。

My own role in operations may best be illustrated by a small tale concerning my granddaughter, Emily, and her fourth birthday party last fall. Attending were other children, adoring relatives, and Beemer the Clown, a local entertainer who includes magic tricks in his act.

我个人在营运上扮演的角色可由我孙女 Emily 的一个小故事来做说明，去年秋天在她四岁的生日宴会上，参加的人除了小朋友与疼爱她的家人之外，还有一位小丑演员 Beemer，席间他还特地为大家表演了一段魔术。

Beginning these, Beemer asked Emily to help him by waving a "magic wand" over "the box of wonders." Green handkerchiefs went into the box, Emily waved the wand, and Beemer removed blue ones. Loose handkerchiefs went in and, upon a magisterial wave by Emily, emerged knotted. After four such transformations, each more amazing than its predecessor, Emily was unable to contain herself. Her face aglow, she exulted: "Gee, I'm really good at this."

一开始 Beemer 请 Emily 帮他拿一支神奇的魔棒在一个宝贝箱上挥舞，绿色的手帕放进箱子里，在 Emily 挥了棒子一下之后，跑出来蓝色的手帕；接着又放进一条手帕，Emily 又挥了一下，这回跑出一条打结的手帕，经过四回合一次比一次精彩的表演之后，Emily 喜不自胜，脸上发光沾沾自喜的大叫，“我实在是太厉害了！”

And that sums up my contribution to the performance of Berkshire's business magicians - the Blumkins, the Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey and Ralph Schey. They deserve your applause.

这就是我在伯克希尔的所有贡献，感谢旗下企业所有的魔术师：Blumkins 家族、Friedman 家族、Heldmans 家族、Mike Goldberg、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey 与 Ralph Schey 等人，请为这些人精彩的演出给予热烈的掌声。