巴菲特致股东的信（1979年）③盈余报告④纺织业及零售业

Sources of Earnings

We again present a table showing the sources of Berkshire’s earnings. As explained last year, Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps which, in turn, owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table shows both aggregate earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire’s share. All of the significant capital gains or losses attributable to any of the business entities are aggregated in the realized securities gain figure at the bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings.

盈余报告

下表系伯克希尔盈余的报告，去年我们曾向各位说明过，伯克希尔持有蓝筹印花60%的股权，后者又持有80%的Wesco金融公司，表中显示各个事业体的盈余合计数，以及伯克希尔依持股比例可分得的部份，各事业体的资本利得或损失则不包含在营业利益项下，而是加总列在已实现资本利得项下。

Blue Chip and Wesco are public companies with reporting requirements of their own. On pages 37-43 of this report, we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both companies, in which they describe 1979 operations. Some of the numbers they mention in their reports are not precisely identical to those in the above table because of accounting and tax complexities. (The Yanomamo Indians employ only three numbers: one, two, and more than two. Maybe their time will come.) However, the commentary in those reports should be helpful to you in understanding the underlying economic characteristics and future prospects of the important businesses that they manage.

蓝筹印花及Wesco都是公开发行公司，各自都必须对外公开报告，在年报的后段附有这两家公司主要经理人关于公司1979年现况的书面报告，他们运用的部份数字可能无法与我们所报告的丝毫不差，但这又是因为会计与税务一些细节规定所致，(Yanomamo印地安人只会用三个数字：一、二、大于二)，不过我认为他们的见解将有助于各位了解这些旗下重要事业的经营现况，以及未来发展的前景。

A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any shareholder of Berkshire upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Bette Deckard for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.

若有需要伯克希尔的股东可向Mr.Robert(地址：加州洛杉矶5801 South Eastern Avenue)索取蓝筹印花的年报或向Mrs.Bette(地址：加州Pasadena 315 East Colorado Boulevard)索取Wesco的年报。

Textiles and Retailing

The relative significance of these two areas has diminished somewhat over the years as our insurance business has grown dramatically in size and earnings. Ben Rosner, at Associated Retail Stores, continues to pull rabbits out of the hat - big rabbits from a small hat. Year after year, he produces very large earnings relative to capital employed - realized in cash and not in increased receivables and inventories as in many other retail businesses - in a segment of the market with little growth and unexciting demographics. Ben is now 76 and, like our other “up-and-comers”, Gene Abegg, 82, at Illinois National and Louis Vincenti, 74, at Wesco, regularly achieves more each year.

纺织业及零售业

随着保险事业规模与盈余快速的成长，纺织业与零售业占整体事业的重要性日益下滑，然而尽管如此，联合零售商店的Ben Rosner还是不断地化腐朽为神奇，即使产业面临停滞不前的窘境，却能利用有限的资本创造出可观的盈余，且大多是现金而非尽是增加一些应收款或存货。Ben现年76岁，就像是其它后进者，伊利诺国家银行82岁的Gene Abegg、Wesco74岁的Louis Vincenti一样，其功力日益深厚。

Our textile business also continues to produce some cash, but at a low rate compared to capital employed. This is not a reflection on the managers, but rather on the industry in which they operate. In some businesses - a network TV station, for example - it is virtually impossible to avoid earning extraordinary returns on tangible capital employed in the business. And assets in such businesses sell at equally extraordinary prices, one thousand cents or more on the dollar, a valuation reflecting the splendid, almost unavoidable, economic results obtainable. Despite a fancy price tag, the “easy” business may be the better route to go.

虽然我们的纺织事业仍持续不断地有现金流入，但与过去所投入的资金实在是不成正比，这并非经理人的过错，主要是产业的环境使然，在某些产业，比如说地方电视台，只要少数的有形资产就能赚取大量的盈余，而这行的资产售价也奇高，帐面一块钱的东西可以喊价到十块钱，这反应出其惊人获利能力的身价，虽然价格有点吓人，但那样的产业路子可能反而比较好走。

We can speak from experience, having tried the other route. Your Chairman made the decision a few years ago to purchase Waumbec Mills in Manchester, New Hampshire, thereby expanding our textile commitment. By any statistical test, the purchase price was an extraordinary bargain; we bought well below the working capital of the business and, in effect, got very substantial amounts of machinery and real estate for less than nothing. But the purchase was a mistake. While we labored mightily, new problems arose as fast as old problems were tamed.

当然我们也不是没有试过其它方法，在纺织业就曾经过数度挣扎，各位的董事长也就是本人，在数年前曾买下位于Manchester的Waumbec纺织厂，以扩大我们在纺织业的投资，虽然买进的价格相当划算，也取得一些价美物廉的机器设备与不动产，几乎可以说是半买半送的，但即使我们再怎么努力，整个决策事后证明依然是个错误。因为就算我们再努力，旧的问题好不容易才解决，新的状况又冒出来。

Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that “turnarounds” seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price. Although a mistake, the Waumbec acquisition has not been a disaster. Certain portions of the operation are proving to be valuable additions to our decorator line (our strongest franchise) at New Bedford, and it’s possible that we may be able to run profitably on a considerably reduced scale at Manchester. However, our original rationale did not prove out.

最后在经过多次惨痛的教训之后，我们得到的结论是，所谓有“转机”的公司，最后显少有成功的案例，所以与其把时间与精力花在购买廉价的烂公司上，还不如以合理的价格投资一些体质好的企业。Waumbec虽然是个错误，但所幸并未酿成灾难，部份的产业仍对位于NewBedford的室内装饰品生产线(这是我们最强的业务)有所助益，而我们也相信Manchester在大幅缩减营运规模之后，仍将有获利的空间，只是我们原先的理论被证明不可行。