巴菲特致股东的信（1990年）⑦有价证券

Marketable Securities

Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

有价证券

下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部分的投资系属于伯克希尔拥有不到 100%的投资。

Lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our investment style: This year we neither bought nor sold a share of five of our six major holdings. The exception was Wells Fargo, a superbly-managed, high-return banking operation in which we increased our ownership to just under 10%, the most we can own without the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. About one-sixth of our position was bought in 1989, the rest in 1990.

树懒(Folivora)天生特有的懒散正代表着我们的投资模式，今年 6 只主要持股中的 5 只，我们没有增加也没有减持。除了富国银行这家拥有良好的经营团队，并享有相当高的股本回报率的银行，所以我们将持股比率增加到10%左右，这是未经美联储批准所能持有的最高上限，其中六分之一是在 1989 年买进，剩下的部分则是在 1990年增加。

The banking business is no favorite of ours. When assets are twenty times equity - a common ratio in this industry - mistakes that involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of equity. And mistakes have been the rule rather than the exception at many major banks. Most have resulted from a managerial failing that we described last year when discussing the "institutional imperative:" the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so. In their lending, many bankers played follow-the-leader with lemming-like zeal; now they are experiencing a lemming-like fate.

银行业并不是我们的最爱，因为这个行业的特性是资产约为股本的 20 倍，这代表只要资产发生一点问题就有可能把股本亏光光，而偏偏大银行出问题早已变成是常态而非特例，许多情况是管理层的疏失，就像是去年度我们曾提到的制度迫力，也就是管理层会不自主的模仿其它同业的做法，不管这些行为有多愚蠢，在从事放款业务时，许多银行业者也都有旅鼠那种追随领导者的行为倾向，所以现在他们也必须承担像旅鼠一样的命运。

Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly-managed bank at a "cheap" price. Instead, our only interest is in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices.

因为 20：1 的高杠杆比率，使得管理的优势与缺点都会被放大，我们对于用便宜的价格买下经营不善的银行一点兴趣都没有，相反地我们希望能够以合理的价格买进一些经营良好的银行。

With Wells Fargo, we think we have obtained the best managers in the business, Carl Reichardt and Paul Hazen. In many ways the combination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another - Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Capital Cities/ABC. First, each pair is stronger than the sum of its parts because each partner understands, trusts and admires the other. Second, both managerial teams pay able people well, but abhor having a bigger head count than is needed. Third, both attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when they are under pressure. Finally, both stick with what they understand and let their abilities, not their egos, determine what they attempt. (Thomas J. Watson Sr. of IBM followed the same rule: "I'm no genius," he said. "I'm smart in spots - but I stay around those spots.")

在富国银行，我想我们找到银行界最好的经理人卡尔·理查德(Carl Reichardt)与保罗·亚曾(Paul Hazen)，在许多方面这两个人的组合使我联想到另外一对搭档，那就是大都会/ABC 的汤姆·墨菲与丹·伯克(Dan Burke)，首先，两个人 1+1 的效果都大于 2，因为每个人都了解、信任并尊敬对方。其次，他们对于有才能的人给予高薪，但也同时厌恶冗员过多。第三，尽管公司获利再好，他们控制成本的努力不曾缩减，最后，两者都坚持自己所熟悉的领域，让他们的能力而非自尊来决定成败，就像 IBM 的 Thomas Watson 曾说：“我不是天才，我只是有点小聪明，不过我就呆在这几点周围。”

Our purchases of Wells Fargo in 1990 were helped by a chaotic market in bank stocks. The disarray was appropriate: Month by month the foolish loan decisions of once well-regarded banks were put on public display. As one huge loss after another was unveiled - often on the heels of managerial assurances that all was well - investors understandably concluded that no bank's numbers were to be trusted. Aided by their flight from bank stocks, we purchased our 10% interest in Wells Fargo for $290 million, less than five times after-tax earnings, and less than three times pre-tax earnings.

我们是在 1990 年银行股一片混乱之间买进富国银行的股份的，这种失序的现象是很合理的，几个月来有些原本经营名声不错的银行，其愚蠢的贷款决定却一一被媒体揭露，随着一次又一次巨大的损失数字被公布，银行业的诚信与保证也一次又一次地被践踏，渐渐地投资人越来越不敢相信银行的财务报表数字。趁着大家出脱银行股之际，我们却逆势以 2.9 亿美元买进富国银行 10%的股份，市盈率不到税后收益五倍，税前收益三倍。

Wells Fargo is big - it has $56 billion in assets - and has been earning more than 20% on equity and 1.25% on assets. Our purchase of one-tenth of the bank may be thought of as roughly equivalent to our buying 100% of a $5 billion bank with identical financial characteristics. But were we to make such a purchase, we would have to pay about twice the $290 million we paid for Wells Fargo. Moreover, that $5 billion bank, commanding a premium price, would present us with another problem: We would not be able to find a Carl Reichardt to run it. In recent years, Wells Fargo executives have been more avidly recruited than any others in the banking business; no one, however, has been able to hire the dean.

富国银行实在是相当的大，帐面资产高达 560 亿美元，股本回报率 ROE 高达 20%，资产回报率 ROA 则为1.25%，买下他 10%的股权相当于以买下一家 50 亿美元资产 100%股权，但是真要有这样条件的银行，其价码可能会是 2.9 亿美元的一倍以上，此外就算真的可以买得到，我们同样也要面临另外一个问题，那就是找不到像卡尔·理查德这样的人才来经营，近几年来，从富国银行出来的经理人一直广受各家银行同业所欢迎，但想要请到这家银行的老宗师可就不是一件容易的事了。

Of course, ownership of a bank - or about any other business - is far from riskless. California banks face the specific risk of a major earthquake, which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn destroy the banks lending to them. A second risk is systemic - the possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it would endanger almost every highly-leveraged institution, no matter how intelligently run. Finally, the market's major fear of the moment is that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion. Because it is a leading real estate lender, Wells Fargo is thought to be particularly vulnerable.

当然拥有一家银行的股权，或是其它企业也一样，绝非没有风险，像加州的银行就因为位于地震带而必须承担客户受到大地震影响而还不出借款的风险，第二个风险是属于系统性的，也就是严重的经济萧条或是财务风暴导致这些高杠杆经营的金融机构，不管经营的多么好都有相当的危机。最后，市场当时主要的考虑点是美国西岸的房地产因为供给过多而崩盘的风险，连带使得融资给这些扩建案的银行承担巨额的损失，而由于富国银行是市场上最大的不动产贷款机构，因此被认为特别脆弱。

None of these eventualities can be ruled out. The probability of the first two occurring, however, is low and even a meaningful drop in real estate values is unlikely to cause major problems for well-managed institutions. Consider some mathematics: Wells Fargo currently earns well over $1 billion pre-tax annually after expensing more than $300 million for loan losses. If 10% of all $48 billion of the bank's loans - not just its real estate loans - were hit by problems in 1991, and these produced losses (including foregone interest) averaging 30% of principal, the company would roughly break even.

以上所提到的风险都很难加以排除，当然第一点与第二点的可能性相当低，而且即使是房地产大幅的下跌，对于经营绩效良好的银行也不致造成太大的问题，我们可以简单地算一下，富国银行现在一年在提列 3 亿美元的损失准备之后，税前还可以赚 10 亿美元以上，今天假若该银行所有的 480 亿借款中有 10%在 1991 年发生问题，且估计其中有 30%的本金将收不回来，必须全部列为损失(包含收不回来的利息)，则在这种情况下，这家银行大致可以损益两平。

A year like that - which we consider only a low-level possibility, not a likelihood - would not distress us. In fact, at Berkshire we would love to acquire businesses or invest in capital projects that produced no return for a year, but that could then be expected to earn 20% on growing equity. Nevertheless, fears of a California real estate disaster similar to that experienced in New England caused the price of Wells Fargo stock to fall almost 50% within a few months during 1990. Even though we had bought some shares at the prices prevailing before the fall, we welcomed the decline because it allowed us to pick up many more shares at the new, panic prices.

若是真有一年如此，虽然我们认为这种情况发生的可能性相当低，我们应该还可以忍受，事实上在伯克希尔选择并购或是投资一家公司，头一年不赚钱没有关系，只要以后每年能够有 20%的股本回报率，尽管如此，加州大地震使得投资人害怕新英格兰地区也会有同样的危险，导致富国银行在 1990 年几个月间大跌 50%以上，虽然在股价下跌前我们已买进一些股份，但股价下跌使我们可以开心地用更低的价格捡到更多的股份。

Investors who expect to be ongoing buyers of investments throughout their lifetimes should adopt a similar attitude toward market fluctuations; instead many illogically become euphoric when stock prices rise and unhappy when they fall. They show no such confusion in their reaction to food prices: Knowing they are forever going to be buyers of food, they welcome falling prices and deplore price increases. (It's the seller of food who doesn't like declining prices.) Similarly, at the Buffalo News we would cheer lower prices for newsprint - even though it would mean marking down the value of the large inventory of newsprint we always keep on hand - because we know we are going to be perpetually buying the product.

以长期投资作为终生目标的投资人对于股市波动也应该采取同样的态度，千万不要因为股市涨就欣喜若狂，股市跌就如丧考妣。奇怪的是他们对于食物的价格就一点都不会搞错，很清楚知道自己每天一定会买食物，当食物价格下跌时，他们可高兴的很，要烦恼的应该是卖食物的人。同样的在布法罗报纸我们期望新闻纸能够降低，虽然这代表我们必须将帐列的新闻纸存货价值向下调整，因为我们很清楚，我们必须一直买进这些产品。

Identical reasoning guides our thinking about Berkshire's investments. We will be buying businesses - or small parts of businesses, called stocks - year in, year out as long as I live (and longer, if Berkshire's directors attend the seances I have scheduled). Given these intentions, declining prices for businesses benefit us, and rising prices hurt us.

同样的原则也适用在伯克希尔的投资之上，只要我还健在(若我死后，伯克希尔的董事会愿意通过我所安排的降神来接受我的指示，则持续的时间或许更长久)，我们会年复一年买下整个企业或是企业的部分股票，也因此股票价格的下跌对我们会更有利，反之则可能会对我们不利。

The most common cause of low prices is pessimism - some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.

股价不振最主要的原因是悲观的情绪，有时是整个市场，有时则仅限于部分行业或公司，我们很期望能够在这种环境下做生意，不是因为我们天生喜欢悲观，而是如此可以得到便宜的价格买进更多好的公司，乐观主义是理性投资人最大的敌人。

None of this means, however, that a business or stock is an intelligent purchase simply because it is unpopular; a contrarian approach is just as foolish as a follow-the-crowd strategy. What's required is thinking rather than polling. Unfortunately, Bertrand Russell's observation about life in general applies with unusual force in the financial world: "Most men would rather die than think. Many do."

当然，以上所述并不代表不受市场欢迎或注意的股票或企业就是好的投资标的，反向操作有可能与从众心理一样的愚蠢，真正重要的是独立思考而不是投票表决，不幸的是伯特兰·罗素(Bertrand Russell)对于人性的观察同样地也适用于财务投资之上，“大多数的人宁死也不愿意去思考！”。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Our other major portfolio change last year was large additions to our holdings of RJR Nabisco bonds, securities that we first bought in late 1989. At yearend 1990 we had $440 million invested in these securities, an amount that approximated market value. (As I write this, however, their market value has risen by more than $150 million.)

* * * * * * * * * * * *

我们去年其它主要的投资组合的变动就是增加 RJR Nabisco 的债券，我们是在 1989 年开始买进这种有价证券，到了 1990 年底我们的投资金额约为 4.4 亿美元，与目前的市价相当(不过在撰写年报的同时，他们的市价已增加了 1.5 亿美元)。

Just as buying into the banking business is unusual for us, so is the purchase of below-investment-grade bonds. But opportunities that interest us and that are also large enough to have a worthwhile impact on Berkshire's results are rare. Therefore, we will look at any category of investment, so long as we understand the business we're buying into and believe that price and value may differ significantly. (Woody Allen, in another context, pointed out the advantage of open-mindedness: "I can't understand why more people aren't bi-sexual because it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.")

就像我们很少买进银行股，同样地我们也很少买进投资等级以下的债券，不过能够引起我们兴趣的投资机会，同时规模大到足以对伯克希尔有相当影响力的投资机会实在是不多，因此我们愿意尝试各种不同的投资工具，只要我们对于即将买进的投资标的有相当的了解，同时价格与价值有相当大的差距。伍迪艾伦有一句台词用来形容开明的好处︰“我实在不理解为什么有那么多人排斥双性恋，因为这会让人们在周六晚上约会的机会翻倍”。

In the past we have bought a few below-investment-grade bonds with success, though these were all old-fashioned "fallen angels" - bonds that were initially of investment grade but that were downgraded when the issuers fell on bad times. In the 1984 annual report we described our rationale for buying one fallen angel, the Washington Public Power Supply System.

在过去我们也曾成功地投资了好几次投资等级以下的债券，虽然他们多是传统上所谓的失翼的天使，意思是指：发行时属于投资级，但后来因为公司陷入困境而被降级。在 1984 年的年报中我们也曾经提到过买进华盛顿公用电力系统债券的原因。

A kind of bastardized fallen angel burst onto the investment scene in the 1980s - "junk bonds" that were far below investment- grade when issued. As the decade progressed, new offerings of manufactured junk became ever junkier and ultimately the predictable outcome occurred: Junk bonds lived up to their name. In 1990 - even before the recession dealt its blows - the financial sky became dark with the bodies of failing corporations.

不过到了 1980 年代大量假冒的失翼的天使充斥着整个投资界，也就是所谓的垃圾债券，这些债券在发行时企业本身的信用评级就不佳，十年以来，人为制造的垃圾债券变得越来越垃圾，最后真的变成名符其实的垃圾。到了 1990 年，在经济衰退引发债权危机之前，整个投资界的天空已布满着这些假冒失翼天使的尸体。

The disciples of debt assured us that this collapse wouldn't happen: Huge debt, we were told, would cause operating managers to focus their efforts as never before, much as a dagger mounted on the steering wheel of a car could be expected to make its driver proceed with intensified care. We'll acknowledge that such an attention-getter would produce a very alert driver. But another certain consequence would be a deadly - and unnecessary - accident if the car hit even the tiniest pothole or sliver of ice. The roads of business are riddled with potholes; a plan that requires dodging them all is a plan for disaster.

迷信这些债券的门徒一再强调不可能发生崩盘的危机，巨额的债务会迫使公司经理人更专注于经营，就像是方向盘上绑着匕首的驾驶员一定会小心翼翼地开车一样。当然，我们绝对相信，这样一个引人注目的装置一定会让驾驶员相当小心谨慎，但另一个确定的后果是，如果车子碰到哪怕最小的一个小坑或是冰片，就可能造成致命的后果。而偏偏在商业的道路上，遍布着各种坑坑洞洞，一个要求必须避开所有坑洞的计划实在是一个相当危险的计划。

In the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor Ben Graham forcefully rejected the dagger thesis: "Confronted with a challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, Margin of Safety." Forty-two years after reading that, I still think those are the right three words. The failure of investors to heed this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s began.

在《聪明的投资者》最后一章中，格雷厄姆很强烈地驳斥这种匕首理论，如果要将稳健的投资浓缩成四字箴言，那就是安全边际，在读到这篇文章的 42 年后，我仍深深相信这四个字，没能注意到这个简单原则的投资人在1990 年一开始就尝到损失的痛苦。

At the height of the debt mania, capital structures were concocted that guaranteed failure: In some cases, so much debt was issued that even highly favorable business results could not produce the funds to service it. One particularly egregious "kill- 'em-at-birth" case a few years back involved the purchase of a mature television station in Tampa, bought with so much debt that the interest on it exceeded the station's gross revenues. Even if you assume that all labor, programs and services were donated rather than purchased, this capital structure required revenues to explode - or else the station was doomed to go broke. (Many of the bonds that financed the purchase were sold to now-failed savings and loan associations; as a taxpayer, you are picking up the tab for this folly.)

在债务狂潮的鼎盛时期，煞费苦心设计的资本结构注定导致失败的发生：有些公司的融资杠杆高到即使是再好的企业也无法负担。几年前，有一个特别惨、一出生就夭折的案例，就是一个坦帕湾地方电视台的并购案，收购时借了太多的债，以至于一年的利息负担甚至超过他一整年的收入，也就是说即使所有的人工、节目与服务都不算成本，且营收也能有爆炸性的成长，这家电视台还是会步上倒闭的命运。许多为这次收购提供资金的债券都是由现在大多倒闭的储贷机构买进，所以身为纳税义务人的你，等于间接替这些愚蠢的行为买单。

All of this seems impossible now. When these misdeeds were done, however, dagger-selling investment bankers pointed to the "scholarly" research of academics, which reported that over the years the higher interest rates received from low-grade bonds had more than compensated for their higher rate of default. Thus, said the friendly salesmen, a diversified portfolio of junk bonds would produce greater net returns than would a portfolio of high-grade bonds. (Beware of past-performance "proofs" in finance: If history books were the key to riches, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)

现在看起来这种情况当然不太可能再发生。当这些错误的行为发生时，专门贩卖匕首的投资银行家纷纷把责任推给学术单位，表示研究报告称，低等级债券所收到的利息收入足以弥补投资人所承担可能收不回本金的风险。因此，好心的业务员表示，多元化的垃圾债券组合将给客户带来比高等级债券更好的收益。特别要小心财务学上过去的统计资料实证，若历史资料是致富之钥，那么福布斯 400 大富豪不都应该是图书馆员吗？

There was a flaw in the salesmen's logic - one that a first- year student in statistics is taught to recognize. An assumption was being made that the universe of newly-minted junk bonds was identical to the universe of low-grade fallen angels and that, therefore, the default experience of the latter group was meaningful in predicting the default experience of the new issues. (That was an error similar to checking the historical death rate from Kool-Aid before drinking the version served at Jonestown.)

不过这些业务员的逻辑有一个漏洞，这是统计系的新生都知道的。人们假设，所有新发行的垃圾债券都与以前的低等级失翼天使债券完全一样。因此，后者的违约经验对于预测新发行债券的违约经验具有重要意义。这种错误就像是在喝琼斯镇被投毒的酷爱饮料之前，以该饮料过去的死亡率为参考(1978 年琼斯镇惨案)。

The universes were of course dissimilar in several vital respects. For openers, the manager of a fallen angel almost invariably yearned to regain investment-grade status and worked toward that goal. The junk-bond operator was usually an entirely different breed. Behaving much as a heroin user might, he devoted his energies not to finding a cure for his debt-ridden condition, but rather to finding another fix. Additionally, the fiduciary sensitivities of the executives managing the typical fallen angel were often, though not always, more finely developed than were those of the junk-bond-issuing financiopath.

两者在许多方面有很大的不同，对于开拓者来说，失翼天使的经理人无不渴望重新到投资等级的名单之上，但是垃圾债券的经营者就全然不是那么一回事了，他们表现得像一个吸食海洛因的人，把精力投入到了寻找另一种治疗方法上，不思解决其为债务所苦的困境。此外，失翼天使高管信托的敏感特质通常比那些垃圾债券经营者要来的好的多。

Wall Street cared little for such distinctions. As usual, the Street's enthusiasm for an idea was proportional not to its merit, but rather to the revenue it would produce. Mountains of junk bonds were sold by those who didn't care to those who didn't think - and there was no shortage of either.

华尔街对于这样的差异根本就不在乎，通常华尔街关心的不是它到底有多少优缺点，而是它可以产生多少收入。成千上万的垃圾债券，就是由这帮满不在乎的银行家，卖给那些不懂得思考的投资人，这两种人遍地都是。

Junk bonds remain a mine field, even at prices that today are often a small fraction of issue price. As we said last year, we have never bought a new issue of a junk bond. (The only time to buy these is on a day with no "y" in it.) We are, however, willing to look at the field, now that it is in disarray.

即使现在垃圾债券的市场价格只剩发行价格的一点点，它仍是个地雷区。就像是去年我们曾经说过的，我们从来不买新发行的垃圾债券，不过趁现在市场一遍混乱，我们倒是愿意花点时间看看。

In the case of RJR Nabisco, we feel the Company's credit is considerably better than was generally perceived for a while and that the yield we receive, as well as the potential for capital gain, more than compensates for the risk we incur (though that is far from nil). RJR has made asset sales at favorable prices, has added major amounts of equity, and in general is being run well.

在 RJR Nabisco 这个案子我们认为这家公司的债信等级要比外界想象中好一点，同时我们感觉潜在的收益，应该可以弥补我们要承担的风险(虽然绝非无风险)，RJR 资产处份的价格还算不错，股东权益增加了许多，现在经营也渐上轨道了。

However, as we survey the field, most low-grade bonds still look unattractive. The handiwork of the Wall Street of the 1980s is even worse than we had thought: Many important businesses have been mortally wounded. We will, though, keep looking for opportunities as the junk market continues to unravel.

然而在我们调查垃圾债后发现，大部分低等级的债券还是不具吸引力， 1980 年代华尔街的工作比我们想象中更糟糕，许多重要企业都大受影响，不过我们还是会继续在垃圾债券市场中寻找好的投资机会。

Marketable Securities Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly-managed bank at a "cheap" price. Instead, our only interest is in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices.

The most common cause of low prices is pessimism - some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.

Wall Street cared little for such distinctions. As usual, the Street's enthusiasm for an idea was proportional not to its merit, but rather to the revenue it would produce. Mountains of junk bonds were sold by those who didn't care to those who didn't think - and there was no shortage of either.

Marketable Securities

Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.