巴菲特致股东的信（1993年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our per-share book value increased 14.3% during 1993. Over the last 29 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $8,854, or at a rate of 23.3% compounded annually.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

本公司 1993 年的账面价值增长了 14.3%(标普 10.1%)，自现任管理层接手的 29 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 8854 美元，年复合成长率约为 23.3%。

During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.5 billion, a figure affected by two negative and two positive non-operating items. For the sake of completeness, I'll explain them here. If you aren't thrilled by accounting, however, feel free to fast-forward through this discussion:

回顾过去一年，伯克希尔的账面价值增加了 15 亿美元，主要受到两项负面以及两项正面非营运因素所影响，为了做完整的表达，我将它们条列如下，若是大家对于会计有点感冒，大可直接跳过本段不看。

1. The first negative was produced by a change in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) having to do with the taxes we accrue against unrealized appreciation in the securities we carry at market value. The old rule said that the tax rate used should be the one in effect when the appreciation took place. Therefore, at the end of 1992, we were using a rate of 34% on the $6.4 billion of gains generated after 1986 and 28% on the $1.2 billion of gains generated before that. The new rule stipulates that the current tax rate should be applied to all gains. The rate in the first quarter of 1993, when this rule went into effect, was 34%. Applying that rate to our pre-1987 gains reduced net worth by $70 million.

1，第一个负面因素是由于一般公认会计原则 GAAP 变动所造成，主要与帐列的依照市价计算的未实现增值利益所估列的所得税有关，原规定，税率必须按照增值部分所发生时点来计算，因此在 1992 年底，我们 1986 年之后的 64 亿美元未实现利益按 34%计算，之前的 12 亿则按 28%计算；而新的规定，则改成全部依照现行税率计算，故新规生效的 1993 年一季度所适用的税率则为 34%，包含 1987 年以前的未实现利得在内全部适用，此举将使得我们的账面价值减少 7,000 万美元。

2. The second negative, related to the first, came about because the corporate tax rate was raised in the third quarter of 1993 to 35%. This change required us to make an additional charge of 1% against all of our unrealized gains, and that charge penalized net worth by $75 million. Oddly, GAAP required both this charge and the one described above to be deducted from the earnings we report, even though the unrealized appreciation that gave rise to the charges was never included in earnings, but rather was credited directly to net worth.

2，第二个负面因素与第一个也有关，因为从 1993 年开始企业税率提高为 35%，此举又使得我们必须为帐上未实现利得多计提 1%的税负，导致我们的账面价值又减少 7,500 万美元，奇怪的是 GAAP 要求这两项变动皆须列入损益表，却不顾当初这些未实现利得根本就从未列入利润之内，而是直接当作是账面价值的增加。

3. Another 1993 change in GAAP affects the value at which we carry the securities that we own. In recent years, both the common stocks and certain common-equivalent securities held by our insurance companies have been valued at market, whereas equities held by our non- insurance subsidiaries or by the parent company were carried at their aggregate cost or market, whichever was lower. Now GAAP says that all common stocks should be carried at market, a rule we began following in the fourth quarter of 1993. This change produced a gain in Berkshire's reported net worth of about $172 million.

3，1993 年另外一个会计原则的变动影响的则是我们帐上持有的这些有价证券的价值，近几年来，我们保险公司所持有的不管是普通股或是约当普通股(可转换优先股)，都是按市价计算，至于母公司或是其它非保险业子公司所持有的的股票则以成本与市价孰低法计算，现在 GAAP 则改成全部都按市价计算，这个规定将从 1993 年的第四季度开始实施，此举将使得伯克希尔的账面价值增加 1.72 亿美元。

4. Finally, we issued some stock last year. In a transaction described in last year's Annual Report, we issued 3,944 shares in early January, 1993 upon the conversion of $46 million convertible debentures that we had called for redemption. Additionally, we issued 25,203 shares when we acquired Dexter Shoe, a purchase discussed later in this report. The overall result was that our shares outstanding increased by 29,147 and our net worth by about $478 million. Per-share book value also grew, because the shares issued in these transactions carried a price above their book value.

4，最后去年我们又发行的一些股份，在一项去年曾提过的并购交易中，我们在 1993 年 1 月将 4,600 万美元的可转换债券赎回，而发行了 3,944 股，此外在买下 Dexter 鞋业时，我们又发行了 25,203 股(后面报告还会详加叙述)，总计新发行了 29,147 股，增加 4.78 亿美元的账面价值，每股帐面账面价值也因发行价格高于原先帐面每股账面价值而提升。

Of course, it's per-share intrinsic value, not book value, that counts. Book value is an accounting term that measures the capital, including retained earnings, that has been put into a business. Intrinsic value is a present-value estimate of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. At most companies, the two values are unrelated. Berkshire, however, is an exception: Our book value, though significantly below our intrinsic value, serves as a useful device for tracking that key figure. In 1993, each measure grew by roughly 14%, advances that I would call satisfactory but unexciting.

当然真正重要的是每股内在价值而非帐面账面价值，帐面价值是一个会计名词，用来衡量一家公司过去所投入的资本，也包含未分配的收益在内。内在价值则是对于一家企业终其一生所能产生现金流量的估计折现值，对大部分的公司来说，这两个数字大多不相关，不过伯克希尔算是一个例外，我们的帐面账面价值，虽然远低于内在价值，但却是追踪内在价值相当好的一项指针，在 1993 年两项数值大约都增长了 14%，这种成绩虽让人满意却不令人惊喜。

These gains, however, were outstripped by a much larger gain - 39% - in Berkshire's market price. Over time, of course, market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the same destination. But in the short run the two often diverge in a major way, a phenomenon I've discussed in the past. Two years ago, Coca-Cola and Gillette, both large holdings of ours, enjoyed market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings gains. In the 1991 Annual Report, I said that the stocks of these companies could not continuously overperform their businesses.

这个增幅比起伯克希尔股价 39%的涨幅来说还是逊色不少，当然就长期而言，伯克希尔的市价与内在价值将会到达相同的水平，但短期而言，两者的变化可能会有很大的差异，这种现象稍后我们会再详细讨论，两年前我们两项主要的投资可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀的股价表现远超过本身的利润成长，在 1991 年的年报中，我便说过，这些公司的股票市价不可能持续超越其本业表现。

From 1991 to 1993, Coke and Gillette increased their annual operating earnings per share by 38% and 37% respectively, but their market prices moved up only 11% and 6%. In other words, the companies overperformed their stocks, a result that no doubt partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension about brand names. Whatever the reason, what will count over time is the earnings performance of these companies. If they prosper, Berkshire will also prosper, though not in a lock-step manner.

从 1991 年到 1993 年，可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀每股收益的增加幅度分别为 38%与 37%，但是同期股价的涨幅却只有 11%与 6%，换句话说，这些公司的本业表现超越股票市场，主要的原因还在于，华尔街对于这些品牌公司有很多担忧，但是不管怎样，真正重要的还是这些公司本业的盈利情况，如果他们经营顺利，伯克希尔也就跟着水涨船高，虽然步调不会始终一致。

Let me add a lesson from history: Coke went public in 1919 at $40 per share. By the end of 1920 the market, coldly reevaluating Coke's future prospects, had battered the stock down by more than 50%, to $19.50. At yearend 1993, that single share, with dividends reinvested, was worth more than $2.1 million. As Ben Graham said: "In the short-run, the market is a voting machine - reflecting a voter-registration test that requires only money, not intelligence or emotional stability - but in the long-run, the market is a weighing machine."

接着让我为各位上一次历史课，1919 年可口可乐股票以每股 40 美元公开上市，到了 1920 年，由于市场对于可口可乐的前景看淡，股价暴跌一半至 19.5 美元。而到 1993 年底，若是将收到的股利再投资进去，则当初每股的价值将变成 210 万美元，正如格雷厄姆所说：短期而言，市场是投票机。投资人不须靠智力或情绪控制，只要有钱都可以登记参加投票。但就长期而言，股票市场却是称重机。

So how should Berkshire's over-performance in the market last year be viewed? Clearly, Berkshire was selling at a higher percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was the case at the beginning of the year. On the other hand, in a world of 6% or 7% long-term interest rates, Berkshire's market price was not inappropriate if - and you should understand that this is a huge if - Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I can attain our long-standing goal of increasing Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value at an average annual rate of 15%. We have not retreated from this goal. But we again emphasize, as we have for many years, that the growth in our capital base makes 15% an ever-more difficult target to hit.

所以，我们应该如何看待伯克希尔去年的股价的超常表现呢？显然在 1993 年底，伯克希尔的股价占内在价值比重较年初更高。另外一方面，在长期利率只有 6-7%的投资环境下，若是你能了解，查理·芒格跟本人只能让伯克希尔的内在价值每年以 15%的成长的话，你就应该知道伯克希尔去年这样的股价表现实在是有点反常。虽然对于这样的目标我们从不妥协，但我们必须再一次强调，随着资本规模的日益扩大，想要达到这个目标的困难度也与日俱增。

What we have going for us is a growing collection of good-sized operating businesses that possess economic characteristics ranging from good to terrific, run by managers whose performance ranges from terrific to terrific. You need have no worries about this group.

我们要做的是，收集越来越多的具有相当规模的大型企业，他们拥有或优秀或卓越的经济特征，并且由杰出的经理人所经营，对于这样的梦幻组合大家大可以放心。

The capital-allocation work that Charlie and I do at the parent company, using the funds that our managers deliver to us, has a less certain outcome: It is not easy to find new businesses and managers comparable to those we have. Despite that difficulty, Charlie and I relish the search, and we are happy to report an important success in 1993.

在母公司查理跟我利用子公司所贡献资金所作的资金分配工作，面临的不确定性比较高：要找到可与我们现有企业相媲美的新企业和经理人并不容易。虽然难度高，但是查理跟我却绝对不会放弃追寻。我们也很高兴报告，在 1993 年我们有一项相当成功的斩获。

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Our per-share book value increased 14.3% during 1993. Over the last 29 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $8,854, or at a rate of 23.3% compounded annually.

During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.5 billion, a figure affected by two negative and two positive non-operating items. For the sake of completeness, I'll explain them here. If you aren't thrilled by accounting, however, feel free to fast-forward through this discussion:

What we have going for us is a growing collection of good-sized operating businesses that possess economic characteristics ranging from good to terrific, run by managers whose performance ranges from terrific to terrific. You need have no worries about this group.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our per-share book value increased 14.3% during 1993. Over the last 29 years (that is, since present management took over) book value has grown from $19 to $8,854, or at a rate of 23.3% compounded annually.