巴菲特致合伙人的信（1964年）⑤我们的目标

Our Goal

You will note that there are no columns in the preceding table for the 27.7% average of the Partnership during its eight-year lifespan or the 22.3% average of the limited partners. Such figures are nonsensical for the long term for several reasons: (Don't worry about me "holding back" to substantiate this prophecy.)

我们的目标

上面的表格中没有过去八年里合伙基金平均 27.7%的收益率，也没有有限合伙人平均22.3%的收益率。这么高的收益率根本不适用于较长时期，原因是：（别担心，我不会为了证实这个预言，而在投资中“裹足不前”。）

(1)Any significant sums compounded at such rates take on national debt proportions at alarming speed.

(1)按照这么高的收益率复合增长，较大的资金会以惊人的速度增加，规模很快就会超过国债。

(2)During our eight-year history a general revaluation of securities has produced average annual rates of overall gain from the whole common stock field which I believe unattainable in future decades. Over a span of 20 or 30 years, I would expect something more like 6% - 7% overall annual gain from the Dow instead of the 11.1% during our brief history. This factor alone would tend to knock 4 points or so off of our annual compounding rate. It would only take a minus 20.5% year in 1965 for the Dow to bring it down to a 7% average figure for the nine years. Such years (or worse) should definitely be expected from time to time by those holding equity investments. If a 20% or 30% drop in the market value of your equity holdings (such as BPL) is going to produce emotional or financial distress, you should simply avoid common stock type investments. In the words of the poet - Harry Truman – “If you can’t stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen. It is preferable, of course, to consider the problem before you enter the “kitchen.”

(2)合伙基金成立这八年以来，由于股票价值的整体重估，股票投资实现了很高的整体收益率，这个收益率在今后十年不可持续。在我们的基金成立以来的这短短几年里，道指的收益率是 11.1%。我认为，把时间拉长到二三十年，道指比较合理的整体收益率应该在 6%-7% 之间。这一个因素就会把我们的年化复合收益率拉低 4 个百分点左右。只要 1965 年道指下跌 20.5%，它这九年的平均收益率就会降到 7%。对于这样的下跌幅度，甚至更大幅度的下跌，长期投资股票的人应该早就做好心理准备。要是你持有的股票（例如，你投资的巴菲特合伙基金）市值下跌 20%或 30%，你就会遭受心理创伤或陷入财务困境，你就不适合投资股票。借用诗人哈里·杜鲁门(Harry Truman)的话说：“吃得咸鱼抵得渴。”(If you can’t stand the heat,stay out of the kitchen.) 你最好还是先考虑一下，要不要吃“咸鱼”。

(3)We do not consider it possible on an extended basis to maintain the 16.6 percentage point advantage over the Dow of the Partnership or the 11.2 percentage point edge enjoyed by the limited partners. We have had eight consecutive years in which our pool of money has out-performed the Dow, although the profit allocation arrangement left the limited partners short of Dow results in one of those years. We are certain to have years (note the plural) when the Partnership results fall short of the Dow despite considerable gnashing of teeth by the general partner (I hope not too much by the limited partners). When that happens our average margin of superiority will drop sharply. I might say that I also think we will continue to have some years of very decent margins in our favor. However, to date we have benefited by the fact that we have not had a really mediocre (or worse) year included in our average, and this obviously cannot be expected to be a permanent experience.

(3)我们认为，从长期来看，不可能始终保持合伙基金领先道指 16.6 个百分点的优势或有限合伙人领先道指 11.2 个百分点的优势。从我们一道投资以来，我们已经连续八年跑赢道指，其中有一年，扣除利润提成后，有限合伙人没有跑赢。我们的合伙基金肯定有落后道指的时候，而且落后的年份肯定不只是一两年。我们跑输了，我作为普通合伙人一定会气得咬牙切齿（希望各位有限合伙人不要太懊恼）。出现这样的情况时，我们的平均相对优势就会显著下降。我也相信，有的年份，我们仍然会取得明显的领先优势。到目前为止，我们没有一年的业绩是平庸或糟糕的，所以我们的平均收益率较高，显然，期望永远如此是不现实的。

So what can we expect to achieve? Of course, anything I might say is largely guesswork, and my own investment philosophy has developed around the theory that prophecy reveals far more of the frailties of the prophet than it reveals of the future.

那么我们预期的目标是什么呢？我下面说的基本都是猜测。在我的投资理念里有一个核心理论：预测常常无法准确判断未来，倒是经常暴露预测者的过错。

Nevertheless, you, as partners, are entitled to know my expectations, tenuous as they may be. I am hopeful that our longer term experience will unfold along the following basis:

(1)An overall gain from the Dow (including dividends, of course) averaging in the area of 7% per annum, exhibiting customarily wide amplitudes in achieving this average -- say, on the order or minus 40% to plus 50% at the extremes with the majority of years in the minus 10% to plus 20% range;

(2)An average advantage of ten percentage points per annum for BPL before allocation to the general partner - again with large amplitudes in the margin from perhaps 10 percentage points worse than the Dow in a bad year to 25 percentage points better when everything clicks; and

(3)The product of these two assumptions gives an average of 17% to BPL or about 14% to limited partners. This figure would vary enormously from year to year; the final amplitudes, of course, depending, on the interplay of the extremes hypothesized in (1) and (2).

各位是我的合伙人，哪怕我的预期未必可靠，我也有义务如实相告。以下是我对长期前景的预期：

(1)道指整体收益率为平均每年 7%左右（包括股息），整体而言，各年波动剧烈，极端时能跌 40%，也能涨 50%，大多数年份在下跌 10%到上涨 20%之间。

(2)扣除普通合伙人分成之前，巴菲特合伙基金平均每年领先指数 10 个百分点。合伙基金的领先优势同样存在剧烈波动：在逆境中可能落后 10 个百分点；在顺风顺水时，可能领先 25 个百分点。

(3)综合以上两点，巴菲特合伙基金的长期平均收益率是 17%，有限合伙人的长期平均收益率是 14%。各年的收益率会相差悬殊，具体波动是多少取决于(1)和(2)两个变量的相互作用。

I would like to emphasize that the above is conjecture, perhaps heavily influenced by self-interest, ego, etc. Anyone with a sense of financial history knows this sort of guesswork is subject to enormous error. It might better be left out of this letter, but it is a question frequently and legitimately asked by partners. Long-range expectable return is the primary consideration of all of us belonging to BPL, and it is reasonable that I should be put on record, foolish as that may later make me appear. My rather puritanical view is that any investment manager, whether operating as broker, investment counselor, trust department, Investment Company, etc., should be willing to state unequivocally what he is going to attempt to accomplish and how he proposes to measure the extent to which he gets the job done.

我再重申一遍，上面的预期只是猜测，其中个人得失或自我等因素有很大影响。熟悉金融历史的人都知道，这种预测经常大错特错。我还不如不写这些，但是这是合伙人很关心的一个问题。我们巴菲特合伙基金的各位合伙人都很关心我们能取得的长期收益率，我应该把我们的目标在白纸黑字上写下来，哪怕有一天这会证明我愚不可及。我的要求是很严格的，我看所有投资管理人，无论是券商、投资顾问，还是信托部门、基金公司，都应该开诚布公，坦诚地说明自己定的目标是什么、衡量标准又是什么。