巴菲特致股东的信（1994年）④薪酬待遇

Compensation

At Berkshire, we try to be as logical about compensation as about capital allocation. For example, we compensate Ralph Schey based upon the results of Scott Fetzer rather than those of Berkshire. What could make more sense, since he's responsible for one operation but not the other? A cash bonus or a stock option tied to the fortunes of Berkshire would provide totally capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, for example, be hitting home runs at Scott Fetzer while Charlie and I rang up mistakes at Berkshire, thereby negating his efforts many times over. Conversely, why should option profits or bonuses be heaped upon Ralph if good things are occurring in other parts of Berkshire but Scott Fetzer is lagging?

薪酬待遇

在伯克希尔，有关经理人薪酬待遇这方面，我们试着采取与处理资金分配时一样合理的做法，举例来说，我们付给 Ralph 的薪酬是基于 ScottFetzer 的业绩，而非伯克希尔，这样的方式再合理不过了，因为他负责的是单一部门而非整个伯克希尔的营运。若是将他的薪酬跟伯克希尔挂钩，对 Ralph 来说将不公平，比如他在ScottFetzer 击出全垒打但查理跟我却在伯克希尔把事情给搞砸了，这相当于否定了他的功劳；而如果伯克希尔其他部门大放异彩的同时，ScottFetzer 却表现平平，那么 Ralph 分享伯克希尔的盈利与奖金也不合理。

In setting compensation, we like to hold out the promise of large carrots, but make sure their delivery is tied directly to results in the area that a manager controls. When capital invested in an operation is significant, we also both charge managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release.

在设定薪酬待遇的标准时，我们希望兑现高薪的承诺，但要确保各个经理人的薪酬与其管理业绩直接挂钩。当经理要对某项业务投入大笔资金时，我们会向经理使用的增量资本收取很高的费率(14-17%)，并以同样的高的费率对待返回的资本。

The product of this money's-not-free approach is definitely visible at Scott Fetzer. If Ralph can employ incremental funds at good returns, it pays him to do so: His bonus increases when earnings on additional capital exceed a meaningful hurdle charge. But our bonus calculation is symmetrical: If incremental investment yields sub-standard returns, the shortfall is costly to Ralph as well as to Berkshire. The consequence of this two-way arrangement is that it pays Ralph - and pays him well - to send to Omaha any cash he can't advantageously use in his business.

这种资金有价的游戏规则，在 ScottFetzer 决策上再清楚也不过了。如果 Ralph 可以运用增量资金创造出高额的回报，那么他这么做是值得的：当增量资本的回报超过我们设定的标准时，他所获得的奖金也会跟着水涨船高。但我们奖金的计算是对应的：当增量资金的回报低于我们设定的标准时，对 Ralph 个人和伯克希尔来说，这种差额的代价高昂。这种双向安排的结果是，当 Ralph 在业务中不能有效的使用资金时，直接送回奥马哈同样奖金丰厚。

It has become fashionable at public companies to describe almost every compensation plan as aligning the interests of management with those of shareholders. In our book, alignment means being a partner in both directions, not just on the upside. Many "alignment" plans flunk this basic test, being artful forms of "heads I win, tails you lose."

上市公司流行强调每一项薪酬计划中管理层的利益与股东是相一致的，在我们看来，「相一致」意味着在两个方向上都是对等的，而不仅仅是公司营运顺利时才如此。许多公司所谓“一致”的薪酬计划根本不符合我们的标准，实质上是一种“赚钱是我的功劳，赔钱由你们承担”的游戏。

A common form of misalignment occurs in the typical stock option arrangement, which does not periodically increase the option price to compensate for the fact that retained earnings are building up the wealth of the company. Indeed, the combination of a ten-year option, a low dividend payout, and compound interest can provide lush gains to a manager who has done no more than tread water in his job. A cynic might even note that when payments to owners are held down, the profit to the option-holding manager increases. I have yet to see this vital point spelled out in a proxy statement asking shareholders to approve an option plan.

这种错位的情况最常见的莫过于员工期权计划了，因为认股权的认购价格并没有定期调整，以补偿留存收益正在增加公司财富的事实。假设一家公司给予员工十年的认股权，又假如该公司股利发放的比例很低，由于留存资金的复利作用，经理人可能混混日子便能得到丰厚的回报。计较一点的人甚至会发现，每年支付给股东的收益越来越少，期权计划中的经理人得到的利益便会越来越多。到目前为止，在任何公司要求股东批准期权计划的委托书中，我还没有看到阐明这一点。

I can't resist mentioning that our compensation arrangement with Ralph Schey was worked out in about five minutes, immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the "help" of lawyers or compensation consultants. This arrangement embodies a few very simple ideas - not the kind of terms favored by consultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they have established that you have a large problem (and one, of course, that requires an annual review). Our agreement with Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him and to me in 1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements with the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though the terms of each agreement vary to fit the economic characteristics of the business at issue, the existence in some cases of partial ownership of the unit by managers, etc.

我忍不住要提到我们与 Scott Fetzer 总裁 Ralph Schey 所做的薪资协议，在我们正式买下公司之后，只花了五分钟就达成这项协议，这中间没有律师或薪酬顾问的“协助”。协议仅仅包含了几个简单的条款，跟薪酬顾问为了高额账单而提出的复杂条款完全不同，当然每年还须定期检视以决定是否有修正的必要。反观我们与 Ralph的协议到目前为止从未更动过，当初在 1986 年我们双方认为公平合理的，至今仍然是如此，同样的我们与旗下事业其它经理人的协议也都相当简单，尽管每个协议的条款都有所不同，以适应相关业务的经济特点，以及在某些情况下经理人持有该业务部分所有权等等。

In all instances, we pursue rationality. Arrangements that pay off in capricious ways, unrelated to a manager's personal accomplishments, may well be welcomed by certain managers. Who, after all, refuses a free lottery ticket? But such arrangements are wasteful to the company and cause the manager to lose focus on what should be his real areas of concern. Additionally, irrational behavior at the parent may well encourage imitative behavior at subsidiaries.

在所有的个案中，我们强调的是公平合理，当然经理人对于高的不合理，或是名不符实的回报通常都来者不拒，必竟没有人会拒绝免费的彩票。但是这类的安排，对于公司的资源来说是一种浪费，同时也会导致经理人忘记他真正的职责所在。此外，母公司非理性行为也会间接鼓励旗下子公司起而效尤。

At Berkshire, only Charlie and I have the managerial responsibility for the entire business. Therefore, we are the only parties who should logically be compensated on the basis of what the enterprise does as a whole. Even so, that is not a compensation arrangement we desire. We have carefully designed both the company and our jobs so that we do things we enjoy with people we like. Equally important, we are forced to do very few boring or unpleasant tasks. We are the beneficiaries as well of the abundant array of material and psychic perks that flow to the heads of corporations. Under such idyllic conditions, we don't expect shareholders to ante up loads of compensation for which we have no possible need.

在伯克希尔，只有查理跟我对整个公司负有管理责任。因此我们两人是唯一应该以公司整体的表现作为薪资回报的依据，即便如此，这也不是我们真正想要的补偿方式。我们精心的塑造了我们的公司和工作模式，好让我们可以与我们欣赏的人一起做我们喜欢的事。同样重要的是，我们可以不用被迫去做一些无聊或是不想做的工作。当这些物质与精神的回报流向企业总部时，我们是最大的受惠者，在这种田园诗歌般的工作环境下，我们不期望股东们再额外给予一些我们根本不需要的回报。

Indeed, if we were not paid at all, Charlie and I would be delighted with the cushy jobs we hold. At bottom, we subscribe to Ronald Reagan's creed: "It's probably true that hard work never killed anyone, but I figure why take the chance."

事实上，就算不领薪水，理和我都会为我们所拥有的轻松工作感到高兴。最起码，我们赞同 Ronald Reagan里根总统的信条：辛勤的工作不太可能要一个人的命，但我在想为何要冒这个险呢。