巴菲特致股东的信（1990年）⑧可转换优先股

Convertible Preferred Stocks

We continue to hold the convertible preferred stocks described in earlier reports: $700 million of Salomon Inc, $600 million of The Gillette Company, $358 million of USAir Group, Inc. and $300 million of Champion International Corp. Our Gillette holdings will be converted into 12 million shares of common stock on April 1. Weighing interest rates, credit quality and prices of the related common stocks, we can assess our holdings in Salomon and Champion at yearend 1990 as worth about what we paid, Gillette as worth somewhat more, and USAir as worth substantially less.

可转换优先股

我们持续持有先前向各位报告过的可转换优先股，包括所罗门 7 亿美金、吉列 6 亿美金、全美航空 3.58 亿美金与冠军国际 3 亿美金。我们吉列的特别股将会在 4 月 1 日转换为 1,200 万股的普通股，在衡量利率、债信与普通股的价格之后，我们可以确信在所罗门与冠军国际的投资现值应该与我们当初的成本差不多，吉列的价值比成本高，至于全美航空的价值则远低于当初的投资成本。

In making the USAir purchase, your Chairman displayed exquisite timing: I plunged into the business at almost the exact moment that it ran into severe problems. (No one pushed me; in tennis parlance, I committed an "unforced error.") The company's troubles were brought on both by industry conditions and by the post-merger difficulties it encountered in integrating Piedmont, an affliction I should have expected since almost all airline mergers have been followed by operational turmoil.

在投资全美航空时，本人真是抓对了时点，我几乎是在航空业爆发严重的问题之前，跳进去这个产业，(没有人强迫我，如同在网球场上，我把它形容成非受迫性失误)，全美航空问题的发生，出自于行业本身的状况以及1989 年对彼得蒙航空(Piedmont Airlines)并购后所产生的后遗症，这点我应该要早该预料到，因为几乎所有的航空业并购案最后的结果都是一团混乱。

In short order, Ed Colodny and Seth Schofield resolved the second problem: The airline now gets excellent marks for service. Industry-wide problems have proved to be far more serious. Since our purchase, the economics of the airline industry have deteriorated at an alarming pace, accelerated by the kamikaze pricing tactics of certain carriers. The trouble this pricing has produced for all carriers illustrates an important truth: In a business selling a commodity-type product, it's impossible to be a lot smarter than your dumbest competitor.

在这不久之后，Ed Colodny 与 Seth Schofield 解决了第二个难题，全美航空现在的服务受到好评，不过整个产业所面临的问题却越来越严重，自从我们开始投资之后，航空业的状况便急剧恶化，尤其再加上某些业者自杀性的杀价竞争，这样的结果导致所有的航空业者都面临一项残酷的事实：在销售商品化产品的产业之中，你很难比最愚蠢的竞争对手聪明到哪里去。

However, unless the industry is decimated during the next few years, our USAir investment should work out all right. Ed and Seth have decisively addressed the current turbulence by making major changes in operations. Even so, our investment is now less secure than at the time I made it.

不过除非在未来几年内，航空业全面地崩溃，否则我们在全美航空的投资应该能够确保安全无虞，Ed 与 Seth很果决地在营运上做了一些重大的改变来解决目前营运所面临的问题，虽然如此，我们的投资现在的情况比起当初还是差了一点。

Our convertible preferred stocks are relatively simple securities, yet I should warn you that, if the past is any guide, you may from time to time read inaccurate or misleading statements about them. Last year, for example, several members of the press calculated the value of all our preferreds as equal to that of the common stock into which they are convertible. By their logic, that is, our Salomon preferred, convertible into common at $38, would be worth 60% of face value if Salomon common were selling at $22.80. But there is a small problem with this line of reasoning: Using it, one must conclude that all of the value of a convertible preferred resides in the conversion privilege and that the value of a non-convertible preferred of Salomon would be zero, no matter what its coupon or terms for redemption.

我们的可转换优先股算是相当单纯的投资工具，不过我还是必须警告各位，若是过去的经验有任何参考价值，大家可能还是会读到一些不正确或是误导的讯息。比如去年，有几家报章杂志错误地计算出我们优先股的价值等于转换为普通股的价值。我们的所罗门的优先股可转换价格为 38 美元普通股，根据它们的逻辑，由于所罗门普通股的现价为 22.8 美元，所以其可转换优先股的价值只有面额的 60%，但这样的推论却有一个盲点，因为这样的说法表示所有的可转换优先股，其价值只在其所拥有的转换权利，至于所罗门不可转换的债券价值则为零，不管它所拥有的赎回条件为何。

The point you should keep in mind is that most of the value of our convertible preferreds is derived from their fixed-income characteristics. That means the securities cannot be worth less than the value they would possess as non-convertible preferreds and may be worth more because of their conversion options.

大家必须特别记住的一点是，我们可转换优先股大部分的价值其实是来自于固定收益的特性，意思是说，这些有价证券的价值不可能低于一般不具转换权的优先股，相反地，会因为它们拥有可转换的选择权而具有更高的价值。

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I deeply regret having to end this section of the report with a note about my friend, Colman Mockler, Jr., CEO of Gillette, who died in January. No description better fitted Colman than "gentleman" - a word signifying integrity, courage and modesty. Couple these qualities with the humor and exceptional business ability that Colman possessed and you can understand why I thought it an undiluted pleasure to work with him and why I, and all others who knew him, will miss Colman so much.

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很遗憾，我必须在报告这部分结尾提一下我的好朋友吉列的 CEO 小科尔曼·莫克勒(Colman Mockler Jr.)，他在今年一月过世。除了“绅士”这个代表品格、勇气与谦和的字，没有其它字更能贴切形容这个人了，除了这些特质之外，再加上他所拥有的幽默与超凡的经营能力，所以大家应该可以想象与他共事是多么令人感到愉快的一件事，这也是为何包含我在内的许多人，会对他感到特别怀念的缘故。

A few days before Colman died, Gillette was richly praised in a Forbes cover story. Its theme was simple: The company's success in shaving products has come not from marketing savvy (though it exhibits that talent repeatedly) but has instead resulted from its devotion to quality. This mind-set has caused it to consistently focus its energies on coming up with something better, even though its existing products already ranked as the class of the field. In so depicting Gillette, Forbes in fact painted a portrait of Colman.

在科尔曼去世前几天，吉列受到福布斯以封面故事大加赞扬，标题很简单，这家公司在刮胡刀产业的成功，并非来自营销手段(虽然他们一再展现这方面的能力)，而是源自于他们对于品质的追求，这种心理建设使得他们持续将精力摆在推出更新更好的产品之上，虽然现有的产品已是市场上最经典的，福布斯对于吉列的形容，就好象是在描述科尔曼本人一样。