巴菲特致股东的信（1994年）①概述

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Our gain in net worth during 1994 was $1.45 billion or 13.9%. Over the last 30 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $10,083, or at a rate of 23% compounded annually.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

本公司 1994 年的账面价值增加 14.5 亿美元，或增长了 13.9%(标普 1.3%)，自现任管理层接手的 30 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 10083 美元，年复合成长率约为 23%。

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I make few predictions. One we will confidently offer, however, is that the future performance of Berkshire won't come close to matching the performance of the past.

查理·芒格跟我本身很少做预测，不过有一点我们倒是很确定，那就是伯克希尔未来的表现将很难再像过去那样的辉煌。

The problem is not that what has worked in the past will cease to work in the future. To the contrary, we believe that our formula - the purchase at sensible prices of businesses that have good underlying economics and are run by honest and able people - is certain to produce reasonable success. We expect, therefore, to keep on doing well.

问题不在于过去有效的方法将来会失效，相反的，我们认为我们的成功方式：以合理的价格买进具有产业竞争优势同时由诚实有才干的人经营的企业，在将来同样能够获得合理的回报。因此，我们期望未来继续表现良好。

A fat wallet, however, is the enemy of superior investment results. And Berkshire now has a net worth of $11.9 billion compared to about $22 million when Charlie and I began to manage the company. Though there are as many good businesses as ever, it is useless for us to make purchases that are inconsequential in relation to Berkshire's capital. (As Charlie regularly reminds me, "If something is not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well.") We now consider a security for purchase only if we believe we can deploy at least $100 million in it. Given that minimum, Berkshire's investment universe has shrunk dramatically.

然而现金太多却是卓越投资成果的大敌，目前伯克希尔的账面价值已高达 119 亿美元，当初查理跟我开始经营这家公司时，公司的账面价值只有 2,200 万美元，虽然像往常一样依然有许多好公司，但相比伯克希尔的资本规模，很难再找到规模足够大的购买对象(就像是查理常常说的：如果一件事情不值得去做，那就不值得做好)。现在我们只考虑买进至少一亿美元以上的投资，在这样的高门槛下，伯克希尔的投资范围一下子缩小了许多。

Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us here and try not to relax our standards. Ted Williams, in The Story of My Life, explains why: "My argument is, to be a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. It's the first rule in the book. If I have to bite at stuff that is out of my happy zone, I'm not a .344 hitter. I might only be a .250 hitter." Charlie and I agree and will try to wait for opportunities that are well within our own "happy zone."

尽管如此，我们还是会坚持让我们成功的方法，绝对不会放松原有的标准，Ted Williams 在《我一生的故事》中写到："我个人的看法是，如果你想成为一个优秀的击球手，首先你必须有一个好的击球点。这是教科书里的第一课，如果强迫自己在甜蜜球区以外挥棒，我绝对无法成为安打率 34.4%的全明星水平，而可能变成 25%的普通击球手"。查理跟我都很同意这样的看法，所以我们宁愿静静的等待机会进入我们自己的甜蜜区。

We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts, which are an expensive distraction for many investors and businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.

我们将继续忽视任何政治和经济预测，这对许多投资者和商业人士来说是一种代价昂贵的干扰。三十年来，没有人能够正确地预测到越战会持续扩大、工资与价格管制、两次的石油危机、总统的辞职下台以及苏联的解体、道琼斯指数在黑色周一大跌 22.6%@508 点或者是国债收益率在 2.8-17.4%之间巨幅波动。

But, surprise - none of these blockbuster events made the slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment principles. Nor did they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.

不过令人惊讶的是，这些曾经轰动一时的重大事件却从未对本杰明·格雷厄姆的投资哲学造成丝毫的影响，也从没有让以合理的价格买进优良的企业看起来有任何的不妥，想象一下，若是我们因为这些未知的恐惧而推迟或改变我们的资本配置，将会使我们付出多少的代价，事实上，我们通常对某些宏观事件的悲观气氛达到顶峰时，找到最好的买入机会，恐惧虽然是盲从者的敌人，但却是基本面信徒的好朋友。

A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next 30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little effect on our long-term results.

未来 30 年一定还会有一连串令人震惊的事件发生，我们不会妄想要去预测它或是从中获利，如果我们还能够像过去那样找到类似的优质企业，那么外在的意外冲击对我们的长期业绩几乎没有影响。

What we promise you - along with more modest gains - is that during your ownership of Berkshire, you will fare just as Charlie and I do. If you suffer, we will suffer; if we prosper, so will you. And we will not break this bond by introducing compensation arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside than the downside.

而就像我曾经承诺过的，除了盈利没办法像以前那么好之外，你们在伯克希尔股权所得到的待遇将会与查理和我完全一致，如果你遭受损失，我们也不好过，如果我们吃香的，那么你们也就跟着喝辣的，而且我们绝对不会靠任何对我们有利的补偿安排多占便宜而破坏这样美好的合伙关系。

We further promise you that our personal fortunes will remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares: We will not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire dominates both the investment portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many friends who belonged to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in the 1960's. We could not be more motivated to do our best.

此外我们也向大家进一步保证我个人绝大部分的个人财富都将继续集中在伯克希尔的股份之上，我们不会在央求各位参与我们投资的同时，还把自己的钱藏在别的地方。此外，巴菲特家族大部分成员，以及在 1960 年代查理和我经营合伙企业时期的大部分老朋友，他们的投资组合绝大部分也都是伯克希尔的股份。我们再也没有比这更积极的动机去尽我们最大的努力了。

Luckily, we have a good base from which to work. Ten years ago, in 1984, Berkshire's insurance companies held securities having a value of $1.7 billion, or about $1,500 per Berkshire share. Leaving aside all income and capital gains from those securities, Berkshire's pre-tax earnings that year were only about $6 million. We had earnings, yes, from our various manufacturing, retailing and service businesses, but they were almost entirely offset by the combination of underwriting losses in our insurance business, corporate overhead and interest expense.

值得庆幸的是，我们可以在一个很好的基础上努力打拼，十年前，也就是在 1984 年，伯克希尔的保险子公司持有价值 17 亿美元的股票投资组合，每股约当有 1,500 美元的投资，扣除这部分的收益与资本利得不算，伯克希尔当年的税前收益只有大约 600 万美元，没错，虽然我们在制造、零售以及服务业务方面依然有不错的利润，但是大部分的收益都被保险业务的承保损失、经营费用以及利息支出所抵消掉了。

Now we hold securities worth $18 billion, or over $15,000 per Berkshire share. If you again exclude all income from these securities, our pre-tax earnings in 1994 were about $384 million. During the decade, employment has grown from 5,000 to 22,000 (including eleven people at World Headquarters).

时至今日，我们持有的股票投资组合价值超过 180 亿美元，每股约 15,000 美元，若是再一次我们将这些股票投资所产生的收益扣除的话，我们在 1994 年的税前收益是 3.84 亿美元，十年来，雇用的员工人数从原来的5,000 人增加到 22,000 人(包含总部的 11 人在内)。

We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing a baseball team as "getting paid for home runs other fellows hit." That's my formula at Berkshire, also.

之所以能有这样的成果，要归功于旗下这群特别的经理人，是他们让那些看起来很普通平凡的事业取得了不凡的结果，Casey Stengel 将管理一支棒球队形容为：靠着别人打出全垒打获得回报。这也是我在伯克希尔谋生的方式。

The businesses in which we have partial interests are equally important to Berkshire's success. A few statistics will illustrate their significance: In 1994, Coca-Cola sold about 280 billion 8-ounce servings and earned a little less than a penny on each. But pennies add up. Through Berkshire's 7.8% ownership of Coke, we have an economic interest in 21 billion of its servings, which produce "soft-drink earnings" for us of nearly $200 million. Similarly, by way of its Gillette stock, Berkshire has a 7% share of the world's razor and blade market (measured by revenues, not by units), a proportion according us about $250 million of sales in 1994. And, at Wells Fargo, a $53 billion bank, our 13% ownership translates into a $7 billion "Berkshire Bank" that earned about $100 million during 1994.

我们持有少数股权企业的贡献，对伯克希尔来说也功不可没，从一些统计数字中，可以看出他们的重要性，1994 年可口可乐总计卖出 2,800 亿罐八盎司饮料，每罐大概能赚一美分，不过积沙成塔，若按伯克希尔拥有7.8%可口可乐的股权比例，我们大概可以分配到 210 亿罐，总计光是软饮料贡献给我们的收益就有二亿美元；同样的，通过对于吉列的持股，伯克希尔大概可以分得全世界刮胡刀 7%的市场占有率(以营收而非销量计算)，约为2.5 亿美元的销售额；另外在拥有 530 亿美元资产的富国银行，我们持有 13%的股权大概就等于是一家拥有 70亿美元资产的伯克希尔银行，它每年盈利大约一亿美元。

It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope diamond than 100% of a rhinestone, and the companies just mentioned easily qualify as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't limited to simply a few of this breed, but instead possess a growing collection.

我们宁愿拥有希望之钻的一部分，也不要 100%拥有水钻，而刚刚提到的那些公司堪称为稀有宝石，重要的是我们不仅限于少数的这几个，以后还会收集更多。

Stock prices will continue to fluctuate - sometimes sharply - and the economy will have its ups and down. Over time, however, we believe it highly probable that the sort of businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a satisfactory rate.

股票价格仍会持续波动，有时是剧烈波动，同时经济景气的循环也会起起落落，然而就长期而言，我们相信所拥有的这类优良企业的价值很有可能还会继续以令人满意的速度成长。