巴菲特致股东的信（1992年）
⑥保险业务营运

Insurance Operations

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:

保险业务营运

以下是我们通常表格的更新版本，列出财产保险行业的主要数字:

     The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 106 - 110 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

保险业务综合比率代表的是保险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100 以下代表会有承保利润，100 以上代表会有承保损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金(扣除股东权益部分所产生的收益)所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在 106-110 之间。

     About four points in the industry's 1992 combined ratio can be attributed to Hurricane Andrew, which caused the largest insured loss in history. Andrew destroyed a few small insurers. Beyond that, it awakened some larger companies to the fact that their reinsurance protection against catastrophes was far from adequate. (It's only when the tide goes out that you learn who's been swimming naked.) One major insurer escaped insolvency solely because it had a wealthy parent that could promptly supply a massive transfusion of capital.

1992 年的综合比率由于 Andrew 飓风的发生而增加了 4%，Andrew 飓风是史上最大的单一损失理赔事件，几家小型保险公司因此倒闭，此外，许多大型保险公司也意识到自己并未寻求到足够的再保险保护(只有当潮水退了，大家才知道谁在裸泳)，还有一家大型的保险公司免于破产，因为他背后有钱的母公司迅速注入了资金。

     Bad as it was, however, Andrew could easily have been far more damaging if it had hit Florida 20 or 30 miles north of where it actually did and had hit Louisiana further east than was the case. All in all, many companies will rethink their reinsurance programs in light of the Andrew experience.  

尽管情况非常糟糕，还好 Andrew 没有往北 20-30 英哩侵袭到佛罗里达，或是往东侵袭到路易斯安那州，否则损失可能难以估计，总而言之，很多公司因为 Andrew 事件可能会重新考虑现有的再保险安排是否妥当。

     As you know we are a large writer - perhaps the largest in the world - of "super-cat" coverages, which are the policies that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses. Consequently, we too took our lumps from Andrew, suffering losses from it of about $125 million, an amount roughly equal to our 1992 super-cat premium income. Our other super-cat losses, though, were negligible. This line of business therefore produced an overall loss of only $2 million for the year. (In addition, our investee, GEICO, suffered a net loss from Andrew, after reinsurance recoveries and tax savings, of about $50 million, of which our share is roughly $25 million. This loss did not affect our operating earnings, but did reduce our look-through earnings.)

大家知道伯克希尔一直都是巨灾再保险保单(超级猫)相当大的承保公司，或许规模已是全世界最大的，这类保单通常是由其它保险公司买来分散他们本身在重大意外事故所需承担的风险，也因此我们必须承受一大块Andrew 所造成的损失，金额约为 1.25 亿美元，这数字相当于我们一整年的保费收入，幸运的是，其它巨灾险保单实际发生的损失都相当轻微，所以结算下来全年的总损失只有 200 万美元，另外，我们投资的 GEICO 保险也因Andrew 飓风产生了一些损失，在扣除再保分摊与税负抵减之后，金额约为 5,000 万美元，依我们的持股比例大概要分摊 2,500 万美元，虽然这项损失不会反应在我们的帐上，但确实已对我们的透视收益造成负面影响。

     In last year's report I told you that I hoped that our super-cat business would over time achieve a 10% profit margin. But I also warned you that in any given year the line was likely to be "either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable." Instead, both 1991 and 1992 have come in close to a break-even level. Nonetheless, I see these results as aberrations and stick with my prediction of huge annual swings in profitability from this business.

在去年的年报中，我曾告诉各位，我们希望能从巨灾再保险业务中获得 10%的利润空间，但我还是要提醒各位在某些特定的年度中，有可能一下子大赚或是一下子大亏，然而 1991 年与 1992 年都是维持在损益两平的边缘，不过我还是认为这样的结果属于异常，同时我还是坚持在这行盈利可能大好大坏的预测。

     Let me remind you of some characteristics of our super-cat policies. Generally, they are activated only when two things happen. First, the direct insurer or reinsurer we protect must suffer losses of a given amount - that's the policyholder's "retention" - from a catastrophe; and second, industry-wide insured losses from the catastrophe must exceed some minimum level, which usually is $3 billion or more. In most cases, the policies we issue cover only a specific geographical area, such as a portion of the U.S., the entire U.S., or everywhere other than the U.S. Also, many policies are not activated by the first super-cat that meets the policy terms, but instead cover only a "second-event" or even a third- or fourth-event. Finally, some policies are triggered only by a catastrophe of a specific type, such as an earthquake. Our exposures are large: We have one policy that calls for us to pay $100 million to the policyholder if a specified catastrophe occurs. (Now you know why I suffer eyestrain: from watching The Weather Channel.)

我还是苦口婆心再提醒各位一下，巨灾险保单的特点，通常只有在两种情况发生时，理赔才会生效，首先，受我们保护的保险或再保公司的损失必须超过一定金额，也就是投保户的自留保额部分；第二，整个保险业界的损失也必须超过一定的上限，比如说 30 亿美元以上或甚至更多。第三，在大部分的状况之下，我们发行的保单只包含特定地区，像是美国一部分州、或是全美国或是除了美国的以外地区。第四，有许多保单也不是在第一次大型灾害发生后就须理赔，有的只保第二次或第三次甚至是第四次大灾害。最后，有些保单只保特定种类的灾害，比如地震，我们暴露的风险相当的大，我们有一张保单若是发生保单上指定的特定灾害发生的话，就必须给予保户 1 亿美元的理赔，(现在你应该知道我常常盯着气象频道盯到眼睛酸的原因了吧)。

     Currently, Berkshire is second in the U.S. property-casualty industry in net worth (the leader being State Farm, which neither buys nor sells reinsurance). Therefore, we have the capacity to assume risk on a scale that interests virtually no other company. We have the appetite as well: As Berkshire's net worth and earnings grow, our willingness to write business increases also. But let me add that means good business. The saying, "a fool and his money are soon invited everywhere," applies in spades in reinsurance, and we actually reject more than 98% of the business we are offered. Our ability to choose between good and bad proposals reflects a management strength that matches our financial strength: Ajit Jain, who runs our reinsurance operation, is simply the best in this business. In combination, these strengths guarantee that we will stay a major factor in the super-cat business so long as prices are appropriate.

目前，伯克希尔是全美国账面价值第二大的财产意外险公司，排名第一的是州立农业保险(State Farm)，不过他们并不从事再保业务。因此，我们绝对有能力也有兴趣去承担别的保险公司无法承担的风险，随着伯克希尔的账面价值与盈利能力继续成长，我们承保的意愿也跟着增加，但是我必须强调，只有好的生意我们才愿意接，有人说：傻子的钱特别好骗。我想这句话也适用在再保险之上，事实上，我们拒绝了 98%以上的业务，我们在好业务和坏业务之间挑选客户的能力，反映了与我们自身的财务实力相匹配的管理能力。阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)负责经营我们的再保业务，堪称业界的翘楚。综上所述，只要保费价格合理，这些优势可以确保我们在巨灾再保险业继续成为主要的参与者。

     What constitutes an appropriate price, of course, is difficult to determine. Catastrophe insurers can't simply extrapolate past experience. If there is truly "global warming," for example, the odds would shift, since tiny changes in atmospheric conditions can produce momentous changes in weather patterns. Furthermore, in recent years there has been a mushrooming of population and insured values in U.S. coastal areas that are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes, the number one creator of super-cats. A hurricane that caused x dollars of damage 20 years ago could easily cost 10x now.

当然，何谓合理的价格实在是很难去界定，灾害保险业者实在是很难依据过去的经验来预估未来。例如，若是全球温室效应确实存在的话，意外变量一定会增多，因为大气状况任何些微的转变就有可能造成气象形态的巨幅波动。此外，最近几年美国海岸地区人口爆炸性成长，这些地区又特别容易受到飓风的侵袭，而飓风正是巨灾再保险业务最大的肇事者，现在人口密集地区的一次飓风所造成的损失可能是 20 年前的十倍以上。

     Occasionally, also, the unthinkable happens. Who would have guessed, for example, that a major earthquake could occur in Charleston, S.C.? (It struck in 1886, registered an estimated 6.6 on the Richter scale, and caused 60 deaths.) And who could have imagined that our country's most serious quake would occur at New Madrid, Missouri, which suffered an estimated 8.7 shocker in 1812. By comparison, the 1989 San Francisco quake was a 7.1 - and remember that each one-point Richter increase represents a ten-fold increase in strength. Someday, a U.S. earthquake occurring far from California will cause enormous losses for insurers.

而且有时还会有意想不到的事情发生，比如说谁会想到南卡罗莱纳州的查尔斯顿地区竟然会发生大地震(1886年发生，里氏规模 6.6 级，造成 60 个人死亡)，又有谁知道美国史上最严重的地震是 1812 年发生在密苏里州新马德里，规模估计 8.7 级，相比之下，1989 年发生在旧金山的大地震，规模只有 7.1 级，大家要知道每增加 0.1 级代表其释放的力量就要增加 10 倍。哪天要是加州发生大地震的话，将会对所有保险业者造成难以估计的损失。

     When viewing our quarterly figures, you should understand that our accounting for super-cat premiums differs from our accounting for other insurance premiums. Rather than recording our super-cat premiums on a pro-rata basis over the life of a given policy, we defer recognition of revenue until a loss occurs or until the policy expires. We take this conservative approach because the likelihood of super-cats causing us losses is particularly great toward the end of the year. It is then that weather tends to kick up: Of the ten largest insured losses in U.S. history, nine occurred in the last half of the year. In addition, policies that are not triggered by a first event are unlikely, by their very terms, to cause us losses until late in the year.

当各位在检视我们季度财务报表时，大家一定要知道我们巨灾再保险的会计原则与一般保险有些许的不同，我们没有将巨灾险的保费收入，按保单承保期间平均分摊认列，我们必须等到整个承保期间结束，或是损失发生后才全部一次认列，我们之所以采取这样保守的做法，原因在于巨灾险保单在年底特别容易发生险情，尤其是天气状况往往变坏：在历史上前十大保险损失中，有九件是发生在下半年。此外，由于许多保单在第一次重大灾害发生时，并不理赔，所以若真的发生损失的话，通常会是在下半年。

     The bottom-line effect of our accounting procedure for super-cats is this: Large losses may be reported in any quarter of the year, but significant profits will only be reported in the fourth quarter.

对于巨灾再保险我们的会计原则底限就是，巨额的损失可能会发生在任何一季，但巨额的盈利只有在每年的第四季才有可能出现。

                    * * * * * * * * * * * *

     As I've told you in each of the last few years, what counts in our insurance business is "the cost of funds developed from insurance," or in the vernacular, "the cost of float." Float - which we generate in exceptional amounts - is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. The cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss.

                    * * * * * * * * * * * *

就像是过去几年我不断向各位提到的，我们保险业务真正重要的是，从保险业所取得的资金成本到底是多少，套句专业术语，就是浮存金成本，浮存金是指我们从保险业所取得大量的资金，它是将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付并购成本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本则是以我们所发生的承保损失来衡量。

     The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967.

下表是我们在 1967 年进入保险业后，浮存金的成本统计：

     Last year, our insurance operation again generated funds at a cost below that incurred by the U.S. Government on its newly-issued long-term bonds. This means that in 21 years out of the 26 years we have been in the insurance business we have beaten the Government's rate, and often we have done so by a wide margin. (If, on average, we didn't beat the Government's rate, there would be no economic reason for us to be in the business.)

去年我们保险营运所产生的资金成本还是一样低于美国政府当年所新发行的公债利率，在过去 26 年的保险业务经营中，我们有 21 年是远胜于政府公债发行利率，而且是以巨大优势做到的。如果我们的平均资金成本高于政府公债的利率的话，我们实在就没有理由继续从事保险业了。

     In 1992, as in previous years, National Indemnity's commercial auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster, and our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred, made excellent contributions to our low cost of float. Indeed, both of these operations recorded an underwriting profit last year, thereby generating float at a less-than-zero cost. The bulk of our float, meanwhile, comes from large transactions developed by Ajit. His efforts are likely to produce a further growth in float during 1993.

1992 年，如同以往年度，由 Don Wurster 领导的国民保险公司所经营的商用汽车与一般责任保险业务，以及 Rod Eldred 领导的住宅保险业务(Home-State)，对于我们取得低廉的资金做出相当大的贡献，事实上，在去年这两家公司都有承保利润，也就是说所产生的保险浮存金的资金成本都是低于零。不过，我们大部分的浮存金是来自于阿吉特所开发出来的巨灾再保险，展望 1993 年，他所贡献的保费收入还会增加。

     Charlie and I continue to like the insurance business, which we expect to be our main source of earnings for decades to come. The industry is huge; in certain sectors we can compete world-wide; and Berkshire possesses an important competitive advantage. We will look for ways to expand our participation in the business, either indirectly as we have done through GEICO or directly as we did by acquiring Central States Indemnity.

查理跟我相当喜爱保险业，这也是我们预期未来十年主要的利润来源。这个产业规模够大，在某些领域我们可以与全世界业者竞争，同时伯克希尔在财务实力方面也拥有特殊的竞争力。我们将继续寻求在保险业进行扩张的机会，不管是间接的，就像通过 GEICO 保险那样，还是直接的，就像取得中央州保险公司那样。

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〔译文源于芒格书院整理的巴菲特致股东的信〕

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