巴菲特致股东的信（1990年）④非保险业务营运

Non-Insurance Operations

Take another look at the figures on page 51, which aggregate the earnings and balance sheets of our non-insurance operations. After-tax earnings on average equity in 1990 were 51%, a result that would have placed the group about 20th on the 1989 Fortune 500.

非保险业务营运

看看上面的那些数字，亦即我们非保险业务的收益与资产负债加总，1990 年的平均股本回报率是 51%，这个获利能力在 1989 年的财富五百强可以排在前 20 名。

Two factors make this return even more remarkable. First, leverage did not produce it: Almost all our major facilities are owned, not leased, and such small debt as these operations have is basically offset by cash they hold. In fact, if the measurement was return on assets - a calculation that eliminates the effect of debt upon returns - our group would rank in Fortune's top ten.

还有两项因素使得这样的成绩显得更为出色，首先，它们完全不靠融资杠杆，几乎所有的主要设备都是自有的，而不是租赁的，仅有的负债可以由自有的现金完全抵销，事实上，如果衡量标准是总资产回报率，亦即排除负债对于收益的助力，我们非保险业务甚至可以排在前 10 名。

Equally important, our return was not earned from industries, such as cigarettes or network television stations, possessing spectacular economics for all participating in them. Instead it came from a group of businesses operating in such prosaic fields as furniture retailing, candy, vacuum cleaners, and even steel warehousing. The explanation is clear: Our extraordinary returns flow from outstanding operating managers, not fortuitous industry economics.

同样重要的是，我们的获利并不是来自于像香烟或是电视台这些拥有特许经营权的产业，相反地它们是来自于一些再平淡无奇的产业，诸如家具零售、糖果、吸尘器甚至是钢铁仓储等，这样的解释很明白，我们得来不易的报酬主要是靠优秀杰出的经理人精湛的运营，而非先天的产业经济优势。

Let's look at the larger operations:

o It was a poor year for retailing - particularly for big-ticket items - but someone forgot to tell Ike Friedman at Borsheim's. Sales were up 18%. That's both a same-stores and all-stores percentage, since Borsheim's operates but one establishment.

让我们来看看其中几项比较大的业务营运：

o 去年对零售业来说算是相当惨淡的一年，尤其是单价高的东西，不过大家可能是忘了提醒在波仙珠宝店 IkeFriedman 这项事实，导致他店里的业绩逆势增长了 18%，这是单店也是全店的数字，自从波仙仅此一家别无分号的老店开张以来就是如此。

But, oh, what an establishment! We can't be sure about the fact (because most fine-jewelry retailers are privately owned) but we believe that this jewelry store does more volume than any other in the U.S., except for Tiffany's New York store.

喔！超厉害的一家店，我们实在不太敢相信这一事实，因为大部分最高级的珠宝店多是私人拥有，但我们却相信这家店除了纽约的 Tiffany 之外，全美其它所有的珠宝店没有一家比得上它。

Borsheim's could not do nearly that well if our customers came only from the Omaha metropolitan area, whose population is about 600,000. We have long had a huge percentage of greater Omaha's jewelry business, so growth in that market is necessarily limited. But every year business from non-Midwest customers grows dramatically. Many visit the store in person. A large number of others, however, buy through the mail in a manner you will find interesting.

波仙的客户群若只有大奥马哈都会区 600 万人口的话，生意可能没有办法做的那么大，长久以来我们在奥马哈地区的占有率一直就很高，因此该地区的增长潜力必然是有限的，所幸每年来自非中西部地区的生意都大幅成长，很多都是客户自己慕名而来亲单上门，但还有一大部分是通过相当有趣的邮购方式购买我们的产品。

These customers request a jewelry selection of a certain type and value - say, emeralds in the $10,000 -$20,000 range - and we then send them five to ten items meeting their specifications and from which they can pick. Last year we mailed about 1,500 assortments of all kinds, carrying values ranging from under $1,000 to hundreds of thousands of dollars.

这些客户大多指定要一定品质与价位的珠宝，例如 1-2 万美元的绿宝石，之后我们会送上五到十件符合他们要求的样品供他们做挑选，去年我们总共寄出超过 1,500 种组合，价值从 1,000 美元到几十万美元不等。

The selections are sent all over the country, some to people no one at Borsheim's has ever met. (They must always have been well recommended, however.) While the number of mailings in 1990 was a record, Ike has been sending merchandise far and wide for decades. Misanthropes will be crushed to learn how well our "honor-system" works: We have yet to experience a loss from customer dishonesty.

这些产品被分送到全美各地，有些人是波仙素未谋面的，(当然他们必须要经过别人郑重的推荐)，虽然这个数量在 1990 年达到高峰，但事实 Ike 在几十年以前就开始这样的创举，在得知我们所实施的荣誉制度竟然能运作的这么好，反对者可能会崩溃，截至目前为止我们还没有因为客户的不诚实而遭受损失。

We attract business nationwide because we have several advantages that competitors can't match. The most important item in the equation is our operating costs, which run about 18% of sales compared to 40% or so at the typical competitor. (Included in the 18% are occupancy and buying costs, which some public companies include in "cost of goods sold.") Just as Wal-Mart, with its 15% operating costs, sells at prices that high-cost competitors can't touch and thereby constantly increases its market share, so does Borsheim's. What works with diapers works with diamonds.

我们之所以能够吸引全美各地的生意上门主要是因为我们有几项优势是其它竞争对手所无法比拟的，其中最重要的一项就是经营的成本，相较于同业的 40%的高费用率，波仙的营业成本大概是营业额的 18%(这包含持有与采购成本，有些上市公司还把他们列在销售成本项下)，就像是沃尔玛的营业费用率只有 15%，因此可以以其它高成本竞争者无法达到的价位销售，从而持续地增加其市场占有率，波仙也是如此，同样的方式适合卖尿布，换做于卖钻石一样管用。

Our low prices create huge volume that in turn allows us to carry an extraordinarily broad inventory of goods, running ten or more times the size of that at the typical fine-jewelry store. Couple our breadth of selection and low prices with superb service and you can understand how Ike and his family have built a national jewelry phenomenon from an Omaha location.

由于价格低廉，所以销售数量也相当大，因此我们可以备有各式各样的产品存货，比起其它店规模与数量甚至超过十倍之多，除了种类齐全、价格低廉之外，再加上我们贴心的服务，这也是为什么 Ike 与他的家人可以在奥马哈这个小地方创造出全美闻名的珠宝传奇。

And family it is. Ike's crew always includes son Alan and sons-in-law Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale. And when things are busy - that's often - they are joined by Ike's wife, Roz, and his daughters, Janis and Susie. In addition, Fran Blumkin, wife of Louie (Chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike's cousin), regularly pitches in. Finally, you'll find Ike's 89-year-old mother, Rebecca, in the store most afternoons, Wall Street Journal in hand. Given a family commitment like this, is it any surprise that Borsheim's runs rings around competitors whose managers are thinking about how soon 5 o'clock will arrive?

真是虎父无犬子，Ike 的团队包括他儿子 Alan 与女婿 Marvin 和 Donald，而且要是生意忙不过来的话，Ike的老婆 Roz 跟他的女儿们 Janis与 Susie 还会过来帮忙，另外，Louie (内布拉斯加家具店的老板，Ike 的表弟) 的老婆 Fran Blumkin，有时也会过来搭把手，最后大家绝对不要忘了还有艾克高龄 89 岁的母亲 Rebecca，每天下午都会手拿华尔街日报坐镇店里，能够有一个家族像这样的投入，也难怪他们可以轻松击败那些由每天只等五点下班的专业经理人所经营的店。

o While Fran Blumkin was helping the Friedman family set records at Borsheim's, her sons, Irv and Ron, along with husband Louie, were setting records at The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Sales at our one-and-only location were $159 million, up 4% from 1989. Though again the fact can't be conclusively proved, we believe NFM does close to double the volume of any other home furnishings store in the country.

当 Fran Blumkin 帮助 Friedman 家族创造波仙珠宝店的记录时，她的先生Louie 以及儿子 Irv与 Ron，同时也在内布拉斯加家具店创造记录，1990 年单店的营业额 1.59 亿美元，较前一年度增加 4%，虽然没有精确的统计数字，但我们相信内布拉斯加家具店的销售量最少是全美其它同业的两倍以上。

The NFM formula for success parallels that of Borsheim's. First, operating costs are rock-bottom - 15% in 1990 against about 40% for Levitz, the country's largest furniture retailer, and 25% for Circuit City Stores, the leading discount retailer of electronics and appliances. Second, NFM's low costs allow the business to price well below all competitors. Indeed, major chains, knowing what they will face, steer clear of Omaha. Third, the huge volume generated by our bargain prices allows us to carry the broadest selection of merchandise available anywhere.

内布拉斯加家具店成功的方式与波仙十分的相近，首先，运营成本实在是压得够低。在 1990 年，相较于全美最大家具零售商 Levitz 的 40%费用率、家电折扣零售商 Circuit City25%的费用率，内布拉斯加家具店竟只有15%。第二，由于运营成本低，所以内布拉斯加家具店的产品定价远低于竞争同业，事实上许多连锁店也很清楚这一点，所以他们唯一的做法就是尽量避开奥马哈地区。第三，便宜的价格导致销量大好，从而可以让我们提供更多别处所看不到，种类齐全的产品。

Some idea of NFM's merchandising power can be gleaned from a recent report of consumer behavior in Des Moines, which showed that NFM was Number 3 in popularity among 20 furniture retailers serving that city. That may sound like no big deal until you consider that 19 of those retailers are located in Des Moines, whereas our store is 130 miles away. This leaves customers driving a distance equal to that between Washington and Philadelphia in order to shop with us, even though they have a multitude of alternatives next door. In effect, NFM, like Borsheim's, has dramatically expanded the territory it serves - not by the traditional method of opening new stores but rather by creating an irresistible magnet that employs price and selection to pull in the crowds.

有关内布拉斯加家具店的商品魔力可以从最近得梅因地区(DesMoines)的消费者行为调查报告中看出端倪，内布拉斯加家具店在该地区所有的 20 家家具零售商当中排名第三，这讯息乍听之下或许没什么了不得，但你可知道其它 19 家都位在得梅因，而内布拉斯加家具店离该地区足足有 130 英里远，也就是说，当地的居民虽然在家门口就有更多的选择，却还是情愿大老远开车驶过相当从华盛顿到费城的距离，只为了买我们的产品。事实上内布拉斯加家具店就像波仙一样，急速地扩张其服务版图的范围，靠的不是传统地开设新店模式，而是利用价格与种类散发出强烈的磁场，吸引客户远道而来。

Last year at the Mart there occurred an historic event: I experienced a counterrevelation. Regular readers of this report know that I have long scorned the boasts of corporate executives about synergy, deriding such claims as the last refuge of scoundrels defending foolish acquisitions. But now I know better: In Berkshire's first synergistic explosion, NFM put a See's candy cart in the store late last year and sold more candy than that moved by some of the full-fledged stores See's operates in California. This success contradicts all tenets of retailing. With the Blumkins, though, the impossible is routine.

去年在家具店发生了一件重大的历史事件，使我经历了一次自我反省，经常阅读我们年报的读者应该都知道，长久以来我对于企业主管动不动就强调的企业协同效应嗤之以鼻，认为这不过是管理层对于愚蠢并购案所作的推托之词，不过现在我有了深的理解，在伯克希尔我们创造出第一个企业协同效应，内布拉斯加家具店在去年底在店内摆设了喜诗的糖果零售车，结果所卖出的糖果甚至比加州的旗舰店还要多，这次的成功打破了所有零售业的定律，然而，有布鲁姆金家族在，实现不可能的事都是家常便饭。

o At See's, physical volume set a record in 1990 - but only barely and only because of good sales early in the year. After the invasion of Kuwait, mall traffic in the West fell. Our poundage volume at Christmas dropped slightly, though our dollar sales were up because of a 5% price increase.

o 提到喜诗糖果，1990 年的销售数量又创新高，不过成长相当有限，且主要是拜年初业绩大好所致。在伊拉克入侵科威特之后，西方世界的购物中心销售量大减，使得圣诞节的销售磅数略微下滑，不过，上调价格使得我们的营收增长了 5%。

That increase, and better control of expenses, improved profit margins. Against the backdrop of a weak retailing environment, Chuck Huggins delivered outstanding results, as he has in each of the nineteen years we have owned See's. Chuck's imprint on the business - a virtual fanaticism about quality and service - is visible at all of our 225 stores.

销售金额增加，加上营业费用控制得当，获利也有所改善，面对零售业大环境不佳的窘境，就如同过去他接手后的 19 年，Chuck Huggins 还是一如往常递出漂亮的成绩单，Chuck 对于品质与服务的坚持，在我们所有225 家分店中都看得到。

One happening in 1990 illustrates the close bond between See's and its customers. After 15 years of operation, our store in Albuquerque was endangered: The landlord would not renew our lease, wanting us instead to move to an inferior location in the mall and even so to pay a much higher rent. These changes would have wiped out the store's profit. After extended negotiations got us nowhere, we set a date for closing the store.

1990 年所发生的一件事最足以说明喜诗糖果与客户之间紧密的关系，经过 15 年的营运，我们在阿尔伯克基市(Albuquerque)的分店濒临关闭：房东不愿与我们续租，而是希望我们搬到购物商场较差的位置。即使这样，还要调涨租金，如此一来将会把我们仅有的利润给吃光，经过协调不成，迫不得已我们贴出的即将停业的告示。

On her own, the store's manager, Ann Filkins, then took action, urging customers to protest the closing. Some 263 responded by sending letters and making phone calls to See's headquarters in San Francisco, in some cases threatening to boycott the mall. An alert reporter at the Albuquerque paper picked up the story. Supplied with this evidence of a consumer uprising, our landlord offered us a satisfactory deal. (He, too, proved susceptible to a counterrevelation.)

之后靠着店经理 Ann Filkins 个人的努力，采取行动敦促客户们向房东表达抗议，总计有 263 位客户写信或打电话到喜诗位于旧金山的总部，有的甚至扬言要抵制购物商场，甚至引起当地记者的注意，大幅刊载这项消息，有了众多客户的支持，房东最后终于妥协，提供一个令我们满意的条件(我想他应该也得到一个自我反省的机会)。

Chuck subsequently wrote personal letters of thanks to every loyalist and sent each a gift certificate. He repeated his thanks in a newspaper ad that listed the names of all 263. The sequel: Christmas sales in Albuquerque were up substantially.

事后 Chuck 对喜诗所有忠实的支持者一一写了亲笔的感谢函，并在报纸上刊登所有 263 位客户名单，后续的发展是我们在阿尔伯克基分店的圣诞节销售大幅增长。

o Charlie and I were surprised at developments this past year in the media industry, including newspapers such as our Buffalo News. The business showed far more vulnerability to the early stages of a recession than has been the case in the past. The question is whether this erosion is just part of an aberrational cycle - to be fully made up in the next upturn - or whether the business has slipped in a way that permanently reduces intrinsic business values.

o 查理跟我对于过去几年媒体业务的发展感到相当的意外，包含布法罗日报等报纸在内，这个产业现在因为经济衰退所受到的伤害，要比过去的经验要来的严重许多，问题是这种衰退只是因为景气循环的暂时失调呢？(意味着下次景气上扬会再恢复)，还是有可能一去不复返，企业的价值就此永远地流失掉。

Since I didn't predict what has happened, you may question the value of my prediction about what will happen. Nevertheless, I'll proffer a judgment: While many media businesses will remain economic marvels in comparison with American industry generally, they will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the industry, or lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.

因为我没能预料事态会如此发展，所以你可能会质疑我预测未来的能力，尽管如此我还是提供个人的判断供大家参考：虽然相较于美国其它产业，媒体业务仍然维持一个不错的经济荣景，不过还是远不如我个人、产业界或是借款人几年前的预期。

The reason media businesses have been so outstanding in the past was not physical growth, but rather the unusual pricing power that most participants wielded. Now, however, advertising dollars are growing slowly. In addition, retailers that do little or no media advertising (though they sometimes use the Postal Service) have gradually taken market share in certain merchandise categories. Most important of all, the number of both print and electronic advertising channels has substantially increased. As a consequence, advertising dollars are more widely dispersed and the pricing power of ad vendors has diminished. These circumstances materially reduce the intrinsic value of our major media investments and also the value of our operating unit, Buffalo News - though all remain fine businesses.

媒体业务过去只所以能有如此优异的表现，并不是因为销售规模的成长，而主要是靠所有的业者运用非比寻常的定价能力。不过时至今日，广告预算增长已大不如前，此外逐渐取得商品销售市场占有率的连锁零售渠道商根本就不做媒体广告(虽然有时他们会做邮购服务)。最重要的是，印刷与电子广告媒体渠道大幅增加，因此广告预算被大幅度地分散稀释，广告商的议价能力逐渐丧失殆尽，这种的现象大大地降低我们所持有的几个主要媒体业务投资与布法罗报纸的内在价值，尽管他们都仍然是不错的生意。

Notwithstanding the problems, Stan Lipsey's management of the News continues to be superb. During 1990, our earnings held up much better than those of most metropolitan papers, falling only 5%. In the last few months of the year, however, the rate of decrease was far greater.

不看这些问题，Stan Lipsey 的新闻业务经营还是相当地杰出，1990 年我们的税前收益比起其它主要都市地区的报纸要好的多，大概只下滑了 5%，虽然去年最后几个月份，下降的幅度稍微大了一点。

I can safely make two promises about the News in 1991: (1) Stan will again rank at the top among newspaper publishers; and (2) earnings will fall substantially. Despite a slowdown in the demand for newsprint, the price per ton will average significantly more in 1991 and the paper's labor costs will also be considerably higher. Since revenues may meanwhile be down, we face a real squeeze.

展望 1991 年我可以很安心地向大家做出两个保证：(1)Stan 将会继续在所有的主要新闻出版者当中名列前茅；(2)收益一定会大幅下降，因为虽然新闻印刷需求大幅缩水，但每吨印刷成本与劳工成本还是会大幅增加，再加上营收下降，面临两头挤压的窘境。

Profits may be off but our pride in the product remains. We continue to have a larger "news hole" - the portion of the paper devoted to news - than any comparable paper. In 1990, the proportion rose to 52.3% against 50.1% in 1989. Alas, the increase resulted from a decline in advertising pages rather than from a gain in news pages. Regardless of earnings pressures, we will maintain at least a 50% news hole. Cutting product quality is not a proper response to adversity.

获利虽然缩水，但我们对于产品依然感到骄傲，比起其它相同规模的报纸，我们拥有超高的新闻比率，从1989 年的 50.1%增加为 52.3%，只可惜增加的原因是因为广告量的减少，而不是新闻版面的增加，虽然受到不小的压力，但我们还是会坚持 50%的新闻比率，降低产品的品质不是应对逆境最好的方式。

o The news at Fechheimer, our manufacturer and retailer of uniforms, is all good with one exception: George Heldman, at 69, has decided to retire. I tried to talk him out of it but he had one irrefutable argument: With four other Heldmans - Bob, Fred, Gary and Roger - to carry on, he was leaving us with an abundance of managerial talent.

o 接下来是我们制服的制造与销售商费区海默的好消息，但有一个例外，那就是 69 岁的 George Heldman 决定要退休，我曾经试着说服他，不过他有一项令人无法拒绝的理由，因为他留下了其它四位 Heldmans 家族的成员做接班：Bob、Fred、Gary 与 Roger。

Fechheimer's operating performance improved considerably in 1990, as many of the problems we encountered in integrating the large acquisition we made in 1988 were moderated or solved. However, several unusual items caused the earnings reported in the "Sources" table to be flat. In the retail operation, we continue to add stores and now have 42 in 22 states. Overall, prospects appear excellent for Fechheimer.

费区海默的经营绩效在 1990 年又大幅增进，因为先前在 1988 年大型的并购所产生的问题已逐渐获得解决，然而由于几个特殊的项目使得我们今年的收益表现平平。在零售的部分，我们持续地拓展店面，目前在全美 22 个州拥有 42 家店，总言之，我们对于费区海默的前景仍然相当看好。

o At Scott Fetzer, Ralph Schey runs 19 businesses with a mastery few bring to running one. In addition to overseeing three entities listed on page 6 - World Book, Kirby, and Scott Fetzer Manufacturing - Ralph directs a finance operation that earned a record $12.2 million pre-tax in 1990.

o 斯科特费泽，Ralph Schey 经营 19 家企业的手法比起一般人经营一个还娴熟，除了后面所叙述的三家企业：世界图书公司、柯比吸尘器与斯科特费泽制造公司之外，Ralph 甚至还掌管一家年税前获利 1,220 万美元的财务公司。

Were Scott Fetzer an independent company, it would rank close to the top of the Fortune 500 in terms of return on equity, although it is not in businesses that one would expect to be economic champs. The superior results are directly attributable to Ralph.

如果斯科特费泽是一个独立的集团，它在财富 500 强中，股本回报率的排名一定能名列前茅，虽然它所处的产业很难出现耀眼的明星，但这些难得的成绩全都要归功于 Ralph。

At World Book, earnings improved on a small decrease in unit volume. The costs of our decentralization move were considerably less in 1990 than 1989 and the benefits of decentralization are being realized. World Book remains far and away the leader in United States encyclopedia sales and we are growing internationally, though from a small base.

世界图书公司，虽然销售数量略微下滑，但税前收益却变好了，1990 年因分散决策中心的做法所须负担的成本较 1989 年减少，而其所带来的效益却逐渐显现，世界百科全书在全美百科全书销售中依旧独占鳌头，至于海外市场方面虽然基础规模较小，但却持续地成长中。

Kirby unit volume grew substantially in 1990 with the help of our new vacuum cleaner, The Generation 3, which was an unqualified success. Earnings did not grow as fast as sales because of both start-up expenditures and "learning-curve" problems we encountered in manufacturing the new product. International business, whose dramatic growth I described last year, had a further 20% sales gain in 1990. With the aid of a recent price increase, we expect excellent earnings at Kirby in 1991.

得益于第三代真空吸尘器推出，柯比在 1990 年的销售数量大增，这无疑是一大胜利，由于先期开发成本与新产品制造所面临的学习曲线问题，使得获利增加不如营收增长的幅度，海外市场方面相较于去年爆炸性的成长，今年再度增长 20%，而由于最近产品价格再度调涨，我们预期柯比在 1991 年的获利应该会更好。

Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, Campbell Hausfeld, its largest unit, had a particularly fine year. This company, the country's leading producer of small and medium-sized air compressors, achieved record sales of $109 million, more than 30% of which came from products introduced during the last five years.

至于斯科特费泽制造公司部分，最大的单位 Campbell Hausfeld 今年的表现特别好，它是全美中小型空气压缩机的领导品牌，年度营业额创下 1.09 亿美元的新高，其中有 30%的营收系来自于最近五年新推出的产品。

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In looking at the figures for our non-insurance operations, you will see that net worth increased by only $47 million in 1990 although earnings were $133 million. This does not mean that our managers are in any way skimping on investments that strengthen their business franchises or that promote growth. Indeed, they diligently pursue both goals.

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在看我们非保险业的营运数字时，大家可能会好奇为何我们年度的利润有 1.33 亿美元，但账面价值却只增加了 4,700 万美元呢？这并不代表我们的经理人用任何方法来掩盖其公司的经济实力或成长潜力，事实上他们无不努力追求这些目标。

But they also never deploy capital without good reason. The result: In the past five years they have funneled well over 80% of their earnings to Charlie and me for use in new business and investment opportunities.

不过他们也从不会毫无理由地浪费资金，过去五年以来他们将所赚得的 80%收益送回母公司，交给查理跟我运用在新的事业与投资机会之上。

Non-Insurance Operations Take another look at the figures on page 51, which aggregate the earnings and balance sheets of our non-insurance operations. After-tax earnings on average equity in 1990 were 51%, a result that would have placed the group about 20th on the 1989 Fortune 500.

Let's look at the larger operations:o It was a poor year for retailing - particularly for big-ticket items - but someone forgot to tell Ike Friedman at Borsheim's. Sales were up 18%. That's both a same-stores and all-stores percentage, since Borsheim's operates but one establishment.