巴菲特致股东的信（1994年）⑧普通股投资

Common Stock Investments

Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over $300 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

普通股投资

下表是我们超过 3 亿美元以上的普通股投资，一小部分的投资属于伯克希尔非完全控股企业所持有。

Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in concept: The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. When these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible prices, it is hard to go wrong (a challenge we periodically manage to overcome).

我们的投资数量仍然很集中，理念也很简单：真正大的投资理念通常可以用一小段话来解释。我们偏爱具有持久竞争优势并且由德才兼备、以股东利益为导向的经理人所经营的优质企业，只要它们确实拥有这些特质，而且我们能够以合理的价格买进就很难出错，这正是我们一直不断要克服的挑战。

Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed using Olympic-diving methods: Degree-of-difficulty doesn't count. If you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent on a single key factor that is both easy to understand and enduring, the payoff is the same as if you had correctly analyzed an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting and complex variables.

投资人必须谨记，你的投资成绩并非像奥运跳水比赛的方式评分，难度高低并不重要。如果你一家企业的价值在很大程度上取决于一个既易于理解且经久不衰的单一关键因素的判断是正确的，那么回报跟正确分析了一项以许多不断变化和复杂的变量为特征的投资结果是一样的。

We try to price, rather than time, purchases. In our view, it is folly to forego buying shares in an outstanding business whose long-term future is predictable, because of short-term worries about an economy or a stock market that we know to be unpredictable. Why scrap an informed decision because of an uninformed guess?

对于买进股份我们只关注价格而不择时。我们认为，因为对经济或股市的短期担忧而放弃买进一家长期前景可合理的预期的好公司是一件很愚蠢的事，为什么会因为短期不可知的猜测就放弃一个明智的投资决策呢？

We purchased National Indemnity in 1967, See's in 1972, Buffalo News in 1977, Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, and Scott Fetzer in 1986 because those are the years they became available and because we thought the prices they carried were acceptable. In each case, we pondered what the business was likely to do, not what the Dow, the Fed, or the economy might do. If we see this approach as making sense in the purchase of businesses in their entirety, why should we change tack when we are purchasing small pieces of wonderful businesses in the stock market?

我们分别在 1967 年买进国民保险公司（保险业周期低谷）、1972 年买下喜诗糖果（接班人无心经营）、1977 年买下布法罗新闻报（恶性竞争）、1983 年买下内布拉斯加家具商场（避免后代争夺）、1986 年买下斯科特费泽（杠杆并购），而我们都是趁它们难得出售时才得以买进，当然也因为它们的开价可以接受。当初在评估每个决定时，我们都在思考企业未来可能会做什么，而不是道琼斯指数、美联储或经济未来可能会做什么。如果我们觉得这样的方式适用于买下整家公司的话，那么每当我们决定要通过股市买进一些优质公司一部分股权时，为什么要改变策略呢？

Before looking at new investments, we consider adding to old ones. If a business is attractive enough to buy once, it may well pay to repeat the process. We would love to increase our economic interest in See's or Scott Fetzer, but we haven't found a way to add to a 100% holding. In the stock market, however, an investor frequently gets the chance to increase his economic interest in businesses he knows and likes. Last year we went that direction by enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express.

在寻找新的投资标的之前，我们会优先考虑增加已有投资的仓位，如果一家企业曾经好到让我们愿意买进，那么重复这一过程可能会很划算。若是有可能我们很愿意再增加在喜诗糖果或是斯科特费泽的持股，但 100%持有想要再增加已经不可能了。然而在股票市场中，投资人常常有很多的机会可以增加他了解并喜欢的公司持股。去年我们就增持了我们在可口可乐(2.75 亿)与美国运通(4.24 亿)的仓位。

Our history with American Express goes way back and, in fact, fits the pattern of my pulling current investment decisions out of past associations. In 1951, for example, GEICO shares comprised 70% of my personal portfolio and GEICO was also the first stock I sold - I was then 20 - as a security salesman (the sale was 100 shares to my Aunt Alice who, bless her, would have bought anything I suggested). Twenty-five years later, Berkshire purchased a major stake in GEICO at the time it was threatened with insolvency. In another instance, that of the Washington Post, about half of my initial investment funds came from delivering the paper in the 1940's. Three decades later Berkshire purchased a large position in the company two years after it went public. As for Coca-Cola, my first business venture - this was in the 1930's - was buying a six-pack of Coke for 25 cents and selling each bottle for 5 cents. It took only fifty years before I finally got it: The real money was in the syrup.

我们投资美国运通的历史(色拉油丑闻)可以追溯到 1965 年，而事实上这也符合从个人过去的公司名单中挖掘投资决策的模式。例如在 1951 年，当时我还是年仅 20 岁的股票业务员，350 股 GEICO 保险占我个人投资组合的 70%，同时它也是我第一次卖掉的股票，我将其中的 100 股卖给我的姑妈 Alice，基本上只要是我建议的她都照单全收。25 年后趁着 GEICO 面临倒闭的危机(为了成长不计成本扩张)，伯克希尔买下其一大部分的股份。另一个例子就是华盛顿邮报(水门事件)，1940 年代，我的初始投资资金有一半是来自派送该报纸的收入，三十年后，伯克希尔趁该公司上市两年后遭遇的危机(报道水门事件被政治打压以及工会罢工)引发的股价低档买下一大部分的股权。至于可口可乐(盲目多元化)，可以算得上是我生平从事的第一笔商业交易，1930 年代当我还是个小孩子的时候，我花了 25 美元买了半打的可乐，然后再以每罐 5 美分分售出去，而直到 50 年后，我才终于搞懂真正有赚头的还是那糖水。

My American Express history includes a couple of episodes: In the mid-1960's, just after the stock was battered by the company's infamous salad-oil scandal, we put about 40% of Buffett Partnership Ltd.'s capital into the stock - the largest investment the partnership had ever made. I should add that this commitment gave us over 5% ownership in Amex at a cost of $13 million. As I write this, we own just under 10%, which has cost us $1.36 billion. (Amex earned $12.5 million in 1964 and $1.4 billion in 1994.)

我个人在美国运通的投资历史包含好几段插曲，在 1960 年代中期，趁着该公司为色拉油丑闻遭受重创时，我们将巴菲特合伙企业 40%的资金压在这只股票上，这是合伙企业有史以来最大的一笔投资，总计花了 1,300 万美元买进该公司 5%的股份。时至今日，我们在美国运通的持股将近 10%，但帐列成本却高达 13.6 亿美元，(美国运通 1964 年的盈利为 1,250 万美元，1994 年则增加至 14 亿美元)

My history with Amex's IDS unit, which today contributes about a third of the earnings of the company, goes back even further. I first purchased stock in IDS in 1953 when it was growing rapidly and selling at a price-earnings ratio of only 3. (There was a lot of low-hanging fruit in those days.) I even produced a long report - do I ever write a short one? - on the company that I sold for $1 through an ad in the Wall Street Journal.

我对美国运通 IDS 金融部门的投资可以追溯更早，该部门目前占公司整体收益来源的三分之一，我在 1953年第一次买进成长快速的 IDS 股份，当时的只有三倍市盈率(在那个年代低垂的果子垂手可得)，为此我甚至还特别写了一篇长篇报告(不过印象中我好象没有写过短的)，并在华尔街日报刊登广告，报价 1 美元公开求购。

Obviously American Express and IDS (recently renamed American Express Financial Advisors) are far different operations today from what they were then. Nevertheless, I find that a long-term familiarity with a company and its products is often helpful in evaluating it.

显然，美国运通与 IDS(最近已更名为美国运通财务顾问)今日的营运与过去已有很大的不同，然而，我发现长期熟悉一家公司及其产品通常有助于对其进行评估。

Common Stock Investments Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over $300 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

Obviously American Express and IDS (recently renamed American Express Financial Advisors) are far different operations today from what they were then. Nevertheless, I find that a long-term familiarity with a company and its products is often helpful in evaluating it.

Common Stock Investments

Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over $300 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.