巴菲特致股东的信（1991年）⑪固定收益证券

Fixed-Income Securities

We made several significant changes in our fixed-income portfolio during 1991. As I noted earlier, our Gillette preferred was called for redemption, which forced us to convert to common stock; we eliminated our holdings of an RJR Nabisco issue that was subject to an exchange offer and subsequent call; and we purchased fixed-income securities of American Express and First Empire State Corp., a Buffalo-based bank holding company. We also added to a small position in ACF Industries that we had established in late 1990. Our largest holdings at yearend were:

固定收益证券

1991 年我们在固定收益证券这方面的投资有很大的变动，如同先前曾提到的我们的吉列可转换优先股到期，迫使我们转换为普通股；另外我们清仓了 RJR Nabisco 的债券，因为它在被转换后赎回；我们也买进了美国运通与第一帝国(一家布法罗的银行控股公司)的固定收益证券；我们还在 1990 年底买进了一些 ACF 工业的债券，以下是截至年底我们持有的主要部位：

(1) Fair value as determined by Charlie and me
(2) Carrying value in our financial statements

(1)由查理和我确定的公允价值
(2)在我们财务报表中的账面价值

Our $40 million of First Empire State preferred carries a 9% coupon, is non-callable until 1996 and is convertible at $78.91 per share. Normally I would think a purchase of this size too small for Berkshire, but I have enormous respect for Bob Wilmers, CEO of First Empire, and like being his partner on any scale.

我们投资了 4,000 万美元在第一帝国 9%收益率的优先股上，在 1996 年前公司无法赎回，可以以每股 78.91美元转换为普通股，通常我会认为这样的规模对于伯克希尔来说实在是太小了，但由于我们对于该公司 CEI 鲍勃·威莫斯(Bob Wilmers)实在是过于崇敬，所以不管金额大小，还是希望有机会能与他一起合伙共事。

Our American Express preferred is not a normal fixed-income security. Rather it is a "Perc," which carries a fixed dividend of 8.85% on our $300 million cost. Absent one exception mentioned later, our preferred must be converted three years after issuance, into a maximum of 12,244,898 shares. If necessary, a downward adjustment in the conversion ratio will be made in order to limit to $414 million the total value of the common we receive. Though there is thus a ceiling on the value of the common stock that we will receive upon conversion, there is no floor. The terms of the preferred, however, include a provision allowing us to extend the conversion date by one year if the common stock is below $24.50 on the third anniversary of our purchase.

至于美国运通的投资则不是一般的固定收益证券，它算是一种 Perc：每年可以为我们 3 亿美元的投资贡献8.85%的股利收入，除了下述例外，那就是我们的优先股必须在发行后的三年内转换成最多 12,244,898 股的普通股，若有必要，转换比率会向下调整，以确定我们所收到的股份总值不超过 4.14 亿美元。因此，虽然对于可能取得的普通股价值有其上限，但相对地却没有下限，然而，这样的特别条款还包含一项规定，若是三年期限到时公司股价低于 24.5 美元时，可以有权请求延长转换期限一年。

Overall, our fixed-income investments have treated us well, both over the long term and recently. We have realized large capital gains from these holdings, including about $152 million in 1991. Additionally, our after-tax yields have considerably exceeded those earned by most fixed-income portfolios.

总的来说，不管最近或是是长期而言，我们在固定收益证券上的投资表现还算不错，靠着这样的投资我们赚取大量的资本利得，在 1991 年这个数字大约在 1.52 亿美元左右，此外我们的税后回报率也远高于一般的固定收益证券。

Nevertheless, we have had some surprises, none greater than the need for me to involve myself personally and intensely in the Salomon situation. As I write this letter, I am also writing a letter for inclusion in Salomon's annual report and I refer you to that report for an update on the company. (Write to: Corporate Secretary, Salomon Inc, Seven World Trade Center, New York, NY 10048) Despite the company's travails, Charlie and I believe our Salomon preferred stock increased slightly in value during 1991. Lower interest rates and a higher price for Salomon's common produced this result.

尽管如此，我们还是发生一些小意外，没有比需要我亲自参与的所罗门事件更让人惊讶的了，当我在撰写这封信时，我也同时写了一封信放在所罗门的年度报告之内，我希望您能参阅这份报告，了解该公司的最新情况。(向纽约第七世贸大楼所罗门公司索取)，虽然公司遭逢不幸，但查理跟我都相信，所罗门优先股价值在 1991 年略有增加，得益于低利率的环境加上所罗门普通股的股价回升。

Last year I told you that our USAir investment "should work out all right unless the industry is decimated during the next few years." Unfortunately 1991 was a decimating period for the industry, as Midway, Pan Am and America West all entered bankruptcy. (Stretch the period to 14 months and you can add Continental and TWA.)

去年我曾告诉各位除非航空业的经营环境在未来几年内加速恶化，否则我们在全美航空的投资应该可以有不错的结果，不过很不幸的随着中美、泛美与美西航空相继倒闭，1991 年正是航空业加速恶化的一年，(若是把时间延长为 14 个月，则还要包括大陆航空与 TWA 两家航空公司)。

The low valuation that we have given USAir in our table reflects the risk that the industry will remain unprofitable for virtually all participants in it, a risk that is far from negligible. The risk is heightened by the fact that the courts have been encouraging bankrupt carriers to continue operating. These carriers can temporarily charge fares that are below the industry's costs because the bankrupts don't incur the capital costs faced by their solvent brethren and because they can fund their losses - and thereby stave off shutdown - by selling off assets. This burn-the-furniture-to-provide-firewood approach to fare-setting by bankrupt carriers contributes to the toppling of previously-marginal carriers, creating a domino effect that is perfectly designed to bring the industry to its knees.

我们对于全美航空投资的评价之所以如此的低，反应出整个产业目前所面临到的盈利前景不佳的风险，这个风险又因为法院鼓励已经宣布破产的航空公司继续营运而加剧，这些同业以低于一般成本价格卖票，因为破产者完全可以不必在乎其它还奄奄一息的同业所需负担的资金成本，为了避免营运停摆，它们可以靠着变卖资产来提供资金，从而避免被关闭。这种拆家具当柴烧的做法，有可能进一步危及其它营运还算正常的同业，然后引发多米诺骨牌效应，使得整个产业一败涂地。

Seth Schofield, who became CEO of USAir in 1991, is making major adjustments in the airline's operations in order to improve its chances of being one of the few industry survivors. There is no tougher job in corporate America than running an airline: Despite the huge amounts of equity capital that have been injected into it, the industry, in aggregate, has posted a net loss since its birth after Kitty Hawk. Airline managers need brains, guts, and experience - and Seth possesses all three of these attributes.

赛斯·斯科菲尔德(Seth Schofield)在 1991 年成为全美航空公司的 CEO，正在对整个公司的营运做出重大调整，以提高其成为航空业仅存的几位幸存者之一的机会。在美国企业界，没有比经营一家航空公司还要困难的工作了，虽然大笔的资金已经投入到这个产业，但是从小鹰号诞生开始，航空业历史累积加总所产生的损失却是相当惊人，航空公司的经理人需要智力、勇气还要再加上经验，而毫无疑问的，Seth 同时具有以上三项的特质。

(1) Fair value as determined by Charlie and me (2) Carrying value in our financial statements

(1) Fair value as determined by Charlie and me
(2) Carrying value in our financial statements