巴菲特致合伙人的信（1964年）②基金公司

Investment Companies

We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95-100% invested in common stock, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corporation, and Lehman Corporation, manage about $4.5 billion, are owned by about 550,000 shareholders, and are probably typical of most of the $30 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.

基金公司

我们一直拿最大的两只开放式股票型基金（股票占 95-100%）和最大的两只分散投资的封闭式股票型基金的业绩，与合伙基金的收益率做对比。Massachusetts Investors Trust、 Investors Stock Fund,Tri-Continental Corp.这四家公司管理着约 45 亿美元的资金，有55万投资者。基金行业管理的总资产是 300 亿美元，它们应该能代表大多数的基金公司。有些投资顾问机构管理的资产规模更大，它们绝大多数的业绩应该和这四家基金公司不相上下。

The purpose of this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of over $8 million and this represents a very small fraction of the professional investment management industry. The public batting average of this highly-paid and widely respected talent indicates performance a shade below that of the Dow, an unmanaged index.

我想用下面的表格说明，作为衡量投资业绩的指数，道指不是那么容易战胜的。上述四家基金由能力出众的经理人管理，它们每年收取的管理费是 800 多万美元，整个基金行业收取的管理费数额就更庞大了。从这些高薪经理人的打击率(batting average)来看，他们的业绩和道指相比稍逊一筹。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1964 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for 1964.

(1)计算包括资产价值变化以及当年持有人获得的分红。
(2)来源：1964 Moody's Bank&Finance Manual for 1957-63。1964 年数据为估算值。

The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: "Why in the world does this happen to very intelligent managements working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4) literally centuries of aggregate investment experience?" (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of experience - which was corrected by the former employer to read “one year's experience -twenty times.”)

合伙人在每年的信中都会看到上述表格，他们问我：“大型基金的经理人才智超群，他们有聪明勤奋的下属、用之不竭的资源、深厚广博的人脉，他们的投资经验加到一起都有几百年了，最后业绩怎么能做成这样？（说到“投资经验加到一起都有几百年了”，我想起了一个段子。有个人去面试，他说自己有 20 年的从业经验，他之前的老板说，不是“20 年的从业经验”，应该是“一年的经验，重复了 20 年”。）

This question is of enormous importance, and you would expect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on $30 billion is $300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attracting this problem, and discussion of it is virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate entities of the United States.

这个问题很有意义，按理说，基金经理和广大投资人都应该深入研究一下。300 亿美元的 1%可就是 3 亿美元。令人匪夷所思的是，在华尔街连篇累牍的长篇大论中，关于这个问题的研究几乎没有；在分析师团体行行色色的会议上，关于这个问题的探讨寥寥无几。在我看来，无论哪家投资管理机构，在对美国各大公司的管理能力和经营业绩品头论足之前，都应该好好分析一下自己的方法和业绩。

In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.

大基金的业绩超不过甚至跟不上无人管理的指数，在大多数情况下，绝对不是因为基金经理能力或品行的问题。我把这个现象的主要原因归结为如下几点：(1)群体决策——这或许是我的偏见：我认为，只要是一个群体，所有成员共同参与决策，投资管理工作就几乎不可能达到一流水平；(2)与其他声誉卓著的大型机构保持一致的倾向，无论是策略，还是部分投资组合；(3)机构框架的束缚——平均水平很“安全”，对于个人而言，特立独行的回报与风险毫不相称；(4)僵化固守某些不理智的分散投资策略；最后一点，也是最重要的一点：(5)惯性。

Perhaps the above comments are unjust. Perhaps even our statistical comparisons are unjust. Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the investment companies in the table. However, I believe both our partners and their stockholders feel their managements are seeking the same goal - the maximum long-term average return on capital obtainable with the minimum risk of permanent loss consistent with a program of continuous investment in equities. Since we should have common goals, and most partners, as an alternative to their interest in BPL, would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with these investment companies, I feel their performance record is meaningful in judging our own results.

也许我对基金经理的这些评论不公平。也许就连上面的统计数据对比都不公平。我们的投资组合和公募基金迥然不同，我们的投资方法也和它们迥然不同。但是，我相信无论是我们的合伙人，还是大基金的投资者，他们有一点是相同的，他们都认为自己的资产管理人追求同一个目标：通过持续投资股票，在将资金永久损失的风险控制在最低限度的同时，实现长期资本回报率的最大化。对于我们的大多数合伙人来说，如果不把资金投到巴菲特合伙基金中，其他的选择可能就是基金等投资公司，获得与基金类似的收益率，因此，我认为与基金对比来检验我们的业绩很有意义。

There is no question that an important service is provided to investors by investment companies, investment advisors, trust departments, etc. This service revolves around the attainment of adequate diversification, the preservation of a long-term outlook, the ease of handling investment decisions and mechanics, and most importantly, the avoidance of the patently inferior investment techniques which seem to entice some individuals. All but a few of the organizations do not specifically promise to deliver superior investment performance although it is perhaps not unreasonable for the public to draw such an inference from their advertised emphasis on professional management.

毫无疑问，基金公司、投资顾问、信托部门等为投资者提供了不可或缺的服务，其中包括实现足够的分散、坚持长期投资、简化投资决策和方法、最重要的是，它们可以帮助投资者避免散户常犯的低级错误。在机构的宣传资料中，它们着力凸显专业管理人士，公众自然会以为他们有能力取得高收益，但绝大多数机构并未对实现超额收益做出具体承诺。

One thing I pledge to you as partners - just as I consider the previously stated performance comparison to be meaningful now, so will I in future years, no matter what tale unfolds. Correspondingly, I ask that you, if you do not feel such a standard to be relevant, register such disagreement now and suggest other standards which can be applied prospectively rather than retrospectively.

各位合伙人，我在这里向大家保证，我现在说上述业绩对比有意义，将来也会如此，无论将来如何。同时，我向各位合伙人提议，如果你认为这个标准不合适，请现在就告诉我，并提出其他标准。标准要定在前面，不能事后再说。

One additional thought - I have not included a column in my table for the most widely-used investment advisor in the world - Bell management. People who watch their weight, golf scores, and fuel bills seem to shun quantitative evaluation of their investment management skills although it involves the most important client in the world - themselves. While it may be of academic interest to evaluate the management accomplishments of Massachusetts Investors Trust or Lehman Corporation, it is of enormous dollars-and-cents importance to evaluate objectively the accomplishments of the fellow who is actually handling your money - even if it’s you.

我还有个想法。很多人自己管理资产，他们是自己的投资顾问。上面的表格里没有“自我管理”一列。人们很关心自己的体重、高尔夫球分数、油费，但是对自己的投资管理水平却刻意回避，不进行量化评估。他们管理的可是自己的钱，客户是全世界最重要的人，是他们自己。研究 Massachusetts Investors Trust 或 Lehman Corporation 等基金的业绩，这种评估的意义是理论上的。客观研究你的资金管理人的表现，即使这个管理人是你自己，这种评估的意义是真金白银的。

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year. (2) From 1964 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for 1964.

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2) From 1964 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for 1964.