巴菲特致股东的信（1993年）②Dexter鞋业

Dexter Shoe

What we did last year was build on our 1991 purchase of H. H. Brown, a superbly-run manufacturer of work shoes, boots and other footwear. Brown has been a real winner: Though we had high hopes to begin with, these expectations have been considerably exceeded thanks to Frank Rooney, Jim Issler and the talented managers who work with them. Because of our confidence in Frank's team, we next acquired Lowell Shoe, at the end of 1992. Lowell was a long-established manufacturer of women's and nurses' shoes, but its business needed some fixing. Again, results have surpassed our expectations. So we promptly jumped at the chance last year to acquire Dexter Shoe of Dexter, Maine, which manufactures popular-priced men's and women's shoes. Dexter, I can assure you, needs no fixing: It is one of the best-managed companies Charlie and I have seen in our business lifetimes.

Dexter鞋业

我们去年的收购是 1991 年买进布朗鞋业的续曲，布朗鞋业一家经营卓绝的工作鞋制造商，是一家真正成功的赢家，虽然一开始我们就对他就有相当高的期望，但是在 Frank 与其他经理人的努力之下，这家公司的表现甚至还超过我们的预期。基于我们对 Frank 团队的信心，在 1992 年年底，我们接着又买下 Lowell 鞋业，Lowell 是一家老牌的女鞋与护士鞋制造商，不过业务管理仍需改进。再一次他的表现又超乎我们的预期，因此，在去年我们立刻又抓住机会买下缅因州的 Dexter 鞋业，一家专门制造大众价格的男女鞋品牌，这次我可以向大家保证，Dexter 并不需要改造，这是查理跟我在职业生涯中，所见过的管理最好的公司之一。

Harold Alfond, who started working in a shoe factory at 25 cents an hour when he was 20, founded Dexter in 1956 with $10,000 of capital. He was joined in 1958 by Peter Lunder, his nephew. The two of them have since built a business that now produces over 7.5 million pairs of shoes annually, most of them made in Maine and the balance in Puerto Rico. As you probably know, the domestic shoe industry is generally thought to be unable to compete with imports from low-wage countries. But someone forgot to tell this to the ingenious managements of Dexter and H. H. Brown and to their skilled labor forces, which together make the U.S. plants of both companies highly competitive against all comers.

话说 Harold Alfond 从 20 岁就在一家鞋厂工作，时薪 25 美分，在 1956 年，他靠着一万美元的资本创立了Dexter。1958 年他的侄子 Peter Lunder 加入，从那时开始，两人协力建立起一家年产 750 万双鞋子的企业，大部分的鞋子都在缅因州生产，其余的则在波多黎各。就像大家都知道的，国内的制鞋业，一般被认为无法与进口自低工资水平国家的产品竞争，但是大家似乎忘记把情况告诉布朗与 Dexter 鞋业的经营团队和熟练的工人们，正是他们联手，使得两家公司位于美国的工厂拥有高度的竞争力以对抗外来的入侵者。

Dexter's business includes 77 retail outlets, located primarily in the Northeast. The company is also a major manufacturer of golf shoes, producing about 15% of U.S. output. Its bread and butter, though, is the manufacture of traditional shoes for traditional retailers, a job at which it excels: Last year both Nordstrom and J.C. Penney bestowed special awards upon Dexter for its performance as a supplier during 1992.

Dexter 还拥有 77 家的零售店，主要集中在东北地区，该公司同时也是高尔夫球鞋的主要制造商，全美的市场占有率约为 15%，不过他的主要业务还是传统零售商的传统鞋类，这也是它最擅长的领域，去年 Dexter 还获得 Nordstrom 与 JCPenny 所颁发的年度最佳供货商奖项。

Our 1993 results include Dexter only from our date of merger, November 7th. In 1994, we expect Berkshire's shoe operations to have more than $550 million in sales, and we would not be surprised if the combined pre-tax earnings of these businesses topped $85 million. Five years ago we had no thought of getting into shoes. Now we have 7,200 employees in that industry, and I sing "There's No Business Like Shoe Business" as I drive to work. So much for strategic plans.

我们 1993 年的业绩，只包含 Dexter 自 11 月 7 号合并后的业绩，而 1994 年，我们预计伯克希尔鞋类销售额将超过 5.5 亿美元，税前利润极有可能超过 8,500 万美元，在五年前我们根本就没想到会进入鞋业，现在光是在这个产业所雇用的员工就超过 7,200 人。现在我会边开车边唱：没有一个行业能像鞋业这样扩张。我的战略计划还有很多发挥的空间。

At Berkshire, we have no view of the future that dictates what businesses or industries we will enter. Indeed, we think it's usually poison for a corporate giant's shareholders if it embarks upon new ventures pursuant to some grand vision. We prefer instead to focus on the economic characteristics of businesses that we wish to own and the personal characteristics of managers with whom we wish to associate - and then to hope we get lucky in finding the two in combination. At Dexter, we did.

在伯克希尔，对于将来会进入哪个产业，我们并没有特别的限制。事实上我们常在想，对于一家大型企业的股东来说，追求具有远景的新创事业有时反而有害。所以，我们更愿意专注于那些既有我们想要拥有的经济特征，又有我们喜爱一起共事的经理人的公司，剩下的就只看我们有没有足够的运气找到同时拥有这两项特点的组合了，在 Dexter 我们确实找到了。

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And now we pause for a short commercial: Though they owned a business jewel, we believe that Harold and Peter (who were not interested in cash) made a sound decision in exchanging their Dexter stock for shares of Berkshire. What they did, in effect, was trade a 100% interest in a single terrific business for a smaller interest in a large group of terrific businesses. They incurred no tax on this exchange and now own a security that can be easily used for charitable or personal gifts, or that can be converted to cash in amounts, and at times, of their own choosing. Should members of their families desire to, they can pursue varying financial paths without running into the complications that often arise when assets are concentrated in a private business.

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接下来让我们休息一下，来段小广告，虽然 Harold 与 Peter 拥有宝石般的生意，但我们相信他们 (都对现金不感兴趣)将 Dexter 的股份转为伯克希尔的股份是一个正确的决定，他们所做的，实际上等于将一家规模小的好公司的全部权益，转换成一群好公司的一小部分权益，这样的转换并不会产生租负，同时还可享有依个人意愿随时进行赠与或变现的好处。如果他们的家族成员愿意，他们可以追求不同的财务目标，而不必像过去那样把所有的资产全部绑在一家私人的企业上面。

For tax and other reasons, private companies also often find it difficult to diversify outside their industries. Berkshire, in contrast, can diversify with ease. So in shifting their ownership to Berkshire, Dexter's shareholders solved a reinvestment problem. Moreover, though Harold and Peter now have non-controlling shares in Berkshire, rather than controlling shares in Dexter, they know they will be treated as partners and that we will follow owner-oriented practices. If they elect to retain their Berkshire shares, their investment result from the merger date forward will exactly parallel my own result. Since I have a huge percentage of my net worth committed for life to Berkshire shares - and since the company will issue me neither restricted shares nor stock options - my gain-loss equation will always match that of all other owners.

基于租税规划以及其它理由，私人企业通常很难在本业以外进行多元化的投资，相对的，在伯克希尔我们可以很轻易地就多元化，因此，藉由将经营权移转至伯克希尔，Dexter 的股东可以很轻易地就解决再投资的问题，此外，虽然 Harold 与 Peter 现在持有的是伯克希尔无控制权的股份，而不是原先 Dexter 具控制权的股份，但他们很清楚自己将被视为真正的合伙人，同时我们也会遵循所有者导向。所以，一旦他们决定将自己的投资转为伯克希尔的股份，那么从合并那天开始，他们就可以确定自身的投资成果将会与我个人的投资成果完全相同。因为我个人绝大部分的资产都放在伯克希尔，并且我个人从不会自公司获得限制性股票和股票期权，所以，我个人的成败得失也将与所有其它股东一致。

Additionally, Harold and Peter know that at Berkshire we can keep our promises: There will be no changes of control or culture at Berkshire for many decades to come. Finally, and of paramount importance, Harold and Peter can be sure that they will get to run their business - an activity they dearly love - exactly as they did before the merger. At Berkshire, we do not tell .400 hitters how to swing.

此外，Harold 与 Peter 也相当了解，在伯克希尔我们言出必行，在可见的未来几十年内，伯克希尔的控制权与文化将不会有所改变，最后同时也是最重要的一点，Harold 与 Peter 可以确定将能够像合并前一样，继续经营原来的企业，这是他们最喜爱的工作。在伯克希尔，我们不会去提醒打击率高达四成的击球手应该要如何挥棒。

What made sense for Harold and Peter probably makes sense for a few other owners of large private businesses. So, if you have a business that might fit, let me hear from you. Our acquisition criteria are set forth in the appendix on page 22.

我想这些的道理同样也适合其它大型私人企业的所有者，所以如果你的公司情况符合我们的标准的，请务必联系我，在年报的后段有我们的收购标准。