巴菲特致股东的信(1978年)
②纺织业③保险核保业务


Textiles

     Earnings of $1.3 million in 1978, while much improved from 1977, still represent a low return on the $17 million of capital employed in this business. Textile plant and equipment are on the books for a very small fraction of what it would cost to replace such equipment today. And, despite the age of the equipment, much of it is functionally similar to new equipment being installed by the industry. But despite this “bargain cost” of fixed assets, capital turnover is relatively low reflecting required high investment levels in receivables and inventory compared to sales. Slow capital turnover, coupled with low profit margins on sales, inevitably produces inadequate returns on capital. Obvious approaches to improved profit margins involve differentiation of product, lowered manufacturing costs through more efficient equipment or better utilization of people, redirection toward fabrics enjoying stronger market trends, etc. Our management is diligent in pursuing such objectives. The problem, of course, is that our competitors are just as diligently doing the same thing. 

纺织业

1978年的盈余达到130万美元,较1977年有所改进,但相较于投入的1,700万资本来说,报酬率还是很低,目前纺织厂房及设备帐列的价值远低于未来重置所需的成本,虽然这些设备都已相当老旧,但大部分的功能与目前同业所采用的全新设备差异并不大,但尽管固定资产的投入不须太大,但销售所须负担的应收帐款及存货周转资金却是相当沉重的担子,纺织业低资产周转率与低毛利无可避免地造成低落的股东权益报酬率,可能的改善方式包括产品差异化、使用新设备降低制造成本或妥善运用人力、朝高附加价值的纺织品转型等,我们的管理阶层正致力达到以上目标,当然真正的问题在于这也正是我们的竞争同业正在努力做的。

     The textile industry illustrates in textbook style how producers of relatively undifferentiated goods in capital intensive businesses must earn inadequate returns except under conditions of tight supply or real shortage. As long as excess productive capacity exists, prices tend to reflect direct operating costs rather than capital employed. Such a supply- excess condition appears likely to prevail most of the time in the textile industry, and our expectations are for profits of relatively modest amounts in relation to capital.

纺织业的现况充分地说明了教科书中提到的,当资本密集但产品无重大差异化的生产者注定将赚取微薄的报酬,除非供给吃紧或真正短缺,只要市场产能过剩,产品价格就会随直接营运成本而非投入资金作变动,不幸的是这样的情况正是目前纺织业的常态,所以我们只能期望获取稍微合理的投资报酬即可。 

     We hope we don’t get into too many more businesses with such tough economic characteristics. But, as we have stated before: (1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment. As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect that they will - we intend to continue to support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.

我们希望以后不要再介入这类产业面临困境的企业,但就像之前曾经提到的,只要:(1)该公司为当地非常重要的雇主;(2)管理当局坦诚面对困境并努力解决问题;(3)劳工体认现况并极力配合;(4)相对于投入的资金,尚能产生稳定现金收入。只要以上前提存在,我们也相信一定会,我们就会继续支持纺织事业的营运,虽然这样将使得我们被迫放弃其它更有利的资金运用管道。 

Insurance Underwriting

     The number one contributor to Berkshire’s overall excellent results in 1978 was the segment of National Indemnity Company’s insurance operation run by Phil Liesche. On about $90 million of earned premiums, an underwriting profit of approximately $11 million was realized, a truly extraordinary achievement even against the background of excellent industry conditions. Under Phil’s leadership, with outstanding assistance by Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims, this segment of National Indemnity (including National Fire and Marine Insurance Company, which operates as a running mate) had one of its best years in a long history of performances which, in aggregate, far outshine those of the industry. Present successes reflect credit not only upon present managers, but equally upon the business talents of Jack Ringwalt, founder of National Indemnity, whose operating philosophy remains etched upon the company. 

保险核保业务

1978年伯克希尔盈余贡献的第一功臣当属由Phil Liesche所带领的国民保险公司,在所赚取的9,000万美元保费收入当中,有1,100万美元是已实现的核保利益,即便是产业情况不错的环境下仍属相当难得,在Phil的领导以及Roland Miller核保部门与Bill Lyons理赔部门的襄助之下,国民保险(包含国民火灾险公司)创下有史以来表现最佳的一年,其表现更远优于其它同业,如今的成功不仅反应出现任经营者的功劳,还要归功于国民保险创办人Jack Ringwalt的远见,其经营哲学目前仍深深烙印在公司之上。

     Home and Automobile Insurance Company had its best year since John Seward stepped in and straightened things out in 1975. Its results are combined in this report with those of Phil Liesche’s operation under the insurance category entitled
“Specialized Auto and General Liability”. 

去年是家庭汽车保险公司自1975年John Seward介入并改正公司营运以来表现最佳的一年,其成绩连同Phil的营运绩效一起被放在特殊汽车及一般责任险业务范围之内。 

     Worker’s Compensation was a mixed bag in 1978. In its first year as a subsidiary, Cypress Insurance Company, managed by Milt Thornton, turned in outstanding results. The worker’s compensation line can cause large underwriting losses when rapid inflation interacts with changing social concepts, but Milt has a cautious and highly professional staff to cope with these problems. His performance in 1978 has reinforced our very good feelings about this purchase.

1978年劳工退休保险是一个混合体,在它被列为Milt Thornton管理的Cypress保险公司子公司的第一年便交出漂亮的成绩单,劳工退休保险业务在通货膨胀加剧以及社会观念改变的情况下,有可能产生巨额的核保损失,但Milt拥有一组谨慎且极度专业的团队小心处理这些问题,1978年他的表现使我们对于买进这项业务开始有不错的感觉。 

     Frank DeNardo came with us in the spring of 1978 to straighten out National Indemnity’s California Worker’s Compensation business which, up to that point, had been a disaster. Frank has the experience and intellect needed to correct the major problems of the Los Angeles office. Our volume in this department now is running only about 25% of what it was eighteen months ago, and early indications are that Frank is making good progress.

Frank DeNardo是在1978年春天加入我们改正国民保险在加州劳工退休保险业务的行列,当时这项业务可以说是一场灾难,Frank具有导正加州办公室问题所需的经验与智能,目前这个部门的业务量只有一年半前的四分之一,初步的结果显示Frank已有相当好的开始。 

     George Young’s reinsurance department continues to produce very large sums for investment relative to premium volume, and thus gives us reasonably satisfactory overall results. However, underwriting results still are not what they should be and can be. It is very easy to fool yourself regarding underwriting results in reinsurance (particularly in casualty lines involving long delays in settlement), and we believe this situation prevails with many of our competitors. Unfortunately, self- delusion in company reserving almost always leads to inadequate industry rate levels. If major factors in the market don’t know their true costs, the competitive “fall-out” hits all - even those with adequate cost knowledge. George is quite willing to reduce volume significantly, if needed, to achieve satisfactory underwriting, and we have a great deal of confidence in the long term soundness of this business under his direction.

George Young的再保险部门创造的保费收入持续挹注投资所需的大量资金,并交出相当令人满意的成绩单,只是核保部门的绩效依旧不如预期理想,再保险的核保成绩很容易让人搞错(尤其是理赔时间通常拉得很长的意外险业务),而我们相信其它同业普遍也面临这样的问题,不幸的是,公司损失准备提列的自我迷惑通常导致不当的保险费率结构,如果市场上的主要份子对于自身的成本结构不甚了解,那么竞争爆炸的结果是伤到所有的参与者,也包含那些具有成本意识的从业者在内,如果有必要的话,为达到合理的核保绩效,George宁愿舍弃大部分的业务,而我们也有信心就长期而言,这项业务在他的领导之下会有不错的表现。 

     The homestate operation was disappointing in 1978. Our unsatisfactory underwriting, even though partially explained by an unusual incidence of Midwestern storms, is particularly worrisome against the backdrop of very favorable industry results in the conventional lines written by our homestate group. We have confidence in John Ringwalt’s ability to correct this situation. The bright spot in the group was the performance of  Kansas Fire and Casualty in its first full year of business. Under Floyd Taylor, this subsidiary got off to a truly remarkable start. Of course, it takes at least several years to evaluate underwriting results, but the early signs are encouraging and Floyd’s operation achieved the best loss ratio among the homestate companies in 1978.

Homestate 1978年的营运让人感到相当失望,虽然核保绩效差,部份的原因要归咎于中西部意外发生的风暴,但是一向表现优异的传统保单业务恶化的情况却特别令人感到忧心,我们对于John Ringwalt导正这种情况的能力有信心,堪萨斯火险第一个完整会计年度不错的表现让我们吃下一颗定心丸,在Floyd Taylor的领导下,这个分支单位有一个非常好的开始,当然至少要好几年才能评估其真正的核保绩效,但初步的结果令人感到相当振奋,而Floyd 1978年的损失比率也是Homestate所有单位中表现最佳的。 

     Although some segments were disappointing, overall our insurance operation had an excellent year. But of course we should expect a good year when the industry is flying high, as in 1978. It is a virtual certainty that in 1979 the combined ratio (see definition on page 31) for the industry will move up at least a few points, perhaps enough to throw the industry as a whole into an underwriting loss position. For example, in the auto lines - by far the most important area for the industry and for us - CPI figures indicate rates overall were only 3% higher in January 1979 than a year ago. But the items that make up loss costs - auto repair and medical care costs - were up over 9%. How different than yearend 1976 when rates had advanced over 22% in the preceding twelve months, but costs were up 8%.

虽然某些单位的绩效令人感到失望,但总的来说,我们保险事业还是渡过了丰收的一年,当然就像1978年一样,在整个产业预期相对乐观的情况下,我们还是期待来年的丰收,几乎可以肯定的是1979年整个产业的综合比率将会上扬几个百分点,甚至有可能使得整个产业平均面临核保损失的情况,比如以目前产险业中最重要的车险业务来说,1979年一月显示消费者物价指数仅比去年同期增加3个百分点,但是损失成本——包含修理及医疗费用的支出却上扬9个百分点,这与1976年物价指数上扬22百分点但相关成本仅增加8个百分点的情况,有很大的不同。 

     Margins will remain steady only if rates rise as fast as costs. This assuredly will not be the case in 1979, and conditions probably will worsen in 1980. Our present thinking is that our underwriting performance relative to the industry will improve somewhat in 1979, but every other insurance management probably views its relative prospects with similar optimism - someone is going to be disappointed. Even if we do improve relative to others, we may well have a higher combined ratio and lower underwriting profits in 1979 than we achieved last year.

只有当费率增加的幅度与成本上扬的速度一致时,才得以维持稳定的利润空间,但很显然1979年的情况并非如此,而1980年甚至有可能还会继续恶化,我们现在的想法是我们1979年的核保绩效应该会比同业好一点,但保险同业或许也抱持着跟我们相同的看法——一定有人会失望。而就算我们比其它同业表现要好一点,我们1979年的的综合比率还是有可能比上一年更高,而核保利益则更低。 

     We continue to look for ways to expand our insurance operation. But your reaction to this intent should not be unrestrained joy. Some of our expansion efforts - largely initiated by your Chairman have been lackluster, others have been expensive failures. We entered the business in 1967 through purchase of the segment which Phil Liesche now manages, and it still remains, by a large margin, the best portion of our insurance business. It is not easy to buy a good insurance business, but our experience has been that it is easier to buy one than create one. However, we will continue to try both approaches, since the rewards for success in this field can be exceptional.

另外一方面,我们还是不断寻求增加保险业务的机会,不过各位对于我们这样的企图千万不要一面倒地感到高兴,我们一些扩张的努力,大部分都是由我本人所发起的,事后证明都是半调子,有的还付出昂贵的代价,事实上,经由买进Phil Liesche的业务,我们在1967年进入保险事业,而到目前为止,这个部门还是我们所有保险事业中表现最好的,实在是很难买到一家好的保险公司,但要创立一家更难,然而我们还是会不断地用各种方法,因为一旦成功所获得的回报是相当惊人的。

〔译文来源于梁孝永康所编《巴菲特致合伙人+致股东的信全集》〕

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