巴菲特致股东的信（1994年）③内在价值与资本配置

Intrinsic Value and Capital Allocation

Understanding intrinsic value is as important for managers as it is for investors. When managers are making capital allocation decisions - including decisions to repurchase shares - it's vital that they act in ways that increase per-share intrinsic value and avoid moves that decrease it. This principle may seem obvious but we constantly see it violated. And, when misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt.

内在价值与资本配置

理解内在价值，对管理者和投资者一样重要，当经理人做出资金配置决策时，也包含决定回购股份，至关重要的是这些决策必须能够增加公司的内在价值，并尽量避免损害内在价值，这原则看来理所当然，但是违反的情况却屡见不鲜，当错误的资本配置发生，股东的权益立即就会受到伤害。

For example, in contemplating business mergers and acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings per share (or, at financial institutions, to per-share book value). An emphasis of this sort carries great dangers. Going back to our college-education example, imagine that a 25-year-old first-year MBA student is considering merging his future economic interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA student, a non-earner, would find that a "share-for-share" merger of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer would enhance his near-term earnings (in a big way!). But what could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind?

举例来说，在思考企业合并活动时，许多经理人都会专注于每股收益是会被稀释还是反稀释(在金融机构则按每股帐面价值)，过分强调这点是相当危险的。回到我们先前所举大学教育的例子，假设一位 25 岁 MBA 一年级的学生，考虑将他个人未来的经济利益与另一位 25 岁的工人合并，你会发现，一个无收入的 MBA 学生与工人以股换股合并的话，会立刻提高近几年的收入，但是对 MBA 学生来说，还有什么交易比这更愚蠢的呢？

In corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the would-be purchaser to focus on current earnings when the prospective acquiree has either different prospects, different amounts of non-operating assets, or a different capital structure. At Berkshire, we have rejected many merger and purchase opportunities that would have boosted current and near-term earnings but that would have reduced per-share intrinsic value. Our approach, rather, has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice: "Go to where the puck is going to be, not to where it is." As a result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer than they would have been if we had used the standard catechism.

在公司交易中，对于潜在买主来说，只关注当前收益，却不管潜在的卖方拥有不同的业务前景、不一样的非经营性资产或不同的资本结构，是一件很愚蠢的事。在伯克希尔我们拒绝了许多本可以让当前收益美观但有损每股内在价值的投资机会。相反，我们的方式乃效法 Wayne Gretzky 的建议：要紧盯冰球要到达的地方而不是它现在的位置。因此，比起运用一般的投资标准，我们的股东现在多赚了好几十亿美元。

The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the shareholders of the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the acquirer's management; and they are a honey pot for the investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But, alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders, often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that enough, says John Medlin, the retired head of Wachovia Corp., and "you are running a chain letter in reverse."

很遗憾的是，大部分的并购交易案都充满了不公平性，对于被并购方来说，算是得到解脱，并购一方的管理层名利双收，双方的投资银行家与专业顾问也都能跟着大捞一笔，只不过真正受害的却是并购方背后全体的股东，他们损失惨重，原因在于并购公司放弃的内在价值通常多于获得的内在价值，就像是 Wachovia 美联银行已退休的领导人 JohnMedlin 说：这种事做太多，就好象是在反向运行连锁信一样。

Over time, the skill with which a company's managers allocate capital has an enormous impact on the enterprise's value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates far more money (at least after its early years) than it can use internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you need a $50,000 rug.

就长期而言，公司经理资本配置的能力将会对企业的价值产生很大的影响，我们认为，一家好公司所能贡献出的现金，比其本身内部所需投入的，要多的多，至少是在早期成长期以后。当然，公司可以通过分配股利或回购股份的方式将资本分配给股东。但是，通常企业的 CEO 会要求公司战略规划部门、顾问或是投资银行家，做出一两次并购的必要性报告。这样的做法就好象是问你的室内设计师，你是否需要一张价值五万美元的地毯。

The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological bias: Many CEO's attain their positions in part because they possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive is heavily endowed with these qualities - which, it should be acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages - they won't disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex life. It's not a push he needs.

并购问题又因为隐藏在背后的生物原始本能而变得更复杂，许多 CEO 之所以能够做到这个位置，部分的原因在于他们先天拥有相当丰富的动物精神与自我价值感。当然我们必须承认，一位主管赋予这样的特质有时也有其优势，然而这种本能在他们爬上顶峰之后并不会消失，而这样的 CEO 被其顾问们鼓励去进行并购交易时，他的反应就像一位十几岁的孩子被父亲鼓励去过正常的性生活一样，这样的做法简直是拔苗助长。

Some years back, a CEO friend of mine - in jest, it must be said - unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals. This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply said: "Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one."

几年前，我的一位 CEO 朋友半开玩笑的在无意间透露出许多大交易的病态过程。他管理着一家财产意外险公司，当时在董事会上，他向所有的成员解释为何公司必须要收购一家人寿保险公司，在对此次收购的经济和战略上的理由喋喋不休之后，他突然停止了演说，带着顽皮的表情说道：好吧！伙计们，谁叫其它人也都有一家。

At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses. As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy their earnings advantageously in their businesses. What's left, they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those funds in ways that build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we believe we understand, that have good, sustainable underlying economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, admire and trust.

在伯克希尔，我们的经理人不断地通过看似平凡普通的事业，赚取惊人的回报，这些经理人的首先从自身业务中寻找可以充分利用其收益的最佳方法，之后再把剩余的资金交回给查理跟我，然后我们会试着为这些资金寻找更好的出路以创造出更多的内在价值。我们的目标是收购我们熟悉了解、有持续竞争力且由我们喜爱、敬佩和信任的经理人所管理的公司的一部分或全部所有权。