巴菲特致股东的信（1991年）⑩今日错误

Mistake Du Jour

In the 1989 annual report I wrote about "Mistakes of the First 25 Years" and promised you an update in 2015. My experiences in the first few years of this second "semester" indicate that my backlog of matters to be discussed will become unmanageable if I stick to my original plan. Therefore, I will occasionally unburden myself in these pages in the hope that public confession may deter further bumblings. (Post-mortems prove useful for hospitals and football teams; why not for businesses and investors?)

今日错误

在 1989 年的年报中，我曾经写过伯克希尔头 25 年所犯的错误，而且承诺在 2015 年还会再有更新的报告，但是第二阶段的头几年让我觉得，若是坚持原来的计划的话，积压的待讨论事项将多到难以管理，因此我偶尔会在这里吐露心声，希望公开的忏悔能够阻止进一步的错误。事后分析对医院和足球赛有用，对企业和投资者也会有用。

Typically, our most egregious mistakes fall in the omission, rather than the commission, category. That may spare Charlie and me some embarrassment, since you don't see these errors; but their invisibility does not reduce their cost. In this mea culpa, I am not talking about missing out on some company that depends upon an esoteric invention (such as Xerox), high-technology (Apple), or even brilliant merchandising (Wal-Mart). We will never develop the competence to spot such businesses early. Instead I refer to business situations that Charlie and I can understand and that seem clearly attractive - but in which we nevertheless end up sucking our thumbs rather than buying.

通常情况下，我们很多重大的错误不是发生在我们已经做的部分，而是在于我们没有去做的那部分。虽然因为各位看不到这些失误，所以查理跟我可以少一点难堪，但看不到不代表我们就不必付出代价。而这些我公开承认的错误，并不是指我错过了某些革命性的新发明(如施乐)、高科技(如苹果)、或是更优秀的连锁零售商(如沃尔玛)，我们永远不可能拥有在早期发掘这些优秀公司的能力。相反，我指的是那些查理跟我可以很容易理解，且很明显对我们有吸引力的公司，无奈在当时我们只是不断地咬着拇指犹豫不决，而没有下定决心把他们买下来。

Every writer knows it helps to use striking examples, but I wish the one I now present wasn't quite so dramatic: In early 1988, we decided to buy 30 million shares (adjusted for a subsequent split) of Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which would have been a $350-$400 million investment. We had owned the stock some years earlier and understood the company's business. Furthermore, it was clear to us that David Maxwell, Fannie Mae's CEO, had dealt superbly with some problems that he had inherited and had established the company as a financial powerhouse - with the best yet to come. I visited David in Washington and confirmed that he would not be uncomfortable if we were to take a large position.

每位作者都知道，要让读者了解其意思最好的方式就是举个例子，不过希望我现在举的例子不会过于极端。回顾 1988 年，当时我们决定以 3.5-4 亿美元之间，买进 3,000 万股(经过事后的分割调整)的联邦国民贷款协会(房利美)，几年之前，我们就拥有这家公司的股份，也对其所处的产业相当了解。此外，我们也很清楚大卫·麦克斯韦(David Maxwell)也就是房利美的 CEO，有能力处理他所接下的一堆问题，同时进一步将公司建立成为一个金融巨擘，一切可说是前景看好，为此我还特地到华盛顿拜访 David，确认他对于我们持有该公司一大部分的股权不会感到任何的不愉快。

After we bought about 7 million shares, the price began to climb. In frustration, I stopped buying (a mistake that, thankfully, I did not repeat when Coca-Cola stock rose similarly during our purchase program). In an even sillier move, I surrendered to my distaste for holding small positions and sold the 7 million shares we owned.

只不过当我们开始买进不到 700 万股时，该公司股价就开始上涨，失望之余，我立刻停止买进(事后回想还好我没有在买进可口可乐时犯下相同的错误)，更有甚者，我觉得区区 700 万股对我们来说实在是没有太大的意义，所以之后又把持有的 700 万股全部卖掉。

I wish I could give you a halfway rational explanation for my amateurish behavior vis-a-vis Fannie Mae. But there isn't one. What I can give you is an estimate as of yearend 1991 of the approximate gain that Berkshire didn't make because of your Chairman's mistake: about $1.4 billion.

我期盼对于我这样不具职业水准的投资行为可以给各位一个稍微合理一点的解释，不过我实在是编不出来，不过我倒是可以跟各位报告，因为本人的这项错误，大概使得伯克希尔在 1991 年少赚了 14 亿美元。